United States v. Jonathan Savage

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4153

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

JONATHAN W. SAVAGE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00688-CMC-1)

Submitted: July 21, 2014 Decided: August 4, 2014

Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, T. DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Jonathan W. Savage pleaded guilty to one count of

making, forging and counterfeiting United States currency, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471 (2012). Savage contends that the

district court erred by not giving him credit under the

Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility. We

affirm.

The determination of whether a defendant is deserving

of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is a factual issue

and thus reviewed for clear error. United States v. Dugger, 485

F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007). “The sentencing judge is in a

unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of

responsibility, and thus . . . the determination of the

sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.”

Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 761 (4th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotations and brackets omitted). We will reverse the

district court’s finding only when “left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Dugger, 485

F.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines Manual provides for a

two-level reduction for a defendant who “‘clearly demonstrates

acceptance of responsibility for his offense.’” United

States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting

USSG § 3E1.1(a)). To merit this reduction, the defendant must

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establish by a preponderance of the evidence “that he has

clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal

responsibility for his criminal conduct.” United States v.

Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1996). The Guidelines note

that in considering this adjustment, the district court should

look at whether the defendant voluntarily terminated or withdrew

from criminal conduct and whether the defendant engaged in post-

offense rehabilitative efforts, among other factors. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, application notes 1(B),

(G); see also Dugger, 485 F.3d at 240 (a court may look for a

clear demonstration of acceptance of responsibility by voluntary

termination of or withdrawal from criminal conduct). Evidence

of continued drug use after indictment but before a guilty plea

may support the district court’s decision to deny an acceptance

of responsibility enhancement. See United States v. Underwood,

970 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (4th Cir. 1992). Even criminal conduct

unrelated to the charged criminal conduct may support a finding

that the defendant has not accepted responsibility. United

States v. Arellano, 291 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2002); see

also United States v. Prince, 204 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir.

2000); United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir.

1996).

We conclude that the district court’s decision not to

give Savage credit for acceptance of responsibility was not

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clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED