UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4861
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
QUENTON DAMON HOLMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00203-JAB-1)
Submitted: July 25, 2014 Decided: August 28, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William J. Stevens, Bridgman, Michigan, for Appellant. Ripley
Rand, United States Attorney, Rebecca Fitzpatrick, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quenton Damon Holman pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to possession with intent to distribute forty-three
grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Holman appeals the ninety-two-month
sentence imposed upon resentencing, arguing that the district
court erred by failing to make specific findings of fact to
support the four-level enhancement based on his possession of a
firearm in connection with another felony offense. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2012).
We review a sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In determining
procedural reasonableness, we consider, among other factors,
whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines
range. Id. Generally, in reviewing the district court’s
Guidelines calculations, “we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Holman failed to
object to the application of the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
enhancement in the district court, however, we review his claim
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for plain error. United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 509
(4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1326 (2014); see
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013)
(explaining plain error). We find no such error.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A), the
sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the
presentence report as a finding of fact.” Moreover, even if a
defendant objects to a finding in the presentence report
(“PSR”), in the absence of an affirmative showing that the
information is not accurate, “the court is free to adopt the
findings of the presentence report without more specific inquiry
or explanation.” United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 606 (4th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Given Holman’s failure to object to the enhancement and his
related failure to affirmatively show that the PSR was
inaccurate, we conclude that there is no error, let alone plain
error, in the district court’s reliance on the PSR and failure
to make specific findings of fact.
Moreover, to the extent Holman argues that the facts
of his case did not justify the district court’s application of
the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, we disagree. The written
factual basis — on which the probation officer relied in
describing the offense conduct in the PSR and to which Holman
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did not object — was more than sufficient to support the
enhancement.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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