Com. v. Baker, Sr., J.

J-A18045-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JAMES ANTHONY BAKER, SR. Appellant No. 2059 MDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 4, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-59-CR-0000127-2012 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2014 James Anthony Baker, Sr., appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County after he pled nolo contendere to two counts of corruption of minors1 and two counts of indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age.2 Prior to imposing sentence, the court determined that Baker is a sexually violent predator (SVP). Following careful review, we affirm. Baker and his wife were foster parents to two teenage girls, A.D. and J.B. While A.D., a special education student, was between the ages of 13 and 15, Baker engaged in sexual activity with her. He also sent her text ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1). 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8). J-A18045-14 direction, J.B., who was between the ages of 17 and 18, sent him photographs of her breasts. Baker was charged with six counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, four counts of statutory sexual assault, four counts of aggravated indecent assault, five counts of corruption of minors and seven counts of indecent assault. On March 18, 2013, Baker pled nolo contendere to two counts of corruption of minors and two counts of indecent assault. On April 22, 2013, the court ordered that Baker be evaluated by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (the Board). The court held a hearing on November 4, 2013, at which Board member William G. Allenbaugh, II, testified that Baker suffers from paraphilia, and has an increased risk of re-offending. N.T. SVP and Sentencing Hearing, 11/4/13, at 9. After concluding that Baker was an SVP, incarceration for corruption of minors, plus two consecutive sentences of 6 eriod of confinement of 3 to 8 years. On November 14, 2013, Baker filed a timely post-sentence motion asserting that the trial court erred by designating him an SVP, and requesting modification of sentence. The court denied the motion the following day. -2- J-A18045-14 This appeal followed, in which Baker raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Commonwealth proved by clear and convincing evidence that Baker would qualify as a sexually violent predator. 2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Baker suffered from a mental abnormality and/or personality disorder that is linked to sexually violent offenses and that he in any way would be predisposed to commit acts of sexual violence. 3. Whether the trial court imposed an unreasonable sentence by sentencing in the aggravated range and failing to state upon the record appropriate reasons for the sentence. Brief of Appellant, at 6. Our standard of review is well settled: ay only be made following an assessment by the Board and hearing before the trial court. In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a sexually violent predator. As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been satisfied. The standard of proof governing the determination of SVP preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. *** -3- J-A18045-14 clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 941-42 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citations omitted). on the analysis of the Honorable Robert E. Dalton, Jr., which includes a discussion of the testimony of Board member William G. Allenbaugh, II, and xpert witness, Dr. Timothy P. Foley, a licensed psychologist. Accordingly, we direct the parties to attach a copy of Judge Baker next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence in the aggravated range. We apply the following standard of review to sentencing matters: Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). The right to review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for allowance of appeal. Id. at -4- J-A18045-14 518. An appellant must satisfy a four- jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence: [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). Baker fulfilled the first two elements by filing a timely notice of appeal and preserving his claim in a timely post-sentence motion. He has met the third element because his brief contains the required concise statement of the reasons relied upon for appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Accordingly, we must determine if his challenge to the discretionary aspect of his sentence raises a substantial question. Whether a particular challenge to a sentence amounts to a substantial question is determined on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has held that an allegation that the trial court failed to state adequate reasons for imposing a sentence in the aggravated range raises a substantial question. -5- J-A18045-14 Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1253, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008). Baker had a prior record score of zero. The offense gravity score on the corruption of minors counts was 5. The standard range sentence was restorati sentences of 12 to 36 months. The offense gravity score on the indecent assault counts was 4. The standard range was restorative sanctions through incarceration. Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code provides, in relevant part, 9721(b). Here, the trial court noted the following factors that it considered when imposing imposing. Id. treated more seriously than normal. We have an offender here who was in a position of authority, actually as a foster parent, who was willing to take -6- J-A18045-14 Id. sentence than the one I am going to impose would deprecate the serious nature of these charges. Id. risk [were] he not incarcerated and also required to participate in mandatory Id. at 49-50. The factors set forth by the trial court, which include the seriousness individual sentence in the aggravated range. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/29/2014 -7-