UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4953
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ILLES WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00020-IMK-JSK-4)
Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: August 4, 2014
Before GREGORY and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kristen Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, L. Richard
Walker, Senior Litigator, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda E. Wesley,
Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Illes Williams appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and imposing a twelve-month
prison term. Williams’ sole appellate contention is that the
evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s
finding that he violated the conditions of his supervised
release. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke
supervised release, a district court need only find a violation
of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); United States v.
Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). This standard is met
when the court “believe[s] that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Appellate courts review for clear error factual
determinations underlying the conclusion that a violation
occurred. United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th
Cir. 2003).
As a condition of supervised release, Williams was
prohibited from committing another federal, state, or local
crime. The district court revoked Williams’ supervised release
2
based on its findings that Williams violated this condition by
knowingly providing false information about his prior driver’s
license suspensions/revocations on two West Virginia driver’s
license applications, both of which he prepared while on
supervised release. Under West Virginia law, “[a]ny person who
makes any false affidavit, or knowingly swears or affirms
falsely to any matter or thing required by the terms of this
Chapter [(W. Va. Code § 17B (Motor Vehicle Driver’s Licenses)]
is guilty of perjury.” W. Va. Code Ann. § 17B-4-2 (LexisNexis
2013).
Williams does not dispute that his driver’s license
was suspended or revoked at the time he completed the driver’s
license applications. Nor does he deny that he stated on his
applications that he had not experienced a revocation or a
suspension. Instead, he contends that the evidence was not
sufficient to establish that he knew his license was revoked or
suspended and hence was not sufficient to show that he knowingly
made a false statement.
Williams’ defense theory was that, before 2011, he had
only applied for, and received, a learner’s permit, and
therefore, having never held a permanent driver’s license, he
was unaware when he filled out the applications in 2011 and 2012
that his driver’s license had been suspended years earlier.
However, Williams had pleaded guilty to and been convicted of
3
driving suspended/revoked prior to completing the two driver’s
license applications. The district court thus found that
Williams’ claim of ignorance was incredible, and we defer to
this credibility determination. United States v. Cates, 613
F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010). Taken in the light most
favorable to the Government, United States v. Green, 599 F.3d
360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), we conclude that the Government
proffered ample evidence to satisfy its burden of proof that
Williams knowingly affirmed falsely that he had no prior
suspensions or revocations.
Accordingly, we conclude that a preponderance of the
evidence established that Williams committed perjury and hence
violated the conditions of his supervised release. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment revoking Williams’ term of
supervised release and imposing a twelve-month sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4