J-S40009-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LANCE PATRICK GREENAWALT,
Appellant No. 1577 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 16, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000347-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2014
Lance Patrick Greenawalt appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on April 16, 2013, following a jury trial that resulted in his
conviction for Criminal Solicitation - Criminal Homicide (two counts),
Criminal Attempt - Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Assault (two counts), and
Burglary.1
imprisonment. We affirm.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to convict [Appellant] of
the crimes of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and
burglary?
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1
Respectively, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 902(a), 901(a), 2702(a)(1), and 3502(a).
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2. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to convict [Appellant] of
solicitation to commit murder?
3. Did the trial court err by not severing the solicitation charges
from the attempted murder, aggravated assault, and burglary
charges?
change in venue for the criminal attempt to commit murder,
aggravated assault, and burglary charges, when jurisdiction was
proper in Adams County, Pennsylvania?
5. Did the [c]ourt
recorded statement on the basis that he was denied his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and were those
statements made in violation of Miranda?[2]
6. Did the [c]ourt err by refusing to grant [App
in [l]imini[,] which sought to exclude the testimony of T. Bryce,
the informant, because Bryce pled guilty in York County,
Pennsylvania, to false reports and obstruction of justice for lying
that he had been solicited by another to murder a Pennsylvania
State Trooper in the hope of receiving favorable treatment for an
open charge that he had at that time in York County?
7. Did the [j]udge err by refusing to suppress and/or exclude the
involuntary interception of conversations both pretrial and at
trial between the informant and [Appellant] because (a) the
affidavit of probable cause that formed the basis for the
involuntary wiretap arose from an informant who was a tainted
and untrustworthy source in that at the time of the application
for the wiretap and its issuance, the informant had an open
charge for falsifying information concerning a false allegation
that he had been solicited to kill a Pennsylvania State Trooper in
York County, Pennsylvania; (b) that neither the Application for
Oral Communications Intercept nor the Affidavit of Probable
credibility issues about which the Commonwealth was aware that
concerned the facts and circumstances surrounding the open
false reports and dealing in unlawful activities charge wherein
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2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the [i]nformant was charged with false statements regarding a
different solicitation for murder case, thereby not disclosing that
material fact in the document; (c) that neither the [a]pplication
for [i]ntercept [o]rder nor the [a]ffidavit of [p]robable [c]ause
contained any statement that the intercept was requested and
required because of concerns with the [i]nformant's credibility
due to his prior criminal record and the open York County false
reports charge to which the [i]nformant had not yet pled guilty,
and (d) the [o]rder that authorized the wiretap did not
sufficiently identify the location of where the wiretap was to be
placed?
8. Did the [c]ourt err by refusing to suppress the statement of
Appellant?
against him in the following manner:
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is
sufficient to support all the elements of the offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. 2003) (citing
Commonwealth v. Miller, 664 A.2d 1310, 1314 (Pa. 1995)). The fact-
Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 607
(Pa. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 624 (Pa.
2010)).
rulings on his (1) motion for severance; (2) motion to change venue; and
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(3) motion in limine for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v.
Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 901 (Pa. Super. 2010) (motion for severance);
Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(motion to change venue); Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187,
1190 (Pa. Super. 2007) (motion in limine).
F
(1) his recorded statement and (2) the wiretapped conversations between
him and Timothy Bryce in the following manner:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court's denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from these facts are correct. When reviewing
rulings of a suppression court, we must consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of
the suppression court, we are bound by those facts an [sic] may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are wrong.
Commonwealth v. Paxton, 821 A.2d 594, 598 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Colon, 777 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2001)); see
also Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 951 A.2d 307, 318 (Pa. 2008) (discussing
a waiver of Miranda rights).
law, and the comprehensive opinion authored by the Honorable M. L. Ebert,
Jr., of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, entered November
4, 2013. We conclude that Judge Ebe
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presented in this appeal. Accordingly, we adopt the opinion as our own for
purposes of further appellate review.3
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2014
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3
The trial court does not Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality). Nevertheless, we note that such
reliance is misplaced. See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505,
525 (Pa. Super. 2011) (rejecting an argument that Seibert established
binding precedent). Moreover, Seibert is inapposite. In that case, a
plurality of the United States Supreme Court determined that Miranda
warnings, intentionally issued mid-interrogation after a defendant gave an
unwarned confession, were ineffective. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612-14. Here,
Appellant received adequate Miranda warnings prior to giving any
inculpatory statement, and there is no indication that the officers who
interviewed Appellant sought to withhold appropriate Miranda warnings.
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