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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13302
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D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00394-MCR-EMT
CHARLES B. BARNIV,
CYNTHIA BARNIV,
BRUCE G. WITKIND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BANKTRUST,
an Alabama Banking Corporation,
HAND ARENDALL, LLC,
an Alabama Limited Liability Company,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(August 27, 2014)
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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is the plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s entry of judgment
against them, more specifically its grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the Florida law claim of wrongful garnishment. Because the parties
and the district court are familiar with the procedural history and the facts, we will
not belabor them here but will instead proceed straight to the points of decision.
Under Florida law, the tort of wrongful garnishment has the same elements
as the tort of malicious prosecution. Burshan v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA, 805 So. 2d 835, 844–45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Gulf Heating & Refrigeration Co., 184 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (“It
is well established that the principles governing a common law action for the
wrongful issuance of such writs [of garnishment] are those common law principles
applicable to actions for malicious prosecution.”), quashed on other grounds, 193
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1966). Those six elements are: (1) the defendant commenced or
continued a proceeding against the plaintiffs, (2) the defendant was the legal cause
of that proceeding, (3) the plaintiffs received a “bona fide termination” of the
proceeding in their favor, (4) the defendant did not have “probable cause” for the
proceeding, (5) the defendant acted with “legal malice”; and (6) the plaintiffs
suffered damages. See Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974). In this
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case the existence of the first two elements is undisputed, while the existence of
each of the remaining four elements is disputed. To explain why the entry of
judgment against the plaintiffs was correct, we need go no further than the third
element, but we will also address the fourth one for good measure.
As for the third element, at the time this lawsuit was filed and even now,
there has been no “bona fide termination” of the garnishment proceeding in favor
of the plaintiffs. A termination is not “bona fide” in this context unless it is on the
merits instead of for a procedural reason. See Doss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 857 So.
2d 991, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[S]uits that terminate because of technical or
procedural reasons or considerations other than the merits of the first suit, are not
‘bona fide terminations’ . . . .”); see also Cohen v. Corwin, 980 So. 2d 1153, 1155–
56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Arison Shipping Co. v. Hatfield, 352 So. 2d 539, 539–40
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The writs of garnishment were not set aside on the merits but
instead were quashed solely because of a procedural reason that arose after the
writs had been issued, that reason being the filing of the plaintiffs’ counterclaims.
See Barniv v. BankTrust, 85 So. 3d 581, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (per curiam)
(“We reverse the lower court’s order denying appellants’ emergency motion to
quash writs of execution and garnishment, because appellants’ counterclaims
against appellee remain pending.”) (emphasis added). The absence of the third
element is enough by itself to defeat the plaintiffs’ wrongful garnishment claim.
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The claim also fails on the fourth element, which requires a plaintiff to show
that there was an absence of probable cause at the time the writ of garnishment was
sought and issued. Under Florida law the issuance of a writ of garnishment raises
a presumption of the existence of probable cause for it. See Goldstein v. Sabella,
88 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. 1956) (noting that a plaintiff who had been convicted of a
crime must overcome a presumption of probable cause when asserting a malicious
prosecution claim); see also Burshan, 805 So. 2d at 844–45 (“The principles
governing a common law action for the wrongful issuance of a garnishment writ
are those common law principles applicable to actions for malicious prosecution.”)
(footnote and quotation marks omitted); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d at 706
(same). The plaintiffs have not rebutted that presumption by a showing that the
writs were obtained by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means. Indeed, even
without the presumption, we would conclude that probable cause for the issuance
of the writs existed.
We have not overlooked the plaintiffs’ contention that a judgment has to be
appealable as well as final in order to serve as the basis for a writ of garnishment.
That is not the general rule in Florida. See E. Ave., LLC v. Insignia Bank, 136 So.
3d 659, 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (recognizing that executable judgments can be
executable under Florida law even if they are not final and immediately appealable,
even though that may leave a party “exposed to enforcement of the judgment at a
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time when it cannot obtain review of it”). The First District Court of Appeal,
which has appellate jurisdiction over the area where the orders giving rise to this
case were entered, has dismissed an appeal from a non-final order while
recognizing that the order contained the traditional language of finality, “for which
let execution issue,” making the judgment “immediately executable.” Raymond
James & Assocs., Inc. v. Godshall, 851 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). That
decision meant that “the appellant [was] unable to obtain review or a supersedeas
of the order while the judgment creditor [was] able to pursue its collection by
execution.” E. Ave., LLC, 136 So.3d at 662. Regardless of whether we think that
the law should be different, it is Florida law and we are bound to follow the
decisions of the Florida courts.
AFFIRMED.
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