United States v. Brian Behrens

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4026

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

BRIAN A. BEHRENS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00019-FPS-JES-1)

Submitted: July 28, 2014 Decided: August 18, 2014

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling,
West Virginia; Kristen S. Leddy, Research and Writing
Specialist, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Stephen L. Vogrin, Assistant United States
Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Brian A. Behrens was convicted by a jury of being a

prohibited person in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (2012), and sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment.

He appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress in which Behrens claimed that both the stop

of his vehicle, and the subsequent search thereof, violated his

Fourth Amendment rights. Behrens also claims that the district

court erred in denying his motions for new trial and to

interview jurors based on his discovery that one of the jurors

was a childhood friend of the son of Behrens’ longtime

girlfriend. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review the district court’s factual findings

regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and the

court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Burgess,

684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 490

(2012). When a suppression motion has been denied by the

district court, this court construes the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Government. United States v. Foster, 634

F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). We also defer to the district

court’s credibility findings. United States v. Griffin, 589

F.3d 148, 150-51 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009).

A vehicle stop is permissible if the officer has

probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred,

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Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996), or has a

reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, regardless of the

officer’s subjective motivations, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-

22 (1968). Here, it is undisputed that the automobile driven by

Behrens had an expired inspection sticker.

Behrens’ reliance on United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d

170 (4th Cir. 2012), is misplaced. In Gaines, the Government

appealed from a district court order granting Gaines’ motion to

suppress. The Government conceded on appeal that the traffic

stop and subsequent pat down were unlawful based on the district

court’s factual finding that “the officers could not have seen

the very slight crack in the lower right portion of the

[automobile’s] windshield.” Id. at 172. In reaching that

conclusion, the district court specifically declined to credit

the testimony of the arresting officers. Here, by contrast,

the district court credited the Government’s version of the

events, including Officer Haines’s testimony that he had seen

the expired inspection sticker before stopping Behrens.

Therefore we find that the district court did not err in finding

that the traffic stop was valid.

Subsequent to a valid stop, an officer “may conduct a

protective search of the passenger compartment of a lawfully

stopped automobile where the ‘officer possesses a reasonable

belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken

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together with the rational inferences from those facts,

reasonably warrant the officer in believing that [a] suspect is

dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons’

within the vehicle.” United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 276

(4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049

(1983)). We find that the evidence supported the district

court’s conclusion that Officer Haines had a reasonable belief

that Behrens was armed and potentially dangerous. Accordingly,

we affirm the denial of Behren’s motion to suppress.

Next, Behrens challenges the district court’s denial

of two post-trial motions—one for a new trial alleging juror

misconduct and one to interview trial jurors. Both motions were

based on Behrens’ assertion that one of the jurors—Michael

Snyder—failed to disclose during voir dire that he knew, and at

one time had a close relationship with, the son of one of the

witnesses who testified for Behrens, Danielle Keith. Keith was

Behrens’ long-time girlfriend. Behrens argues that, because of

the potential bias against him based on prior personal

knowledge, he would have had cause to strike Snyder had he known

of the relationship with Keith’s son. He also argues that he

should have been given the opportunity to ascertain whether

Snyder shared this information with any other member of the

jury.

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We review both the denial of a motion for new trial,

as well as the denial of a post-trial request to interview

jurors, under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v.

Bartko, 728 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v.

Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988).

In order to obtain a new trial based on juror deceit

(either intentional or unintentional) a defendant “must first

demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material

question . . . and then further show that a correct response

would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556

(2005). In addition, “a showing that a juror was actually

biased, regardless of whether the juror was truthful or

deceitful, can also entitle a defendant to a new trial.” Jones

v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2002).

As the district court noted, there is no evidence that

Snyder dishonestly answered questions during voir dire as both

Keith and her son now go by a different last name and Behrens

failed to identify the time period when Snyder and her son were

friends. Moreover, there is no evidence that Snyder’s

relationship with Keith’s son (or with Keith) was anything other

than congenial. Because Behrens’ allegations of bias are purely

speculative, we find no abuse of discretion by the district

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court in denying Behrens’ motion for a new trial or his motion

to interview the jurors for potential bias.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Behrens’ conviction.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED