UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4984
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HORACE SINCLAIR THOMPSON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00290-GBL-1)
Submitted: July 25, 2014 Decided: July 31, 2014
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John O. Iweanoge, II, THE IWEANOGE’S FIRM, P.C., Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney,
Michael E. Rich, G. Zachary Terwilliger, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Horace Sinclair Thompson, Jr., was
convicted of arson, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 844(i)
(2012). On appeal, Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction and the district court’s
admission of certain evidence. We affirm.
The denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is
reviewed de novo. United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93
(4th Cir. 2011). “We review the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction by determining whether there is substantial
evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the government, to support the conviction.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Madrigal–Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir.
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this
analysis, “circumstantial evidence is treated no differently
than direct evidence, and may be sufficient to support a guilty
verdict even though it does not exclude every reasonable
hypothesis consistent with innocence.” United States v.
Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1989). We can reverse a
conviction based on insufficient evidence only when “the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
To support a conviction for arson under 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i), the government must prove that the defendant: “(1)
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maliciously; (2) damaged or destroyed a building, vehicle, or
other real or personal property; (3) by means of fire or
explosive; and (4) the building, vehicle, or personal or real
property was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” United
States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1996). Thompson
challenges only the evidence of malicious intent.
After viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light
most favorable to the government, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The evidence
that the damaged business was failing financially, that Thompson
communicated frequently with the building’s owner on the night
before the fire, and that he lied to police about his burns, as
well as the manner in which the fire was started, entitled the
jury to conclude that Thompson set the fire intentionally.
Thompson also challenges the district court’s
admission of evidence regarding the financial condition of the
damaged business and the owner’s insurance claims after the
fire. We review the district court’s rulings regarding the
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011). A district
court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, see id.,
or applies “erroneous legal principles to the case,” United
States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995).
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The challenged evidence was relevant to proving
Thompson’s motive, and raised no prejudice beyond that which was
inherent in the charges against him. See United States v. Boyd,
53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence is not
unfairly prejudicial if it does not “involve conduct any more
sensational or disturbing than the crimes with which [the
defendant] was charged”). Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence. ∗
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
∗
Thompson also asserts that the challenged evidence was
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Rule 404(b)
is inapplicable because the district court admitted the evidence
under Rule 401, not under Rule 404(b)(2), and the challenged
evidence was not character evidence under Rule 404(b)(1).
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