FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 22 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT H. TOWNSEND, No. 12-56559
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-09325-MWF-
RNB
v.
NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, MEMORANDUM*
INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 13, 2014**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Robert H. Townsend appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with defendants’
arbitration and debt collection procedures. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Townsend’s
request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. King v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court dismissed Townsend’s claims against six individual
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and permitted the suit to continue
against other defendants. The district court then dismissed various defendants and
claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and
dismissed improperly joined defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Townsend does
not appeal the judgment as to the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 21 rulings.
Townsend appeals the judgment only insofar as the district court dismissed certain
individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and denied Townsend’s
motion for reconsideration.
The district court properly dismissed defendants Frederick J. Hanna and
Gerald E. Moore for lack of personal jurisdiction because these individuals did not
have sufficient contacts with California to support assertion of general jurisdiction,
and Townsend failed to make a prima facie showing that their actions satisfied the
purposeful direction standard to support specific jurisdiction. See Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) (discussing
circumstances that warrant an exercise of general jurisdiction); Brayton Purcell
LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing
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requirements for specific jurisdiction). Contrary to Townsend’s contention, the
district court did not apply a preponderance of the evidence standard in ruling on
defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Townsend’s Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion because Townsend did not identify any new evidence,
change in law, clear error, or manifest injustice. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah
Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth
standard of review and grounds for reconsideration); Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] Rule 59(e) motion
may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they
could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation”).
We reject Townsend’s contentions concerning defendant Dennis Henry over
whom the district court concluded it had specific jurisdiction before dismissing
Henry as a defendant under Rule 21.
Because Townsend does not argue any discernable issues in his appeal
regarding the district court’s order dismissing claims for failure to state a claim,
and dismissing improperly joined parties, we deem those issues waived. See
Pierce v. Multnomah Cnty., Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1037 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not
supported by argument in pro se brief are deemed abandoned).
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Appellees’ pending motions to withdraw or remove names from the appeal
are denied as unnecessary. The portion of the judgment dismissing claims as to
these appellees was not appealed, and is not before this court.
Townsend’s request that this court take judicial notice, set forth in his reply
brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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