STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A13-0610
Court of Appeals Anderson, J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: August 20, 2014
Office of Appellate Courts
Erica Ann Rohde,
Appellant.
________________________
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Donald LeBaron, Assistant Anoka
County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota, for respondent.
Adam T. Johnson, Meshbesher & Associates, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant.
________________________
SYLLABUS
An inventory search of a motor vehicle was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because the police improperly impounded
the vehicle of a driver who was stopped but not arrested for misdemeanor traffic offenses
when the vehicle was lawfully parked.
Reversed and remanded.
1
OPINION
ANDERSON, Justice.
Appellant Erica Rohde was convicted of fifth-degree drug possession, Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012), and possession of drug paraphernalia, Minn. Stat.
§ 152.092 (2012), based on evidence that police officers found while performing an
inventory search during the course of impounding Rohde’s car. The district court denied
Rohde’s motion to suppress the evidence as the product of an unconstitutional search.
The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Rohde, 839 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Minn. App. 2013).
We granted Rohde’s petition for review. The issue presented on appeal is whether the
impoundment of the vehicle was unreasonable and, therefore, the subsequent inventory
search of Rohde’s car was unconstitutional. We conclude that the impoundment was
unreasonable and therefore the search was unconstitutional.
During the afternoon of September 11, 2012, Blaine Police Officer Barry Koch
was in plain clothes and an unmarked car, watching a house suspected of hosting drug
trafficking. He saw a Chevrolet Monte Carlo drive away from the house. He followed
the Monte Carlo because he had heard from another officer that people involved in drug
trafficking at the house might be riding in a Monte Carlo. This Monte Carlo’s license-
plate number did not match the information he had received, but Koch ran a registration
check. He learned that the Monte Carlo’s registration had been revoked and that it was
registered to Rohde, whose driver’s license had also been revoked. He also learned that
Rohde had been arrested previously and police had found a handgun and drugs in her
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purse. From what Koch could see, the driver of the Monte Carlo matched Rohde’s
description in the records.
Koch called Blaine Police Officer Albert Champagne, who was in uniform and on
patrol in a marked squad car nearby, and asked him to stop the Monte Carlo. Koch
followed the Monte Carlo for about 4 miles while Champagne was en route. When
Champagne arrived, he ran the Monte Carlo’s license-plate number to verify what Koch
had told him about the registration and the revoked status of Rohde’s license. He also
confirmed that the driver matched Rohde’s description. After observing a signaling
violation by the Monte Carlo, he stopped the vehicle. The Monte Carlo pulled over to the
side of a residential street and was not interfering with traffic, blocking access to any
property, or otherwise violating any parking rules.
Champagne approached the Monte Carlo and identified the driver as Rohde. He
told her that he had stopped her because of the signaling violation and the revoked status
of her license and registration. When Champagne asked for proof of insurance, Rohde
indicated that the car was not insured.
Champagne decided to tow and impound the Monte Carlo, based on a Blaine
Police Department policy requiring impoundment of uninsured vehicles stopped on a
public road. He asked Rohde to get out of the car, and Rohde asked if she was under
arrest. Champagne secured her in his squad car and explained that she was “technically”
under arrest, by which he meant that she was not free to leave at the moment. Despite
telling Rohde that she was “technically” under arrest, Champagne did not plan to take her
to jail. Instead, he allowed her to call her mother to attempt to arrange a ride.
3
Koch arrived while Champagne was talking to Rohde. Champagne asked Koch to
assist him in conducting an inventory search, which the department policy required for all
impounded vehicles.
Koch found two small bags of methamphetamine and two glass pipes in a purse on
the passenger seat of the Monte Carlo. Rohde was charged with fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1), and possession of
drug paraphernalia under Minn. Stat. § 152.092.
Rohde requested an omnibus hearing and moved to suppress the evidence that
Koch had found in the Monte Carlo. She stipulated that the initial stop by Champagne
was lawful but argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, because the police
were not authorized to impound the Monte Carlo and the inventory search itself was
pretextual. The district court denied Rohde’s motion. Rohde and the State then agreed to
a stipulated-facts trial. The district court found Rohde guilty on both counts.
Rohde appealed, the court of appeals affirmed, Rohde, 839 N.W.2d at 766, and we
granted Rohde’s petition for review. Because we hold that the impoundment was
unreasonable, and therefore the resulting inventory search was unconstitutional, we
reverse and remand to the district court.
I.
The U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution forbid “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; see also Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to the
4
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The language of
the two constitutional provisions is nearly identical, and we have not held that Article I,
Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution is more protective than the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution in the context of inventory searches. See State v. Carter, 596
N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1999). Because Rohde does not argue that the Minnesota
Constitution is more protective, we need not consider whether the Minnesota Constitution
provides a separate basis for relief here.
Evidence obtained from an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The basic question presented by
this case, therefore, is whether the district court should have suppressed the evidence that
Koch found when searching Rohde’s Monte Carlo because the search was unreasonable
and thus unconstitutional. Neither party disputes the facts underlying the district court’s
refusal to suppress the evidence, so the constitutionality of the search presents a pure
question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn.
2001); see also State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992) (“[T]he reviewing
court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the
evidence need be suppressed.”).
Generally, a search conducted without a warrant is “per se unreasonable.” Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In this case, the police did not have a warrant to
5
search 1 the Monte Carlo, so the search was unreasonable—and thus the evidence was
inadmissible—unless the general warrant requirement does not apply. The State argues
that the impoundment was proper and therefore the search was an inventory search,
which is “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371 (1987). The State bears the burden of showing that such an exception
applies in a particular case. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (citing
Ture, 632 N.W.2d at 627).
In determining whether an inventory search was reasonable, the administrative and
caretaking purposes that justify inventory searches only arise because the police have
taken custody of some piece of property. See State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506, 510
(Minn. 1977). Accordingly, the underlying impoundment must be the first part of the
analysis of whether an inventory search was reasonable; if the impoundment was
unreasonable, then the resulting search was also unreasonable. See Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
at 502 (“[T]he threshold inquiry when determining the reasonableness of an inventory
search is whether the impoundment of the vehicle was proper.”). We must determine as a
threshold matter whether the officers had any authority or purpose that justified the
impoundment.
1
The State does not dispute that Koch conducted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when he opened the car door, emptied a purse, found a closed bag
inside, and opened the bag.
6
II.
In order for an impoundment to be proper, the State “must have an interest in
impoundment that outweighs the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 502. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
the police, in the interests of public safety, have the authority to “remove from the streets
vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.” South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). Additionally, police may impound a vehicle to
“protect[] the [defendant’s] property from theft and the police from claims arising
therefrom.” Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 511. Here, the State has not met its burden of
proving that the State’s interest in impounding the vehicle outweighed Rohde’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.
The State attempts to address the reasonableness of impounding the Monte Carlo
by arguing that impoundment was authorized by statute because the car’s registration had
been revoked and its insurance had expired. The court of appeals took a similar
approach. See Rohde, 839 N.W.2d at 763-65 (“[T]he impoundment of the vehicle was
lawful because the vehicle could not remain on the public roadway with revoked license
plates and without insurance.”). But this focus on whether the impoundment was
authorized by Minnesota law is misplaced, because the real question in this case is
whether the impoundment was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. An
impoundment is reasonable if “[t]he state’s interest in impounding . . . outweigh[s] the
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 510. Logically, this question is independent of whether the
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impoundment was authorized under Minnesota law, because a state statute might
authorize an unreasonable search. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)
(“[T]he question here is not whether the search was authorized by state law. The
question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
Furthermore, none of the statutes expressly allow or prohibit impoundment under the
circumstances of this case. The parties’ statutory arguments, therefore, are not definitive.
The court of appeals’ focus on Minnesota statutes appears to be a result of
misreading our opinion in Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 503-05. See Rohde, 839 N.W.2d at
763. In Gauster, we looked to “state law to determine whether impoundment was
justified.” 752 N.W.2d at 504. We did so, however, because the impoundment at issue
in Gauster was allegedly based on a policy of impounding “for violations, or for related
enforcement or safety reasons as defined by state law.” Id. In other words, in Gauster
we addressed whether an impoundment was authorized by state law in order to determine
whether the impoundment was “conducted pursuant to standardized criteria,” because the
standardized criteria in that case depended on state law. Id. at 503. Our decision does
not support the general proposition that state law determines whether a search is
constitutionally reasonable. See id. at 504-08 (considering whether the nonstatutory
“police caretaking role” justified impounding a vehicle, despite first concluding that
various statutes did not authorize impoundment).
The State also argues that “the police caretaking basis” authorized the police to
impound the Monte Carlo to “ensure that traffic safety was protected.” The U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that police perform “community caretaking functions” and
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have authority “to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or
threatening public safety and convenience.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69. There are a
number of different circumstances in which a police officer could justifiably impound a
car based on a judgment that the public safety is put at risk by leaving the vehicle in
place. For example, impounding may be reasonable when there has been a vehicle
accident, to permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic, or when vehicles have violated
parking ordinances and thus jeopardize the public safety and the efficient movement of
traffic. In these situations, the authority of the police to impound vehicles is “beyond
challenge.” Id. at 369. This authority cannot justify the impoundment here, however,
because Champagne and Koch both testified that the Monte Carlo was not violating any
parking laws, impeding traffic, or posing a threat to public safety. 2 Therefore, there is
nothing in this record to support an inference that immediately impounding the Monte
Carlo was in any way necessary for public safety. 3
Even though the State only mentions the caretaking authority in the context of
“traffic safety,” we recognize a similar caretaking authority to “impound a vehicle to
2
The State makes what may be a related argument when it asserts that the
department policy “rendered authority to the police to impound the vehicle.” The State’s
argument appears to be that the department policy justified the impoundment because the
policy generally furthers “the unimpeded and safe flow of traffic, proper registration and
vehicle use.” In this case, however, the record is clear that the Monte Carlo was not
impeding traffic or otherwise unsafe, so there is no reason to conclude that the immediate
impoundment in this case, even if consistent with the policy, served public safety.
3
While we recognize that uninsured vehicles operated on public roadways pose a
safety threat, in this case, given the testimony of the officers as well as the record, the
State has not proven that its interest in public safety outweighs Rohde’s right to be free of
an unreasonable search and seizure.
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‘protect[] the [defendant’s] property from theft and police from claims arising
therefrom.’ ” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 503 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodrich, 256
N.W.2d at 511). This authority arises “when it becomes essential for [the police] to take
custody of and responsibility for a vehicle due to the incapacity or absence of the owner,
driver, or any responsible passenger.” City of St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 304, 218
N.W.2d 697, 701 (1974).
In this case, until Koch searched the Monte Carlo and found the methamphetamine
and pipes, Champagne did not plan to arrest Rohde or take her to jail, as demonstrated by
the fact that he allowed Rohde to call her mother to attempt to arrange a ride. At the time
the search began, Rohde was present and retained control over the Monte Carlo, and there
was no reason for the police to take responsibility for the vehicle. See Gauster, 752
N.W.2d at 506 (explaining that “the need for the police to protect the vehicle and its
contents is often present when police officers arrest a driver” but, conversely, is not
present when the driver “was not arrested and therefore never relinquished control of his
vehicle and had no need to leave it unattended”); cf. State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 104
(Minn. 2000) (finding that an impoundment would not be reasonable when a friend was
willing and able to take control of the vehicle); Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 511
(concluding that even a defendant who was arrested was still able to “obviate[]” the
“necessity of protecting [his] property from theft and the police from claims arising
therefrom” by arranging to have a family member take care of his car).
In response, the State emphasizes that Rohde never asked if she could arrange a
tow herself instead of letting the police impound the Monte Carlo. The State’s argument
10
is based on Colorado v. Bertine, in which the Supreme Court held that police were not
required to offer an arrested driver an opportunity to make alternative arrangements
before taking his van into custody for safekeeping. 479 U.S. at 373-74. But, as we
recognized in Gauster, cases in which the driver of a vehicle is arrested are
fundamentally different from cases in which the driver remains free. 752 N.W.2d at 507.
When the driver is arrested, it “may [be] necessary to do something with the vehicle”; in
those cases, the police have a reason to take responsibility for the vehicle. Id. On the
other hand, when the driver is not arrested, it is “not necessary for the police to take [the]
vehicle into custody in the first place.” Id. Because Rohde was not arrested, it was not
necessary for the police to take control of the vehicle; thus, the police had no interest in
protecting the property from theft or other claims arising from police control of the
vehicle.
III.
We conclude, in light of the facts of this case—including that Rohde was not
arrested prior to the impoundment and that the vehicle did not pose a safety threat—that
the impoundment of Rohde’s vehicle was not justified under the Fourth Amendment.
Because the impoundment of the Monte Carlo was not justified, we further conclude that
the inventory search of the vehicle violated Rohde’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches or seizures. We therefore reverse the respective decisions of the
court of appeals and district court, and we remand this matter to the district court with
instructions to suppress the evidence found during the inventory search.
Reversed and remanded.
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