FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 19 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORENA MEYER, No. 12-17050
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02786-GGH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted August 13, 2014***
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Lorena Meyer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her action alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and California state law arising from the repossession and sale of a car she
purchased with a loan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo, Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012), and
may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Summary judgment on Meyer’s FDCPA claim was proper because, even
though a creditor like defendant is not per se exempt from the FDCPA, Meyer
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant is a “debt
collector” under the FDCPA by showing that defendant’s principal business is debt
collection or that it collects debts on behalf of others. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
(defining “debt collector”); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204,
1208 n.2, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting claim that “a ‘creditor’ is not per se a
‘debt collector’” under the FDCPA, but concluding that the defendant was not a
debt collector under § 1692a(6) merely because it collected debts in the course of
doing business or that were originated by others before they were assigned to it).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining supplemental
jurisdiction over Meyer’s state law claims after granting summary judgment on her
sole federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Meyer further leave
2 12-17050
to file a third amended complaint based on settlement of an unrelated, state law
consumer class action against defendant. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review
and noting that district court may dismiss without leave to amend when
amendment would be futile); Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th
Cir. 2002) (noting that a district court’s discretion regarding leave to amend is
“particularly broad” when a plaintiff previously received leave to amend).
Meyer’s remaining contentions are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
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