J-A10022-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
WILLIAMS FIELD SERVICES COMPANY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LLC, PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
CLEO R. TEEL AND GLORIA D. TEEL,
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
Appellees No. 1475 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment entered August 8, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County,
Civil Division, at No(s): 2012-1959-CP
BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2014
uit in
favor of the Teels.
Instantly, the entry of the nonsuit against Appellant effectively denied
the equitable remedy Appellant sought, i.e., a permanent injunction against
lief,
J-A10022-14
actions of the court below. Erickman v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 21
A.3d 1203, 1206-
exist to support the decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably
erroneous or misapplied will we interfere with the decision of the [trial
Id. My review of the record indicates that the trial court had
1
In granting the nonsuit in favor of the Teels, the trial court
determined:
The crux of
particular issue is that the Pipeline Right-of-Way and Compressor
Site Grant executed on October 6, 2007 (hereinafter "Right-of-
Way Agreement") and the Compressor Station Agreement
executed on June 19, 2008 (hereinafter "Compressor
Agreement") are controlling and merely require mutual consent
Complaint, ¶29; see
also Right-of-Way Agreement
consent was, in fact, obtained from [the Teels].
to construction of the discharge pipeline at issue in the instant
matter. Answer and New Matter, ¶12. [The Teels] assert that
they were "unilaterally sent a check for payment of the
easement rights requested by [Appellant] but refused to accept
the check and tried to return it."
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injunctions and nonsuits are to be reviewed by our Court under an abuse of
discretion standard. This dissenting memorandum has neither ignored nor
conflated this standard of review. Any assertions to the contrary are
inaccurate. After a careful scrutiny of the record, I respectfully disagree with
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Based on the testimony provided at trial, we are of the
-of-
Way Agreement, was never obtained by [Appellant]. At no point
did [Appellant] or its witnesses provide this Court with proof that
consent was obtained.
Preliminarily, [Appellant] admitted that mutual consent
was required in order to move forward with the discharge
pipeline. N.T., 07/10/13, p. 24, ¶9-24; p. 97, ¶7-24. However,
during the negotiations between the parties, [the Teels] were
consistent in their refusal to allow construction of the discharge
pipeline absent agreement on certain provisions, as evidenced
by the following testimony provided by Ms. Cremer:
Q: Did you have any knowledge whether the Teels wanted
this pipeline to be built at all on their property?
A: I believe they did say that they would prefer not to
have any more pipelines on their property.
Id., at p. 50, ¶12-16.
Q: Okay. How did that meeting end? What was the result
of that meeting?
A: Pretty much we were in agreement on the route, that
was not an issue. I said that we would go back and take a
look at the provisions and figure out what we could do or
not do and I told them that - - there was no way that we
would be able to budge on the money and I asked them to
seriously consider that during that period of time and -
that was it.
Id., at p. 61, ¶1-9.
Exhibit Number 7. Do you recognize that
document?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And what is that document?
A: This is a - - letter from Mr. and Mrs. Teel sent to
[Appellant] to the person who actually issued the check
stating that they will not accept payment for the pipeline
right-of-way, and that contrary to what we have said or
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what you had said, that they have not consented to the
location of the proposed pipeline, however, they still do
install an additional pipeline.
Id., at p. 63, ¶11-24.
Q: So there was no final agreement reached at the
meeting on April 4th.
A: No.
Id. at p. 78, ¶ 19-11.
It is clear from the aforementioned testimony, along with
other testimony provided at various stages of trial, that consent
was never fully obtained. [Appellant] may argue that consent to
location was obtained, but that hardly satisfies the consent
requirement, considering the fact that [the Teels] had issue with
monetary compensation, among other provisions. Each of
[
was obtained. However, each witness also stated that there
were outstanding provisions presented by [the Teels] that had
yet to be finalized. Assuming for a moment that an agreement
as to location was, in fact, obtained, we fail to see how agreeing
on one (1) or a few issues, but failing to agree on the rest,
constitutes consent as to the whole.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that [Appellant] failed to
meet its burden of proof regarding mutual consent. Because no
agreement was present between the parties, [Appellant] was not
entitled to permanent injunction, rendering a nonsuit in favor of
[the Teels] appropriate.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/13, at 3-5. My examination of the record comports
showing it was entitled to a permanent injunction against the Teels, such
that a nonsuit was appropriate.
An injunction is a court order that prohibits or commands virtually any
type of action. It is an extraordinary remedy that should be issued with
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equity of the plaintiff are clear and
free from doubt, and where the harm to be remedied is great and
Big Bass Lake Community Association v. Warren, 950
A.2d 1137, 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting 15 Standard Pennsylvania
Practice 2d, § 83:2 (2005)). The requirements for permanent injunctive
relief are well settled: a clear right to relief; an urgent necessity to avoid an
injury that cannot be compensated in damages; and a finding that greater
injury will result from refusing, rather than granting, the relief requested.
Id. Even where the essential prerequisites of an injunction are satisfied, the
court must narrowly tailor its remedy to abate the injury. Id. at 1144 1145
(citing John G. Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 471 Pa.
1, 7, 369 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1977)).
The power to grant or refuse injunctive
sound discretion of the court under the circumstances and the
facts of the partic Rick v. Cramp, 357 Pa. 83, 91, 53
A.2d 84, 88 (1947)
discretion is the trial court and not the appellate court. The
action of the court may be reviewed on appeal for error in case
of a c Id. at 91, 53
A.2d at 89.
Woodward Township v. Zerbe, 6 A.3d 651, 658 (Pa. Commwlth. 2010).
to build a new discharge
See Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/13, At 3-5. Significantly,
Specifically, while Appellant argues that the Tee
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placement of the discharge line on their property under the existing
agreements that [Appellant] acquired from Cabot, the Teels told [Appellant]
that the
meetings, telephone calls, and correspondence between the Teels and
representatives of [Appellant], a new agreement regarding compensation
and other terms for a pipeline agreement could not be reached among the
Id. at 8.
Furthermore, the record reviewed in toto
Big
Bass Lake, 950 A.2d at 1144 (internal citation omitted). Appellant is not
without recourse at law. Appellant can initiate a civil action for damages
against the Teels for a breach of contract alleging that the Teels
unreasonably withheld their consent to the construction of the new pipeline.
Finally, I am not persuaded by my review of the record that Appellant
See Big Bass Lake, supra. Therefore, I
woul Wyland v. West Shore
School District, 52 A.3d 572, 582-583 (Pa. Commwlth. 2012) citing Cnty.
of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1988)
(emphasis in original) ( Supr
preliminary injunction to issue, every one of [the] prerequisites [to the
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granting of an injunction] must be established; if the petitioner fails to
establish any one of them, there is no need to address the others.
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