FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL T. HAYES, No. 12-35899
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00555-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KATHY RADFORD, Mail Room
Supervisor of ICC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 13, 2014**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Michael T. Hayes, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging interference with his mail.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Resnick v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A);
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) (summary judgment), amended
by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to the portion of
Hayes’s legal mail claim that was properly exhausted because Hayes failed to raise
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any legal mail had been opened
outside his presence. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094 (“Mail from the courts, as
contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.”).
The district court properly dismissed Hayes’s claim regarding the holding of
his mail while Hayes was temporarily housed at Shoshone County Jail because the
allegations in Hayes’s complaint and the attachments thereto show that defendant
Radford’s handling of Hayes’s mail was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest and constituted an isolated interference. See Crofton v. Roe,
170 F.3d 957, 959-61 (9th Cir. 1999) (temporary delay in mail delivery did not
violate First Amendment where the record showed that there was a legitimate
penological reason for the delay).
The district court properly dismissed Hayes’s claim against defendants
Prado and Valdez because Hayes failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal
involvement in the alleged violations or a causal connection between their conduct
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and the alleged violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir.
2011) (discussing the requirements for establishing supervisory liability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayes’s motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that “[a]lthough leave to amend should be given freely, a district
court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would
fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”).
Hayes’s contentions regarding his motion for review of his first amended
complaint and his motion to augment the record are without merit.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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