J-S27032-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SARA ALVISO
Appellant No. 1539 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 4, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-33-CR-0000587-2010,
CP-33-CR-0000449-2012,
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2014
Appellant, Sara Alviso, appeals from the judgment of sentence the
Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County entered September 4, 2013,
after revoking her probation/parole. Appellant argues the sentencing court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence and for
failing to adequately state its reasons for the sentence.1 Upon review, we
affirm.
____________________________________________
1
In her statement of questions involved on appeal, Appellant seems to
challenge only the length of the sentence; in the argument section, however,
Appellant raises an additional claim, not mentioned or suggested in the
statement of questions involved (i.e.
the reasons for the sentence). Counsel is encouraged to more carefully
review Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (no question will be considered unless stated in
statement of questions involved or fairly suggested thereby), and the
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J-S27032-14
The underlying factual and procedural facts of this matter are not at
issue here. Briefly, following probation/parole violations (i.e., failure to
report and failure to make required payments), Appellant was resentenced
to, inter alia, a term of 1 to 2 years in a state correctional institution at
docket number CR-587-2010, and a consecutive sentence of 1½ to 3 years
in a State Correctional Institution, at docket number CR-449-2012.
Appellant argues the trial court imposed an excessive aggregate
sentence given the nature of the parole/probation violations and the original
offenses.2
consecutive sentences imposed by the lower court, which aggregate to two
and one-half (2½) to five (5) years in a State Correctional [Institution] are
e Id.
Id. Appellant argues
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(Footnote Continued)
consequences generally resulting from failing to adequately state the issues
involved in the statement of questions involved. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Fremd, 860 A.2d 515, 523-
his brief, appellant also argues that the police conduct was so outrageous as
to bar conviction even if entrapment is not found. Appellant failed to raise
s appellate
2
At docket number CR-587-2010, Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful
taking (M2), and sentenced to a term of incarceration of 30 days to a
maximum of 1 year in the Jefferson County Jail; at docket number CR-449-
2012, Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking (M1), and sentenced
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the sentences should be vacated and the case remanded for more
appropriate sentencing. Id. We disagree.
Ap
preserve a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must file timely notice of appeal, preserve the argument in a timely post-
sentence motion or orally at sentencing, include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)
statement in the appellate brief, and raise a substantial question.
Commonwealth v. Dewey, 57 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here,
it is undisputed Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, timely filed a post-
sentence motion raising the discretionary issues, and included a
Pa.R.A.P.2119(f) statement in his brief. The only issue is whether he raised
a substantial question for our review.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See
Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. 2007).
substantial question exits only when the appellant advances a
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underli Commonwealth v.
Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation and
quotation marks omitted).
Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Appellant merely states the aggregate sentence is excessive
e of a substantial question by
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inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code or violated a
Commonwealth v.
Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289-90 (Pa. Super. 2008). We conclude,
question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263,
excessiveness due to the
consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial
(citation omitted).
Even if we were to conclude Appellant raised a substantial question for
our review, the claim is nonetheless without merit. Our standard of review
of a sentencing challenge is well-settled:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
record, and in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the reasons for the sentence
imposed.
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[T]he [c]ourt did indeed explain its reasons for the sentence,
including why it believed [Appellant] could benefit from
motivational boot camp. . . . Prior to sentencing, the [c]ourt
reviewed a presentence investigation report prepared by the
Jefferson County Probation Department, and was adequately
informed about [Appellant]. . . . The [c]ourt was also aware that
her violation, while technical in nature, was a reflection of her
general disregard for authority. . . . Having concluded that
[Appella
lack of discipline and not merely a criminogenic mindset,
however, the [c]ourt by including a boot camp recommendation
at both cases, also afforded her the opportunity to remediate her
sentence. The recommendation was wholly contrary to her
unreasonable or evidenced partiality, bias, prejudice or ill-will.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/13, at 1-2 (citations omitted).3
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3
The trial court, in its opinion, quoted from the notes of testimony of the
sentencing hearing, where the court stated:
you did
not commit new charges this time. . . . However, it is partially
because you never complied while you were there. I know you
. So I think those violations would happen again
and then since, I as I see it, you were kind of cut a break initially
Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/13, at 1-2. The trial court also cited Section
9771(c) of the Sentencing Code, which in relevant part provide:
(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court
shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation
unless it finds that:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he
will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or
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In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
the record the reasons for the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/7/2014
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(Footnote Continued)
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the
court.
42 Pa.C.S.A § 9771(c).
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Com. v. Alviso, S.
Combined Opinion