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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14131
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cr-00038-GKS-GJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICHARD MIDDLETON,
a.k.a. Stanley Holmes,
a.k.a. Melvin Drake,
a.k.a. Delroy Stevens,
a.k.a. Richard Kelly,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(August 25, 2014)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Richard Middleton appeals his convictions and sentence of 70 months of
imprisonment, following his pleas of guilty to possessing access device-making
equipment, 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4), (c)(1)(A)(ii), and to possessing a document-
making implement with the intent to produce a false identification document, id.
§ 1028(a)(5), (b)(1)(C). Middleton argues, for the first time, that his pleas were
not entered knowingly and voluntarily; the district court failed to allow him to
allocute before imposing his sentence; and the district court failed to solicit
objections after imposing the sentence. Middleton also argues that the district
court miscalculated his sentence and that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm
Middleton’s convictions, but because he was not afforded an opportunity to
allocute, we vacate Middleton’s sentence and remand for resentencing. In the light
of our disposition, we need not address Middleton’s remaining arguments.
Because Middleton failed to present to the district court his arguments about
the validity of his guilty pleas and his right to allocute, we review for plain error.
Before we can correct an error not presented to the district court, the defendant
must establish that an error occurred that was plain and that affected his substantial
rights. United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 583 (11th Cir. 2011). If those
elements are satisfied, we may exercise our discretion to correct the error if it
“seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial
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proceeding.” Id.
The district court did not plainly err by accepting Middleton’s pleas of
guilty. Middleton argues that the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11(b) to ensure that his guilty pleas were knowing and
voluntary, but the district court questioned Middleton to determine whether he
understood the crimes charged against him and the elements of those crimes; the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty; and the penalties for his offenses. See
United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). Under further
questioning by the prosecutor, Middleton acknowledged that he was not coerced to
change his pleas to guilty and that the factual basis in his written plea agreement
was accurate. Middleton agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence and
argues that the district court failed to explain adequately the consequences of his
waiver, but even if we were to assume that the district court plainly erred, that did
not affect Middleton’s substantial rights. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d
1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). Middleton has not been prejudiced because the
government waives enforcement of the waiver.
Middleton is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the district court
plainly erred by failing to give him an opportunity to allocute. The district court
failed, “before imposing sentence, . . . [to] address [Middleton] personally in order
to permit [him] to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed.
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R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A). The district court invited Middleton to “place on the
record . . . anything [he wished] regarding the contents in the [presentence
investigation] report,” but Middleton was not allowed to “plead personally to the
court for leniency in his sentence by stating mitigating factors and to have that plea
considered by the court in determining the appropriate sentence,” United States v.
Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir. 1996). The district court asked
Middleton’s attorney if there was “anything [he] wish[ed] to state at this time,” but
the inquiry directed “to counsel [did] not adequately protect [Middleton’s] right of
allocution.” Perez, 661 F.3d at 585; see Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291,
1299 (11th Cir. 2008). The failure to allow Middleton to allocute affected his
substantial rights because his sentence of 70 months exceeded the low end of his
advisory sentencing range of 63 months. See Perez, 661 F.3d at 586. And the
“denial of [Middleton’s] right to allocute affects the fairness, integrity, and public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citing United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d
1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002). We exercise our discretion to correct the error in
Middleton’s sentencing hearing because “[f]ailing to give a defendant the
opportunity to speak to the court directly when it might affect his sentence is
manifestly unjust.” Id. (quoting Prouty, 303 F.3d at 1253).
The government argues that Middleton was given an “invitation to object to
his sentence before it was finalized,” but we disagree. The district court
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announced Middleton’s sentence in futuristic terms by stating that it was “going to
sentence [Middleton] to 70 months,” but the district court also stated that it was
imposing 3 years of supervised release, a $200 special assessment, and a forfeiture
of his access devices. The district court did not revisit the subject of Middleton’s
sentence and proceeded to ask Middleton if “there [was] anything [he]’d like to
state to the Court now that [he] [had] been sentenced.” Because the district court
failed to “clearly inform [Middleton] of his allocution rights” and to “issue[] [him]
a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing,’” United States v. Gerrow, 232
F.3d 831, 833 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 305,
81 S. Ct. 653, 655 (1961)), we must vacate his sentence and remand for the district
court to conduct a new sentencing hearing. During that hearing, the district court
must give Middleton an opportunity “to speak or present any information to
mitigate the sentence” before his sentence is imposed. Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A).
We AFFIRM Middleton’s convictions, but we VACATE his sentence and
REMAND for resentencing in compliance with Rule 32(i)(4)(A).
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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