UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 01-30012
__________________________
BATON ROUGE OIL AND CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION, Previously doing business as Exxon
Company, USA, a division of Exxon Corporation and Exxon Chemicals
Americas, an Operating Division of Exxon Chemical Company, a
Division of Exxon Corporation, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
formerly known as Exxon Company USA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana
____________________________________________________
April 23, 2002
Before DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.*
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal of an order compelling arbitration of a
grievance filed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). Because we conclude that the CBA at issue does not require
*
Judge Higginbotham heard oral argument in this case but had
to recuse. Accordingly the case is being decided by a quorum. See
28 U.S.C. §46(d).
the defendant, ExxonMobil Corporation, to arbitrate grievances
protesting the discharge of probationary employees, we reverse the
district court’s order compelling arbitration.
I.
ExxonMobil and Baton Rouge Oil and Chemical Workers Union
signed a CBA covering certain employees at ExxonMobil’s Baton Rouge
facilities. The CBA at issue, which extended from February 1999
through March 2002, governed the terms and conditions of employment
for bargaining unit members.
ExxonMobil hired Michael Melancon as a special laboratory
technician apprentice on March 16, 1998, and discharged him on
February 11, 1999. It is undisputed that he was a member of the
bargaining unit and that he was a probationary employee for
purposes of the CBA. However, the parties do dispute the reason
for his termination. The company claims that he was discharged for
incompetence, while Melancon and the Union claim that he was
discharged because his participation in a National Guard exercise
caused him to lose critical training.2
2
Following his dismissal, Melancon filed a complaint with
the Department of Labor’s Veteran’s Employment and Training Service
(VETA) under the Uniformed Services Employment Rights Act of 1994,
38 U.S.C. § 4301. However, Melancon’s allegation that his missed
on-the-job training contributed to his termination was rejected by
VETA, which subsequently notified ExxonMobil that it had concluded
its investigation and closed its file after finding no violation.
2
Melancon filed a grievance with ExxonMobil complaining about
his discharge. After the Company rejected his claim and refused to
arbitrate, the Union brought this action under the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), seeking to compel arbitration.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on the arbitrability of
this grievance. The district court granted the Union’s motion and
entered an order compelling arbitration. ExxonMobil appeals here.
II.
The sole issue presented is whether the CBA requires
ExxonMobil to arbitrate the reasonableness of a probationary
employee’s discharge. The relevant provisions of the CBA provide:
Article 144 Unlawful Provision is Invalid:
If this Agreement requires a party to do anything which
is prohibited by law, the requirement is invalid. In
this connection, law means federal, state or municipal
law or a rule, regulation or order issued by a competent
government authority or regulative or administrative
body.
Article 251 What grievances are Arbitrable:
An arbitrable grievance is a good faith claim by one
party that the other party has violated a written
provision of this agreement. If the claim is disputed,
the issue is either
(1) The interpretation of the provision, or
(2) The facts, or both.
Article 1121 General Discipline:
(a) The Company may discipline an employee only for
cause.
(b) Even though an employee does not commit a posted
offense, his conduct or work performance may still be
cause for discipline. However, the Company may not
discipline him without giving him advance notice and,
3
where practicable, an opportunity to correct the
situation.
Article 1122 Penalty:
When the Company disciplines an employee, it may impose
any penalty which it deems appropriate. But there is
this exception when the Company disciplines an employee
other than a probationary employee: If the penalty
imposed by the Company is discharge, the decision making
leave, or suspension in excess of five work-days, and a
claim is made that it is not reasonable, then the
reasonableness of the penalty is an arbitrable grievance.
Article 1141 Termination:
(a) The Company may terminate a probationary employee at
will.
(b) A probationary employee is one whose Total Service after
the date of last employment or reinstatement does not exceed
one year.
Article 1151 Exercising Rights:
Neither party shall exercise any right under this
agreement in an arbitrary manner, but each party shall
exercise its right in a reasonable manner and in good
faith.
III.
Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56, summary
judgment must be entered against “a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
4
the burden of proof at trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). In a bench trial, the court has
“somewhat greater discretion to consider what weight it will afford
the evidence” than it would in a jury trial. In re Placide Oil
Co., 932 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1991). We review the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Carpenters Dist.
Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir.
1994).
IV.
Due to its inherently contractual nature, arbitration may be
ordered only for a dispute that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communication Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986). ExxonMobil can therefore be compelled
to arbitrate only those disputes contemplated by the CBA. As such,
the sole inquiry before us is whether Michael Melancon’s discharge
is an arbitrable grievance under the CBA.
ExxonMobil first directs our attention to Article 1141 of the
CBA, which states that probationary employees are “at-will”
employees. At-will employees in Louisiana may be discharged with
or without cause, and in no case is the employer liable for
wrongful discharge. See Stevenson v. Lavalco, Inc., 669 So. 2d
5
608, 611 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1996); Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 451
So. 2d 3, 4-5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
The Union counters that Article 1121 allows an employee to be
disciplined only for cause. While this may be so, Article 1122,
which discusses rights of the disciplined employee, explicitly
bestows an arbitration right only for non-probationary employees
facing certain specifically enumerated sanctions. Thus, while all
employees have some remedy against wrongful discharge (i.e.,
grievance procedures), arbitration is not a remedy afforded
probationary employees in such cases. This is consistent with
Article 1141's “at will” distinction between probationary and
permanent employees.
The Union also points to Article 1151's admonishment that
“[n]either party shall exercise any right under this agreement in
an arbitrary manner, but each party shall exercise its right in a
reasonable manner and in good faith.” Because Article 251 provides
that “an arbitrable grievance is a good faith claim by one party
that the other party has violated a written provision of the
agreement,” the Union argues that the reasonableness of the
decision to discharge Melancon is “an arbitrable grievance.”
However, we decline to rely on this catchall phrase to create a
right of arbitration that clearly does not exist under the terms of
the CBA, and which would explicitly conflict with the CBA’s express
provision allowing ExxonMobil to discharge probationary employees
6
“at will.” Clearly, if only non-probationary employees are allowed
to arbitrate serious sanctions or discharge under Article 1122,
then it follows that there must be some employees covered by the
CBA that may not arbitrate sanctions or discharge. Because
probationary employees have the fewest rights under the CBA of all
employees in that they are the only ones that can be terminated at
will, it is evident that the CBA does not contemplate arbitration
of termination decisions regarding probationary workers. This is
because if permanent employees could be terminated in the same
manner, or if probationary employees had the same recourse as their
permanent counterparts following termination, Article 1141
(allowing at-will discharge of probationary employees) and Article
1122 (permitting non-probationary employees to arbitrate the
reasonableness of certain articulated serious sanctions, including
discharge) would both be rendered meaningless. See, e.g., Texas E.
Transmission Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 145 F.3d 737, 741-42 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“[U]nder Louisiana law[,] . . . [c]ontract provisions
susceptible to different meanings should be interpreted to avoid
neutralizing or ignoring any of them or treating them as
surplusage.”).
Finally, the Union relies on Article 144, which, it asserts,
prohibits one party to the CBA from performing unlawful acts under
the CBA. However, the Article’s actual text reveals that, contrary
to the Union’s assertions, Article 144 does not prohibit the
7
Company from acting in violation of the law; rather, it prohibits
the Company from being forced to act in violation of the law by a
provision of the CBA. Specifically, it states that “[i]f this
Agreement requires a party to do anything which is prohibited by
law, the requirement is invalid.” We do not read this provision as
providing a basis for compelling ExxonMobil to arbitrate the
Union’s claim that Melancon’s discharge was unlawful.
V.
It is a fundamental axiom of contract interpretation that
specific provisions control general provisions. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c). And, as the Union notes, we must
“honor the presumption that parties to a contract intend every
clause to have some effect.” Chapman v. Orange Rice Milling Co.,
747 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1984). There is simply no way to give
effect to Article 1122 and Article 1140 while simultaneously
allowing the Union to proceed to arbitration. Accordingly, because
we conclude that the CBA cannot fairly be interpreted to allow the
Union to arbitrate the dismissal of Michael Melancon, the judgment
of the district court is REVERSED.
8