FILED
102T 11c. APPEALS
OF
01 \ 11 4
20111,
KA R 25 AN S: 53
ST
7" 1'
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASIIIN(
E
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent, No. 44051 -2 -II
V.
TIMOTHY ANDREW HOCKLEY, JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MAXA, J. — Timothy Hockley, appeals his conviction of attempting to elude a pursuing
police vehicle. He argues that ( 1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction and ( 2)
the case should be remanded so the trial court can enter a written order regarding the oral
dismissal of count two, driving with a suspended or revoked license. There is sufficient evidence
that Hockley willfully failed to immediately stop his vehicle after being given visual and audible
signals to do so and continued to drive in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing
police vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm Hockley' s conviction. We deny Hockley' s request for
remand or a written order dismissing count II because he did not raise the issue below.
FACTS
On December 24, 2011, while driving with his girlfriend Charlene Massey, Hockley
tailgated and then passed another vehicle. Hockley entered the oncoming lane of traffic and
nearly collided with Pierce County Deputy Sheriff Matthew Smith' s vehicle. Smith then turned
No. 44051 -2 -II
his sheriff' s vehicle around and began following Hockley. As Smith approached Hockley' s
vehicle he activated his overhead lights. Hockley continued driving. Smith then activated his
siren, but Hockley still continued to drive. Smith continued to follow the vehicle with both his
lights and siren activated.
During the pursuit, Hockley proceeded through a stop sign without stopping and made a
left hand turn at 35 miles per hour, causing sparks to come from the vehicle' s front left tire.
Hockley also accelerated to approximately 60 miles per hour and entered the oncoming traffic
lane in order to pass another vehicle. Finally, after driving approximately one to two miles and
making a number of turns, Hockley stopped in the driveway of Massey' s mother' s house.
Hockley exited the car and agreed to speak with Smith. Hockley told Smith that he saw
the emergency lights but was looking for a safe place to park. Smith informed Hockley there
were a number of safe places to pull over during the pursuit. Hockley then stated that he messed
up and thought if he got the car to Massey' s mother' s house, law enforcement could not tow it
away. When Smith again asked Hockley why he did not stop, Hockley stated he thought there
might be a warrant out for his arrest.
The State charged Hockley with felony attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle
count I) and
driving with a suspended or revoked license ( count II). The State also filed a
special allegation of endangerment. Prior to trial, the court orally dismissed count II upon an
oral motion by the State and without objection from either party.
A jury found Hockley guilty of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle and
answered yes on the special verdict form alleging endangerment. The court left blank the line on
the judgment and sentence providing for dismissed charges. Hockley appeals.
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No. 44051 -2 -II
ANALYSIS
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Hockley argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his attempting to elude a
pursuing police vehicle conviction. Specifically, Hockley argues the State did not prove he drove
his vehicle in a reckless manner or that he was attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. We
disagree.
Evidence is legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Montgomery, 1.63 Wn.2d 577, 586, 183 P. 3d
267 ( 2008). We interpret all reasonable inferences in the State' s favor. State v. Hosier, 157
Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P. 3d 936 ( 2006). Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight.
State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 201, 86 P. 3d 139 ( 2004). "[ C] redibility determinations are for
the trier of fact and are not subject to review." State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819, 831, 132 P. 3d
725 ( 2006).
Under RCW 46. 61. 024( 1);
a] ny driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring
his or her vehicle to a stop and who drives his or her vehicle in a reckless manner
while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of this offense.
First, Hockley argues that there was insufficient evidence to show he drove his vehicle in
a reckless manner. Because there was evidence that Hockley sped through a residential area
while running stop signs, drove in the oncoming lane of traffic, and took a turn at high speed, we
disagree.
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No. 44051 -2 -II
To establish that an individual drove in a reckless manner, it must be shown that the
person was " ` driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.' " State v.
Hunley, 161 Wn. App. 919, 926, 253 P. 3d 448 ( 2011) ( internal quotation marks omitted)
quoting State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 621 -22, 106 P. 3d 196 ( 2005)), aff'd, 175 Wn.2d
901, 287 P. 3d 584 ( 2012). Driving in a " ` reckless manner' does not mean [ driving with] a
willful or wanton disregard for the lives or property of others.' " State v. Naillieux, 158 Wn.
App. 630, 644, 241 P. 3d 1280 ( 2010) ( internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting State v. Ratliff,
140 Wn. App. 12, 15, 164 P. 3d 516 ( 2007)).
The State offered testimony at trial that Hockley drove through a residential
neighborhood at speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour while a police vehicle, with lights and
siren activated, followed him. While being followed, Hockley passed another vehicle by
entering the opposing lane of traffic at 60 miles per hour. Hockley failed to stop at two stop
signs. Hockley conducted a left hand.turn at approximately 35 miles per hour causing sparks to
emit from the vehicle' s tire. This is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that
Hockley drove the vehicle- in a '- rash or heedless manner, indiff6refitto the consequences.' "
Hunley, 161 Wn. App. at 926 ( internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting Roggenkamp, 153
Wn.2d at 621 -22).
Second, Hockley argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that he attempted to
elude a pursuing police vehicle. Because there was sufficient evidence that Hockley attempted to
avoid being stopped by Smith, we disagree.
Intent is not a component in establishing the element of " ` attempting to elude a police
vehicle.' " State v. Gallegos, 73 Wn. App. 644, 650, 871 P. 2d 621 ( 1994) ( quoting RCW
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No. 44051 -2 -II
46. 61. 021( a)). Based on the construction of the statute, attempt is given its ordinary meaning of
to try.' " Gallegos, 73 Wn. App. at 650. "' To elude' means ` to avoid slyly or adroitly (as by
artifice, stratagem, or dexterity) : evade.' " Gallegos, 73 Wn. App. at 650 n. 1 ( quoting
WEBSTER' S THIRD NEW INT' L DICTIONARY 738 ( 1969)).
There was sufficient evidence that Hockley tried to avoid Smith. He sped away from
Smith and made several quick turns after Smith turned on his lights and siren. After finally
stopping the vehicle and being placed under arrest, Hockley told Smith that that he saw Smith
behind him but did not stop because he was worried about his car being towed and he believed
there was a warrant for his arrest. Given Hockley' s actions and these statements, there was
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to infer that Hockley tried to elude the police vehicle.
B. ABSENCE OF WRITTEN DISMISSAL
Hockley also challenges the sentencing court' s failure to include count II under the
dismissed charges listed on the judgment and sentence. He requests the case be remanded to the
trial court to address the error. Alternatively, he seeks a written order from this court dismissing
the charge. However, Hockley did not object -o the trial court' s failure to enter a written order of
t
dismissal. Under RAP 2. 5( a), we generally do not review an issue raised for the first time on
appeal. Hockley does not argue that any of the exceptions in RAP 2. 5( a) apply. Therefore, we
decline to address this issue.
However, neither party disputes that the court orally dismissed the charge and that entry
of a written order would be appropriate. CrR 7. 8( a) states that "[ c] lerical mistakes in judgments,
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court ... on the motion of any party." A clerical mistake is a mistake or
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omission that when amended, correctly conveys the intention of the issuing court. State v.
Priest, 100 Wn. App. 45 1, 456, 997 P. 2d 452 ( 2000) ( citing Presidential Estates Apartment
Assocs. v. Barrett, 129 Wn.2d 320, 326, 917 P. 2d 100 ( 1996)). Once review has been
terminated, Hockley is free to seek modification of the trial court' s order on proper motion.
We affirm Hockey' s conviction. We deny Hockley' s request for remand to correct the
clerical mistake and deny Hockley' s request for a written order from this court dismissing count
II.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
1
MAXA, J.
We concur:
a
f:
B GEN. .
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