UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4753
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BOBBIE JO BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4754
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MITCHELL EDWARD GARVIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-13; 1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-26)
Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: August 7, 2014
Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Casey Allen Sears, II, Johnson City, Tennessee; Douglas L.
Payne, LAW OFFICE OF DOUGLAS L. PAYNE, Greeneville, Tennessee,
for Appellants. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney,
Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Bobbie Jo Brown and Mitchell Edward
Garvin of multiple counts of passing false and fictitious checks
with the intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 514(a)(2) (2012), and conspiracy to pass false and fictitious
checks with the intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (2012). On appeal, Brown and Garvin challenge their
convictions, arguing that the Government did not meet its burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they had the intent to
defraud. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Strayhorn,
743 F.3d 917, 921 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2689
(2014). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The test is
whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
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Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We consider “the complete picture” created by the
evidence, United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc), including both circumstantial and direct
evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from such evidence
in the Government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d
326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). If the evidence supports different
interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to
believe, and we “may not overturn a substantially supported
verdict merely because [we] find[] the verdict unpalatable or
determine[] that another, reasonable verdict would be
preferable.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862. Rather, “[a] defendant
bringing a sufficiency challenge must overcome a heavy burden,
and reversal for insufficiency must be confined to cases where
the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Engle,
676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012).
To sustain convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and
§ 514(a)(2), the government must prove, among other elements,
that the defendant had the intent to defraud when cashing the
false or fictitious instrument. See 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)
(“Whoever, with the intent to defraud . . . .”); Ingram v.
United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (“Conspiracy to commit a
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particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the
degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense
itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like other facts,
“[f]raudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.”
United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, under the doctrine of willful blindness, knowledge may
be inferred where a defendant deliberately avoids enlightenment.
United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).
Here, although there was no direct evidence that
Appellants had the intent to defraud, we conclude that the
circumstances surrounding the check-cashing scheme were
suspicious enough to alert even the most unsophisticated
individual to the fraudulent nature of the scheme. Moreover,
the evidence suggests that Appellants took very few actions to
ascertain the validity of the checks even when the transpiring
events gave them reasons to suspect that the checks were not
legitimate. Finally, Brown testified that she was generally
wary of requests to cash monetary instruments but cashed the
checks nevertheless, having only the bald assertion from someone
she barely knew that they were legitimate. Thus, the jury could
have concluded that Appellants “subjectively believe[d] that
there [was] a high probability that” the checks were not valid
and that they took “deliberate actions to avoid learning” that
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they were in fact invalid. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. V. SEB
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
Accordingly, we conclude that the Government met its
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants had
the intent to defraud, and we affirm the district court’s
judgments. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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