J-S45030-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.G.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.D., MOTHER
No. 778 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000268-2013
CP-51-DP-0001852-2011
IN THE INTEREST OF: V.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.D., MOTHER
No. 779 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000333-2012
CP-51-DP-0000653-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: G.A.R.D., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.D., MOTHER
No. 780 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 7, 2014
J-S45030-14
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000332-2012
CP-51-DP-0000652-2010
BEFORE: BOWES, J., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2014
In these consolidated appeals,1 A.D. ( Mother ) appeals the February
7, 2014 decrees that terminated her parental rights to her daughters S.D.
(born in April 2011), V.A. (born in September 2008), and G.D. (born in
October 2007) ( Children ).2 We affirm.
The record supports the following recitation of the facts of this case.
G.D. and V.A. were living with Mother and Maternal Grandmother
DHS ) received a
General Protective Services ( GPS ) report on August 10, 2010, regarding
G.D. The report stated that Maternal Grandmother had admitted herself to
Fairmount Behavioral Health the week prior, and that G.D., then five years
old, was outside the home, unattended, at 2:30 a.m. on August 9, 2010.
unknown during the time that G.D. was alone. DHS found that both Mother
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
This Court, sua sponte, consolidated these appeals on April 1, 2014.
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the respective
fathers of the Children. The fathers did not file appeals.
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and Maternal Grandmother were abusing drugs in the home, and that
Maternal Grandmother was prostituting herself to finance her drug habit.
The GPS report prompted DHS to refer the family for In Home
Protective Services. at 9. In its
September 23, 2010 application for a protective order, DHS caseworkers
stated that, during a home visit, Maternal Grandmother was high on crack
cocaine; that Mother, who was three months pregnant with S.D. at the time,
admitted that she used prescription drugs and drank alcohol; that the home
and the Children were dirty; that the house had no gas service and an illegal
electric hook-up; and that the Children went to the neighbor s house when
they were hungry because there was no food in the house. DHS obtained an
Order of Protective Custody for V.A. and G.D., and placed them in foster
care. At that time, Mother and Maternal Grandmother each asked DHS to
place them in in-patient treatment. N.T. at 9.
The trial court adjudicated G.D. and V.A. dependent on October 1,
FSP ) objectives were to obtain
housing, visit with the Children, complete a parenting education course,
engage in drug and alcohol treatment, and pursue a General Educational
Development Certificate ( GED ). Id. at 10. When Mother began to exhibit
signs of depression, DHS added the objective of stabilizing her mental health
and complying with treatment recommendations, therapy, and medication.
Id. at 15.
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S.D. was born in April 2011. She spent the first five months of her life
with Mother at a shelter called Pathways. Pathways, however, discharged
Mother for selling drugs to other residents. Id. at 9. DHS attempted to
implement In Home Protective Services to assist Mother, and referred her to
outpatient treatment. Mother, however, missed two intake appointments at
the treatment center.
a home visit at which Mother was disoriented, DHS obtained an order for
protective custody for S.D. on September 22, 2011, and placed her in foster
care. Id.
Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit ( CEU ) on multiple
occasions. On January 18, 2011, Mother had been referred to the CEU for
an evaluation but rescheduled the evaluation four times due to complications
with her pregnancy. T.C.O. at 2. When Mother finally was evaluated on
April 4, 2011, the CEU recommended that she attend an intensive outpatient
program. DHS provided Mother with assistance in finding housing by
referring her to Methodist Shelter Plus and the Achieving Reunification
Center ( ARC ). N.T. at 10-11. Mother was discharged from the Methodist
program for non-compliance with the drug and alcohol program.
Mother missed two intake appointments for outpatient programs. On
September 28, 2011, she was admitted to Valley Forge Medical Center for
severe depression, and was discharged three days later.
Mother came to the CEU voluntarily on October 3, 2011, and
requested an appointment for an evaluation. The CEU made the
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appointment but Mother did not appear on the scheduled date. T.C.O. at 3.
Mother had provided an urine sample to the CEU on January 27, 2012, which
tested positive for opiates, amphetamines, marijuana, and benzodiazepines.
Mother provided a sample on April 20, 2012, which tested positive for
opiates, marijuana and benzodiazepines. Mother, however, did not stay for
an evaluation on that date. DHS social worker Elisa Graves testified that
Mother has never completed a drug and alcohol program, despite being
referred to several different programs. N.T. at 15. Ms. Graves also testified
that Mother was referred to Behavioral Health Systems. Id. at 15-16.
Mother, however, did not provide any documentation that she was attending
any therapeutic programs. Id. at 16. Ms. Graves referred Mother to a
parenting class, but Mother failed to complete the program. Id. at 11. She
also failed to follow through with pursuing a GED. Id. at 12.
Mother attended inpatient treatment at Interim House, starting on
September 16, 2013, and, while there, provided negative urine screens.
N.T. at 22. Mother then transferred to a program at Liberte House, but was
ejected from the program for fighting. Id. at 23. Mother relapsed after this.
Id. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was in another inpatient
program. Id. at 25.
At an October 9, 2012 permanency review, the trial court found that
Mother had signed voluntary relinquishments for V.A. and G.D. The trial
court also directed that V.A. and G.D.
with Pre-Adoptive Resource to Maine [sic] by agreement of the pa
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Order, 10/9/2012, at 2. The court noted that paperwork had been
submitted pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children.
Id. V.A. and G.D. moved to Maine with their foster family in October 2012,
and at that point, sits with V.A. and G.D. ceased. N.T. at 29-30.
Based upon the signed voluntary relinquishments for V.A. and G.D.,
the trial court scheduled a hearing on the voluntary relinquishments for
November 19, 2012. However,
terminated by voluntary relinquishment. Instead, the hearing was continued
and never rescheduled.
to the Children. The trial court held a hearing on those petitions on February
7, 2014, and terminated
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),3 and (b). Mother filed her notices of appeal and
statement of matters complained of on appeal on March 7, 2014.
Mother raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.
C.S.A. sections 2511(a) (1) where [M]other presented evidence
that she tried to perform her parental duties[?] Additionally,
[M]other was consistently denied visitation with two of her
children for the last sixteen months.
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.
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3
also found that the grounds pursuant to section 2511(a)(9) had been met.
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C.S.A. sections 2511(a) (2) where [M]other presented evidence
that she has remedied her situation by taking parenting and
receiving drug and alcohol and mental health treatment and has
the present capacity to care for her children[?] Additionally,
[M]other was consistently denied visitation with two of her
children for the last sixteen months.
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.
C.S.A. sections 2511(a) (5) where evidence was provided to
establish that the [C]hildren were removed from the care of the
[M]aternal [G]randmother and now [M]other is capable of caring
for her children[?] Additionally, [M]other was consistently denied
visitation with two of her children for the last sixteen months.
4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.
C.S.A. sections 2511 (a) (8) where evidence was presented to
show that [Mother] is now capable of caring for her children after
she began receiving the drug and mental health treatment she
needed[?] Additionally, [M]other was consistently denied
visitation with two of her children for the last sixteen months.
5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.
C.S.A. sections 2511(b) where evidence was presented that
established the children had a close bond with [Mother] and had
lived with [Mother] for the first part of their lives[?] Additionally,
mother was consistently denied visitation with two of her
children for the last sixteen months.
at 7.
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hea
evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even
though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have
adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not
evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible
evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve
errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
It is well-
bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by clear and convincing
t, weighty, and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
In re T.F., 847
A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further:
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in
resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting
for a more suitable or convenient time to
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
physical and emotional needs.
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In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
The trial court found grounds to terminate Mother tal rights
pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). However, this Court only
needs to agree with one
subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order to
affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Termination is a two-step process, in
which the court first must determine if the grounds under subsection (a) are
met, and then consider subsection (b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956
A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the
focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is upon the
parent, while section 2511(b) focuses upon the child. Id. at 1008. Herein,
we review the orders pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
To satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(2), the moving party must
produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental
rights under § 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct. Grounds pursuant to
this section may include refusal, as well as incapacity, to perform parental
duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In support of her claim that that the trial court erred in terminating her
parental rights pursuant to subsection 2511 (a)(2), Mother claims that she
has substantially completed her FSP goals of parenting classes, drug and
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16. Mother testified that she had met or was making progress toward her
FSP goals. N.T. at 47-49.
While the trial court initially found that Mother had made progress
toward her goals in October 2011, the trial court concluded that Mother
made minimal or no progress at all subsequent permanency reviews. T.C.O.
at 5. y regarding her FSP goals was contradicted by the
other witnesses, and Mother offered no documentary evidence of her
completion of her goals. Instead, the testimony was clear that Mother made
little to no progress. Ms. Graves testified that Mother had not completed
any of her goals. N.T. at 17. The trial court was free to credit this
Based upon those credibility
determinations, t conclusion that Mother
has not corrected the conditions that have caused the Children to be without
parental care and control. The trial court did not err in finding the
requirements for subsection 2511 (a)(2) had been satisfied.
2511 (b)
was met. shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the chi this determination,
our case law requires the evaluation of any parent-child bond. In re:
T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). However, this Court has held that
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the trial court is not required to order a formal bonding evaluation performed
by an expert. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In support of her claim that the trial court erred in terminating her
parental rights pursuant to subsection 2511 (b), Mother claims that
and A.V. has [sic] lived with their mother for the first years of their lives and
has [sic] a strong bon Mother also claims
that she has a bond with S.D. However, the record
does not support these claims.
Instead, the testimony supports the conclusion that neither G.D. nor
V.A. had a parent-child bond with Mother. Mother has not seen them since
October 2012. We are aware that this is when G.D. and V.A. moved to
Maine, making visitation impractical. However, G.D. and V.A. had been in
foster care for two years prior to October tation with
them was inconsistent before the move. N.T. at 18. Also, Mother consented
to the move. G.D. and V.A. are bonded with their foster parents and are in
a loving, nurturing environment with their foster parents and foster siblings.
N.T. at 37. Ms. Graves opined that neither would be harmed by the
Id. at 25-27.
S.D. lived with Mother for her first five months before she was placed
in foster care, where S.D. has remained since that placement. S.D. is
bonded with her foster mother. N.T. at 27. While Mother has had visitation
with S.D., it has been supervised and not consistent. Id. at 40-41. S.D.
Id. at
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42. Felicia Silva, an agency social worker, testified that S.D. views her
foster parent as her parent and that adoption would be
interest. Id. at 43. Based upon the record evidence, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it determ
parental rights was in the best interests of the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the Children.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2014
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In the Interest of: S.G.D.,a minor Appeal of: A.D.
Combined Opinion