FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30106
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:12-CR-00063-SLG-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TRISTAN JAMAL GRANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 14, 2014**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Tristan Jamal Grant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(b)(1)(C), and his resulting 47-month sentence. We affirm Grant’s conviction and
sentence.
1. Grant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Grant
was found with 1.69 grams of crack cocaine divided into 13 individual doses, a
scale with cocaine residue, multiple cell phones, and over $1,000 in cash. Prior to
his arrest, law enforcement observed two individuals enter the back seat of Grant’s
car and leave in less than two minutes. Although Grant explained how most of the
evidence could be consistent with Grant’s personal use of crack, the government
offered a competing characterization consistent with distribution of crack. Taking
the evidence in a light favorable to the government, a rational jury could have
agreed with the government and found Grant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Norwood, 603 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. The district court properly applied a two-level obstruction of justice
sentencing enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court found that Grant
perjured himself by testifying that the crack cocaine was intended only for personal
use, not distribution. The materiality and willful intent behind the false statement,
which was designed to negate an element of the charged offense, are apparent from
the record. See United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1994).
2
Because we find that the enhancement was properly based on Grant’s trial
testimony, we do not reach alternate bases for the enhancement. Id. at 1119.
3. The district court properly applied a two level enhancement for
possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
The district court did not clearly err by finding Grant possessed a firearm by a
preponderance of the evidence because there was ample evidence supporting
Grant’s awareness of the gun. Nor was it an abuse of discrection to apply the
enhancement because, given the record, it was not “clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note
11(A).
AFFIRMED.
3