United States v. Casey Burnett

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4274

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

CASEY SEON BURNETT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (4:99-cr-00006-CMC-5)

Submitted: August 14, 2014 Decided: August 28, 2014

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Casey Seon Burnett pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012), and possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The district court sentenced Burnett

to a total of 200 months of imprisonment followed by five years

of supervised release. Following his release, Burnett admitted

violating the terms of his supervised release, and the district

court revoked Burnett’s supervised release and sentenced him to

eleven months of imprisonment. During the revocation hearing,

the court expressed concern that Burnett would not receive

adequate long-term drug treatment outside of prison and relied

on Burnett’s need for medical care in explaining its sentence.

Burnett has appealed, arguing that the sentence imposed upon him

is procedurally unreasonable because the district court

improperly considered his need for drug treatment while

incarcerated. We hold that although the district court erred in

considering Burnett’s rehabilitative needs, the error did not

affect Burnett’s substantive rights. We therefore affirm.

We review a sentence imposed as a result of a

supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence

was plainly unreasonable, generally following the procedural and

substantive considerations employed in reviewing original

sentences. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir.

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2006). Moreover, although a district court must consider the

policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines

along with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012)

and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), “the court ultimately has broad

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

“[18 U.S.C.] Section 3582(a) [(2012)] precludes

sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to

promote an offender’s rehabilitation.” Tapia v. United States,

131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011); see also United States v. Bennett,

698 F.3d 194, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2012) (court may not consider

need for rehabilitation in imposing revocation sentence), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013). Here, Burnett “did not object

at the revocation hearing on the grounds asserted here,” and we

therefore review this issue for plain error. Bennett, 698 F.3d

at 199. To establish plain error, Burnett must demonstrate that

(1) the district court erred, (2) the error was plain, and

(3) the error affected his substantial rights. Id. at 200

(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Even

if all three prongs are met, we have discretion to deny relief,

particularly when doing so “would not ‘result in a miscarriage

of justice.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d

941, 954 (4th Cir. 2010)).

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In Bennett, we held that it is procedural error to

consider rehabilitative needs in sentencing a defendant to a

term of imprisonment at a revocation hearing. Bennett, 698 F.3d

at 200. The district court in that case erred by improperly

considering the defendant’s needs for intensive substance abuse

treatment. Id. Despite the error, we affirmed Bennett’s

sentence because the procedural error did not affect the

defendant’s substantial rights “by influencing the outcome of

the sentencing proceeding.” Id. Other factors, such as

Bennett’s criminal acts while under supervised release,

“provided independent justification for the sentence.” Id. at

201.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude

that in the case at hand the district court committed procedural

error by considering Burnett’s need for drug treatment in

determining his sentence. We nonetheless affirm because the

error did not affect Burnett’s substantial rights. As in

Bennett, consideration of Burnett’s rehabilitative needs

“constituted only a minor fragment of the court's reasoning.”

Bennett, 698 F.3d at 201. The district court properly relied on

other factors, like the need to promote respect for the law and

provide just punishment, in sentencing Burnett to eleven months’

incarceration. Affirming Burnett’s sentence would therefore not

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affect his substantial rights, nor would it result in a

miscarriage of justice.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. We also deny Burnett’s motion to file a pro se reply

brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED