UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4612
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES PAGE HAINES, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh,
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00057-GMG-DJJ-3)
Submitted: August 27, 2014 Decided: August 29, 2014
Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott C. Brown, SCOTT C. BROWN LAW OFFICE, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant United
States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Page Haines was sentenced to ninety-two months
of imprisonment following his conviction by a jury of conspiracy
to distribute twenty-eight grams or less of cocaine base, three
counts of distributing cocaine base, distributing heroin, and
maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a), 846, 856 (2012). On appeal, Haines claims that the
district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior
narcotics distribution under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and improperly
enhanced his offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(b)(12) (2012). We affirm.
Evidence of prior bad acts may be admitted as proof of
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident” but “not
. . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with [his]
character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see United States v. Wilson,
624 F.3d 640, 651 (4th Cir. 2010). “To be admissible under Rule
404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue other than
character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” United States v.
Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Potential Rule 404(b) evidence should be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
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its unfair prejudice to the defendant. United States v.
Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, there was an adequate connection between Haines’
June 2012 narcotics distribution, which supported his present
convictions, and the challenged Rule 404(b) evidence — namely
Haines’ participation in several controlled buys in early 2010.
See id. Those earlier controlled buys involved Haines
facilitating the sale of substantially the same varieties of
drugs to the same confidential informants in the same geographic
area as his instant offenses. Thus, the 2010 controlled buys
were relevant. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341-
42 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312
(4th Cir. 2004) (reaching same result under analogous facts).
The evidence of the 2010 controlled buys was also
necessary to the Government’s case. Because Haines squarely
placed his knowledge and intent at issue, evidence of his
repeated, analogous drug transactions was instrumental to the
Government’s case. See United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385,
398 (4th Cir. 2012). Finally, the prejudice to Haines resulting
from the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence did not
substantially outweigh its probative value. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
challenged evidence. See United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d
308, 314 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating standard of review).
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Next, Haines claims that the district court’s
application of USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12) constituted impermissible
double counting in light of his conviction under 21 U.S.C.
§ 856. We review this claim for plain error. See Puckett v.
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-36 (2009) (discussing
standard). We conclude that the district court did not err —
plainly or otherwise — because the Guidelines do not proscribe
applying § 2D1.1(b)(12) where a defendant is convicted under
§ 856. See USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17; see United States v.
Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 664 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is a
presumption that double counting is proper where not expressly
prohibited by the guidelines.”).
Finally, Haines contends that the district court
clearly erred in finding that narcotics distribution was a
primary purpose for which he maintained his residence. See
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010)
(stating standard of review). However, “[m]anufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance need not be the sole purpose
for which the premises was maintained, but must be one of the
defendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises.” USSG
§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. We conclude that the evidence before the
district court was clearly sufficient to support its application
of § 2D1.1(b)(12) despite the fact that Haines had lived in his
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home his entire life. See United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d
699, 706-07 (8th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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