J-S48036-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WAYNE MICHAEL GLASS,
Appellant No. 216 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 8, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-01-MD-0001896-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2014
Appellant, Wayne Michael Glass, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after his non-jury conviction of indirect criminal contempt
involving violations of a protection from abuse (PFA) ord
counsel seeks to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant
The
as follows:
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S48036-14
[o]rder which modified the conditions of a previously entered
PFA [o]rder[a] to include a no-contact provision and to extend the
terms through April 20, 2017. The April 15, 2013 [o]rder was
entered after Appellant acknowledged violations of a PFA [o]rder
entered on May 23, 2012. Appellant has received copies of the
initial and modified PFA [o]rders entered against him and was
present before the [trial c]ourt on April 15, 2013. Following a
hearing on January 8, 2014, [the c]ourt determined that
Appellant violated the provisions of the PFA [o]rders entered
against him by contacting the PFA plaintiff, [the victim], and
engaging in conduct which was harassing to her.
[a]
The original PFA became effective on April 20,
2012 and was subsequently modified and extended
by both a May 23, 2012 and April 15, 2013 PFA
[o]rder.
that Appellant had sent a total of eight letters to various parties,
-in-
law, and the Postmaster at the New Oxford Branch of the United
States Postal Service,[b] which contained both explicit references
to [the victim] and messages directed to her. These letters were
given to [the victim] by the parties to whom they were
addressed. The postmarks on the envelopes indicate that the
letters were sent between July 9, 2013 and October 21, 2013.
and Corporal Christopher Mumma of the Pennsylvania State
Police, who read the letters provided by [the victim], testified to
the contents of the letters.
[b]
[The victim] works as a postal carrier for the
U.S.P.S. in New Oxford, Pennsylvania.
The series of letters contained language which both
indirectly and directly referenced [the victim]. The letter sent by
supervisor at the postal service, but nevertheless directly related
to [the victim]. In that letter, Appellant stated that he believed
[the victim] was deceiving and manipulating the mail. In August
which contained many statements about [the victim], including
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w]ake up she is on my mind and you guys too[,] I need you in
love -11). The letter
Id. at 11).
A [twelve]-page section of the August 2013 letter began
Id.).
In that
past relationship and references songs that the two used to
listen to together. (Id.). The [twelve]-page section also
contains a description of roses that Appellant had sent to [the
victim] and the meaning of each. (Id.). Appellant wrote
also wrote about the effects of addiction, discusses divorce, and
expresses his desire for a happy marriage. (See id.). A
sentence at the bottom
are no longer two but one, let no man or anything split apart
what God has joined together. Only God loves you more than
Id. at 18).
A subsequent letter, received the week of September 16,
2013
described as depicting a cross with a heart in the middle with a
hand holding the heart and two rings intertwined at the top of
the cross. (Id. at 14). A house had been drawn inside the
picture of the heart and in that house there is a picture of a
Id. at 14-15). The picture is signed
Id. at 16). Later in the
] my wife and sons I have them after [twenty-six]
Id. at 15). The next sentence states:
Id.). On the
especially mom in bed with me, smelling her, touching her,
having her hair in my face, rubbing her leg up and down my leg
Id.). The letter concludes with
(Id.).
A letter dated October 18[,] 2013 directs a family member
instructs the individual not to tell [the victim] that they are from
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(Id. at 16). Each of the eight letters references [the victim].
Corporal Mumma testified that, in his experience with
[Appellant] and [the victim], the letters which Appellant sends to
his children are given to [the victim]. (See id.). He also
t
with [the victim]. (Id. at 18-19).
(Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/14, at 1-4) (citation formatting provided). At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of indirect
criminal contempt for violating the no-contact terms of the April 15, 2013
PFA order, and sentenced him to not less than three nor more than six
serving, plus a fine and costs. Th -sentence
motion on January 22, 2014. Appellant timely appealed and, on May 16,
2014, counsel filed an application to withdraw and an Anders brief on the
basis that the appeal is frivolous.1
The standard of review for an Anders brief is well-settled.
Court-appointed counsel who seek to withdraw from
representing an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the
appeal is frivolous must:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw
stating that, after making a conscientious
examination of the record, counsel has determined
that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief
referring to anything that arguably might support the
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1
Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on February 25, 2014
March 25, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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letter or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy
of the brief to the defendant and advise the
defendant of his or her right to retain new counsel or
raise any additional points that he or she deems
[T]his Court may not review the merits of the underlying
issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.
Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations
and most quotation marks omitted). Further, our Supreme Court ruled in
Santiago, supra, that Anders of
Santiago, supra at 360.
Anders brief and application to withdraw comply
conscientious examination of the record [and] determined that the appeal
Lilley, supra at 997; (see also Petition for Leave to
Withdraw as Counsel, 5/16/14, at 1). Additionally, the record establishes
that counsel served Appellant with a copy of the Anders brief and
application to withdraw, and a letter of notice which advised Appellant of his
right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se and raise additional issues
to this Court. See Lilley, supra at 997; (see also Petition for Leave to
Withdraw as Counsel, 5/16/14, Appendix C, at 1). Further, the application
to anything that arguably might support the appeal[
Lilley, supra at 997; (see also Anders Brief, at 11-15). As noted by our
Supreme Court in Santiago, the fac
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arguably support the frivolity of the appeal does not violate the
requirements of Anders. See Santiago, supra at 360-61.
with the technical Anders requirements,
Lilley, supra at 998
(citation omitted).
The Anders brief raises three questions for our review:
1. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence
of indirect criminal contempt?
2.
3. Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion in sentencing
Appellant to [three to six] months, the maximum allowed by
law?
(Anders Brief, at 8).
standard of review for sufficiency challenges is well-settled:
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
the elements of the offense. Additionally, to sustain a
conviction, the facts and circumstances which the
Commonwealth must prove, must be such that every essential
element of the crime is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admittedly, guilt must be based on facts and conditions proved,
and not on suspicion or surmise. Entirely circumstantial
evidence is sufficient so long as the combination of the evidence
links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Any
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s guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The fact finder is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented at trial.
Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 44 A.3d 1161 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
Further:
A charge of indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim
that a violation of an Order or Decree of court occurred outside
the presence of the court. Where a PFA order is involved, an
indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek
punishment for violation of the protective order. As with those
accused of any crime, one charged with indirect criminal
contempt is to be provided the safeguards which statute and
criminal procedures afford. To establish indirect criminal
contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the Order was
sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to
leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had
notice of the Order; (3) the act constituting the violation must
have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted
with wrongful intent.
Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the April 15, 2013 PFA order2 contained a no-contact provision
ng any contact of any type with [the
____________________________________________
2
The PFA order is dated April 15, 2013, and was filed in the civil division of
the trial court on April 17, 2013. After this Court requested a copy of that
order, it was filed in the criminal court and made a part of the certified
record in this matter on July 22, 2014. The contempt order that is the
subject of this appeal
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Order, 4/15/13, at 1). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
the fourth element necessary for indirect criminal contempt. See
Brumbaugh, supra at 110; (Anders Brief, at 8, 12-13). Specifically,
act contrary to the . . . PFA
Anders Brief,
at 13). We disagree.
As aptly stated by the trial court:
. . . [T]here is sufficient evidence to show that Appellant
acted with wrongful intent by writing and sending letters which
contained references to and messages for [the victim]. The PFA
[o]rder against Appellant specifically directed him not to have
any contact of any type with [the victim] and to refrain from
harassing her. . . . Several of the letters . . . contain messages
that appear to be directly intended for [the victim] to read,
though the envelopes and headings of the letter are not
addressed to her. In one letter, Appellant directs his sons to
with wrongful intent when he sent messages to and about [the
victim] in violation of the PFA order, especially in light of [the
affirmation that she does not wish to be
contacted by Appellant in any way, a fact that Appellant appears
unwilling to accept.
(Trial Ct. Op., at 7-8) (emphasis added and citation formatting provided).
We agree with the trial court.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
is the date that we also will use.
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The April 15, 2013 PFA order modified a previously entered order to
any contact of any
(Order, 4/15/13, at 1 (emphases added)). From July 9, 2013 through
October 21, 2013, Appellant sent approximately eight letters containing
messages for and about the victim. (See N.T. Hearing, 1/08/14, at 6-7).
Although Appellant addressed the subject letters to third parties, they all
gave them to her to open. (See id. at 5, 7, 18-19). In the letters
Id. at 9). In the August, 2013
letter, Appellant wrote:
I think about [the victim] all the time, all day before bed.
Wake up she is on my mind and you guys too. I need you in my
life. . . . I love mom. . . . I love your mother more than anyone
will know. . . . I want my wife back. . . . The love of my life. . . .
You know what to do I hope. . . . [H]appy 24th anniversary,
[Victim].
(Id. at 9-11). In that approximately twelve-page letter, Appellant writes
about songs he and the victim used to listen to, the roses he sent to the
Id. at 11).
Corporal Mumm
violations of the PFA order between the parties. (See id. at 13). He
described the September 16, 2013 letter as containing artwork of a cross
Id.
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at 15; see id. at 14-15). He also read portions of the September 16, 2013
letter into evidence, in which Appellant stated:
sons I have them after 26 years of being together. . . . They are
out of their fucking minds for real. . . . I miss you all the most,
especially mom in bed with me, smelling her, touching her,
having her hair in my face, rubbing her leg up and down my leg
before she goes to sleep. . . . Tell mom I love her always and
(Id. at 15).
Finally, in the October 18, 2013 letter, Appellant directed its recipient
Id. at 16).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it found that the Commonwealth met its burden of
third parties, which is a violation of t
see also Moreno, supra at
136; Brumbaugh, supra at 110; (see also Order, 4/15/13, at 1).
Lilley, supra at 998.
[f]inding of [c]ontempt [w]as [c]ontrary [t]o [t]he [w]eight [o]f [t]he
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Anders Brief, at 13).3 Specifically, Appellant argues that,
with the victim until he was older], the [trial] court, as factfinder, rendered a
verdict which was so contrary to the evidence as to shock
Id. at 14; see id. at 13). We disagree.
Our standard of review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
well-settled:
[T]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of
fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and
to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact.
contrary to the evidence as to
Moreno, supra at 135 (citation omitted). To succeed on a challenge to the
the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 722 A.2d 195, 200 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal
denied, 739 A.2d 165 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court based its verdict on the credibility of the victim
____________________________________________
3
Appellant failed to raise a weight of the evidence claim in his post-sentence
motion. Generally, this would result in waiver. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A);
Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 933 A.2d 1061, 1066 (Pa. Super. 2007).
However, because we are required to own review of the trial
Lilley, supra at 998 (citation omitted),
we will review this issue on its merits.
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t
the evidence [was
not] so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience
of the [C]ourt Shaffer, supra
Moreno, supra at
135. (See Anders Brief, at 13-14). The trial court properly exercised its
discretion and its verdict does not shock the conscience. Accordingly, we
Lilley, supra at
998.
In his third issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. (See id. at 11, 14-15). This issue does not merit relief.
It is well-settled that:
[w]hen challenging the discretionary aspects of the sentence
imposed, an appellant must present a substantial question as to
the inappropriateness of the sentence. Two requirements must
be met before we will review this challenge on its merits. First,
an appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of
the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Second, the appellant
must show that there is a substantial question that the sentence
imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. That is,
the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing
scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. We
whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry must focus on
the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the
facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide
the appeal on the merits.
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Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-87 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).4
Here,
ot less than three nor more than six
Anders Brief, at 11). We conclude that this does not raise a
violate[d] either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in
the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the
Ahmad, supra at 886 (citation omitted).
consider mitigating factors. (See Anders Brief, at 15 (arguing that the trial
However, an argument that the court failed to consider mitigating factors
does not raise a substantial question, either. See Commonwealth v.
Moury
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4
Appellant arguably raised this issue in his post-sentence motion. (See
Post-Sentence Motion for Reconsideration, 1/17/14, at unnumbered page 2);
see also Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008),
affirmed, 17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011) (noting that to preserve claims relating to
discretionary aspects of sentence properly, appellant must first raise them
with trial court). Therefore, we give Appellant the benefit of the doubt and
review his claim.
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weigh the proposed mitigating factors as Appellant wished, absent more,
independent review of the record reveals that the court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Appellant.
Our standard of review of a sentencing challenge is well-settled:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
A sentence for indirect criminal contempt resulting from a violation of
a PFA
6114(b)(1)(i)(A).
Here, the court sentenced Appellant to not less than three nor more
the legal range.
Also, our review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the trial court
the court stated:
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been repetitive. [Appellant] has been told repeatedly that letters
of this sort are a violation of the PFA [o]rder in that whether
they are direct communication to [the victim] or third party
communication, he has been aware that his children are not
holding these letters and are regularly providing them to her.
In addition, the PFA [o]rder prescribes conduct that would
constitute harassment. Certainly this falls into that context as
well. So the violation here is not necessarily just communication
with the protected party, but also course of conduct that is in my
view harassing toward that person and while there are no direct
repeatedly such that this is the fourth contempt violation, they
are very threatening, very intimidating, and [the c]ourt takes it
quite seriously.
(N.T. Hearing, 1/08/13, at 21).
Therefore, based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in imposin
failed to offer any persuasive argument to support his request that we
disturb it. See Glass, supra at 727. Accordingly, based on our own
is
Lilley, supra at 998.
Additionally, we find no other non-frivolous issues.
granted.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/20/2014
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