This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1983
Landon Ricky Olesiak, Petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Appellant.
Filed August 4, 2014
Reversed
Ross, Judge
Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CV-13-1203
Joel D. Eaton, Eaton & Mitchell Law Office, LLP, Owatonna, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Adam Kujawa, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Landon Olesiak spoke with a lawyer and agreed to submit to a blood draw after
Owatonna police charged him with driving while impaired and read him the implied-
consent advisory. The commissioner of public safety revoked Olesiak’s driving
privileges, and Olesiak petitioned the district court to reverse that decision. The district
court held that Olesiak had been coerced to take the test by the threat of criminal
penalties for refusing, and it overturned the commissioner’s revocation decision. Because
the criminal penalties for test refusal are insufficient to coerce Olesiak’s consent to the
search and no other evidence of coercion is alleged, we reverse.
FACTS
Owatonna Police Officer Ben Johnson stopped a car driven by Landon Olesiak
late one night in April 2013 after Olesiak drove over the center line. Johnson noticed that
Olesiak smelled strongly of alcoholic beverages and had watery eyes. Olesiak failed all
field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a preliminary breath test. Johnson arrested
Olesiak for driving while impaired and placed him in the squad car. Johnson began
reading Olesiak the implied-consent advisory. Olesiak indicated that he understood the
advisory and said that he wanted to contact an attorney. Officer Johnson took Olesiak to a
hospital. Olesiak spoke to an attorney and then agreed to submit to a blood test. Hospital
staff drew a blood sample that indicated a .16 alcohol concentration. The state charged
Olesiak with driving while impaired, and the commissioner revoked his driving
privileges.
Olesiak petitioned the district court to rescind the revocation, arguing that the
blood test violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. He contended that the criminal test-refusal penalties coerced his consent, and,
based only on that coercion theory, the district court agreed with Olesiak and rescinded
his revocation.
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The commissioner appeals.
DECISION
The commissioner argues that the district court erred when it suppressed the result
of Olesiak’s blood test and rescinded the revocation of his driving privileges. The facts
are undisputed, so we review de novo the district court’s suppression order. State v.
Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992).
The federal and state constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A blood test is a search.
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013). Warrantless searches are
unreasonable unless the state demonstrates that an exception to the warrant requirement
applies. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). Consent is an exception to
the warrant requirement. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 222. The state must prove that consent
was voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045
(1973); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011). We determine whether
consent was voluntary by examining the totality of the circumstances. State v. Brooks,
838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). We consider
“the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and
how it was said.” Id. at 569 (quotation omitted).
Nothing in the record suggests, nor does Olesiak contend, that any aspect of
Officer Johnson’s conduct, aside from reading the implied-consent advisory, was
coercive. The district court based its decision that Officer Johnson had coerced Olesiak to
consent entirely on the force of that advisory. It specified that the officer was not
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“threatening or coercive in his manner, tone, or conduct.” But the district court did not
have the benefit of the Brooks decision, which has since rejected the notion that the
criminal penalties for test refusal can alone coerce consent. Id. at 570–71.
The commissioner asserts that this case presents substantially the same
circumstances that were present in Brooks, where the supreme court held that the driver
had consented. See id. The assertion is accurate. In Brooks, police had probable cause to
suspect the defendant of driving while impaired, arrested him, and read him the implied
consent advisory. Id. at 565–66. Brooks spoke to his lawyer and submitted to a chemical
test afterward. Id. at 571–72. Olesiak’s case closely mirrors these facts, and only
Brooks’s more extensive impaired-driving history distinguishes him from Olesiak. This
distinction does not lead to a different result.
We hold that the district court erred when it concluded that Olesiak’s consent was
coerced and therefore invalid. Because Olesiak’s consent was not invalid and he provides
no other reason to suppress the test result, we reverse. We do not reach the
commissioner’s other arguments.
Reversed.
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