UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4274
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CASEY SEON BURNETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (4:99-cr-00006-CMC-5)
Submitted: August 14, 2014 Decided: August 28, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Casey Seon Burnett pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012), and possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The district court sentenced Burnett
to a total of 200 months of imprisonment followed by five years
of supervised release. Following his release, Burnett admitted
violating the terms of his supervised release, and the district
court revoked Burnett’s supervised release and sentenced him to
eleven months of imprisonment. During the revocation hearing,
the court expressed concern that Burnett would not receive
adequate long-term drug treatment outside of prison and relied
on Burnett’s need for medical care in explaining its sentence.
Burnett has appealed, arguing that the sentence imposed upon him
is procedurally unreasonable because the district court
improperly considered his need for drug treatment while
incarcerated. We hold that although the district court erred in
considering Burnett’s rehabilitative needs, the error did not
affect Burnett’s substantive rights. We therefore affirm.
We review a sentence imposed as a result of a
supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
was plainly unreasonable, generally following the procedural and
substantive considerations employed in reviewing original
sentences. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir.
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2006). Moreover, although a district court must consider the
policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines
along with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012)
and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), “the court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[18 U.S.C.] Section 3582(a) [(2012)] precludes
sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to
promote an offender’s rehabilitation.” Tapia v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011); see also United States v. Bennett,
698 F.3d 194, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2012) (court may not consider
need for rehabilitation in imposing revocation sentence), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013). Here, Burnett “did not object
at the revocation hearing on the grounds asserted here,” and we
therefore review this issue for plain error. Bennett, 698 F.3d
at 199. To establish plain error, Burnett must demonstrate that
(1) the district court erred, (2) the error was plain, and
(3) the error affected his substantial rights. Id. at 200
(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Even
if all three prongs are met, we have discretion to deny relief,
particularly when doing so “would not ‘result in a miscarriage
of justice.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d
941, 954 (4th Cir. 2010)).
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In Bennett, we held that it is procedural error to
consider rehabilitative needs in sentencing a defendant to a
term of imprisonment at a revocation hearing. Bennett, 698 F.3d
at 200. The district court in that case erred by improperly
considering the defendant’s needs for intensive substance abuse
treatment. Id. Despite the error, we affirmed Bennett’s
sentence because the procedural error did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights “by influencing the outcome of
the sentencing proceeding.” Id. Other factors, such as
Bennett’s criminal acts while under supervised release,
“provided independent justification for the sentence.” Id. at
201.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that in the case at hand the district court committed procedural
error by considering Burnett’s need for drug treatment in
determining his sentence. We nonetheless affirm because the
error did not affect Burnett’s substantial rights. As in
Bennett, consideration of Burnett’s rehabilitative needs
“constituted only a minor fragment of the court's reasoning.”
Bennett, 698 F.3d at 201. The district court properly relied on
other factors, like the need to promote respect for the law and
provide just punishment, in sentencing Burnett to eleven months’
incarceration. Affirming Burnett’s sentence would therefore not
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affect his substantial rights, nor would it result in a
miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We also deny Burnett’s motion to file a pro se reply
brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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