34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(2). Appellant's petition was procedurally
barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See
NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the
State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the
rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).
First, we note that appellant's claim challenging the dates of
his parole hearings is not a cognizable claim that may be raised in a post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See NRS 34.724(1)
(limiting post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus to challenges
to the judgment of conviction or to the computation of time served).
Second, appellant failed to allege any specific good cause to
overcome the procedural bars. To the extent that appellant may have
alleged that he was actually innocent, appellant failed demonstrate that
"it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in light of. . . new evidence." Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,
559 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also
Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001); Mazzan v.
Warden, 112 Nev. 838, 842, 921 P.2d 920, 922 (1996). To the extent that
appellant cited to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012),
appellant failed to support that cite with any cogent argument or facts as
to why that case provided good cause. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498,
502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). We therefore conclude that the district
...continued
27, 2014). Appellant did not appeal the denial of his first, second, or sixth
petitions.
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court did not err in denying appellant's petition as procedurally barred,
and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3
Pickering
1:20"Sairra'r
Parraguirre
J.
J.
Saitta
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Farrin Hawkins
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
3We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in
proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude
that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent
that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those
submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings
below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance.
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