UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4582
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEROME REID,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. James C. Dever
III, Chief District Judge. (2:12-cr-00010-D-3)
Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: August 6, 2014
Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Jennifer Haynes Rose, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER HAYNES ROSE, Cary,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jerome Reid pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B) (2012), and was sentenced to 180
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning
whether the district court erred in assessing a two-point
enhancement and calculating the drug quantity associated with
the offense, and challenging the reasonableness of Reid’s
sentence. Although advised of his right to file a supplemental
pro se brief, Reid has not done so. The Government seeks to
dismiss the appeal as untimely and as barred by the appellate
waiver provision in the plea agreement.
By prior order, we remanded the appeal to the district
court to determine whether to extend the appeal period under
Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). The district court found good cause to
extend the appeal period, and therefore the appeal is timely and
not subject to dismissal on that basis.
We therefore proceed to consider the Government’s
alternate basis for dismissal—the appellate waiver. We review
de novo the validity of an appellate waiver. United States v.
Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
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126 (2013). We “generally will enforce a waiver . . . if the
record establishes that the waiver is valid and that the issue
being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United
States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A
defendant’s waiver is valid if he agreed to it “knowingly and
intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2010). “Although the validity of an appeal waiver
often depends on the adequacy of the plea colloquy, the issue
ultimately is evaluated by reference to the totality of the
circumstances,” United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 355 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), such as “the
experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s
educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea agreement.” Thornsbury, 670 F.3d at 537 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Reid knowingly and intelligently pled guilty and waived his
right to appeal his sentence. Because the sentencing issues he
seeks to raise on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver, we
grant the Government’s motion to dismiss Reid’s appeal of his
sentence and dismiss this portion of the appeal.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes review of the sentence, the waiver does not preclude
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review of any errors in Reid’s conviction that may be revealed
pursuant to the review required by Anders. In accordance with
Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found
nothing that calls into question the validity of Reid’s
conviction. Thus, as to the conviction, we affirm.
This court requires that counsel inform Reid, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Reid requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Reid. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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