UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50742
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES RAY BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(W-00-CR-106-1)
_________________________________________________________________
March 15, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
Charles Ray Brooks appeals his conviction after a jury trial
for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Brooks contends the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence gathered after a
traffic stop. He maintains: the officers’ questioning of him and
the other van occupants impermissibly exceeded the scope of the
traffic stop for a seatbelt violation; and this Fourth Amendment
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
violation did not dissipate before he gave his consent to search
the van.
For a suppression ruling, “we review questions of law de novo,
and accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous”. United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731
(5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 827 (1999). We
“view the relevant evidence in a light most favorable to the party
that prevailed”. Id.
No reversible error was committed. The officers’ brief
questioning, which was unrelated to the stop and which occurred
before a request was made for a computer check of the occupants
(the request was made approximately five minutes after the stop was
initiated), did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). Furthermore,
the district court did not clearly err in finding voluntary Brooks’
consent to search. See United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 201
(5th Cir. 1999), opinion corrected on denial of reh’g, 203 F.3d 883
(5th Cir. 2000).
AFFIRMED
2