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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14857
Non-Argument Calendar
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Docket No. 1:11-cv-03163-AT
TONY SPEIGHT,
FELICE CUNNINGHAM,
Individually and as Parents and
Natural Guardians of D.M.C., a Minor,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
BENJAMIN W. GRIGGS,
Corporal,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(September 2, 2014)
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Before HULL, MARCUS, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant Corporal Benjamin W. Griggs, an
officer with the Fulton County Police Department (“FCPD”), challenges the
district court’s partial denial of his motion for summary judgment. Corporal
Griggs contends that he is entitled to official immunity under Georgia law from
Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Reversible error has been shown; we vacate the
judgment, reverse and remand the case.
Briefly stated, this case arises from Corporal Griggs’s accidental shooting of
Plaintiffs’ teenage son, D.M.C. On the night of the shooting, D.M.C. was riding as
a passenger in a stolen vehicle driven by his friend, Darden. Darden and D.M.C.
stopped at a gas station; and an officer, having identified the vehicle as stolen,
approached the car. While the officer was distracted, D.M.C. ran away from the
scene and into a wooded area. When the officer attempted to detain Darden,
Darden resisted physically the officer’s attempts to handcuff him; a struggle
ensued. Then, Darden also ran into the wooded area.
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Several officers responded to the scene shortly thereafter, including Corporal
Griggs. Corporal Griggs and two other officers entered the wooded area where
both Darden and D.M.C. had run. Using a search dog, the officers located D.M.C.
and ordered D.M.C. to get on the ground. Because it was dark, Corporal Griggs
illuminated the scene using the tactical light on his gun. After D.M.C. dropped
only to one knee, Corporal Griggs push-kicked D.M.C. to the ground. Corporal
Griggs says he then intended to holster his gun, kneel on D.M.C. and handcuff
him. But, as Corporal Griggs approached D.M.C., while attempting to holster his
gun and pull out handcuffs, the gun went off. The bullet struck D.M.C. in the hand
and the back of the head. D.M.C. survived, but suffered extensive injuries as a
result.
Plaintiffs, D.M.C.’s mother and father, filed this civil action against
Corporal Griggs and Fulton County, Georgia. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
asserted (1) a Fourth Amendment claim against Corporal Griggs for unlawful use
of excessive and deadly force; (2) a federal constitutional claim against Fulton
County for defective customs and policies and failure to train; and (3) state law
claims against Corporal Griggs for negligence and battery.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Corporal Griggs
and Fulton County on Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims, but denied summary
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judgment to Corporal Griggs on Plaintiffs’ state law claims, concluding that a
genuine issue of material fact existed about whether Corporal Griggs was
performing a ministerial or a discretionary act when he shot D.M.C.
We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on official
immunity de novo. Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 981 (11th Cir. 2012). Because
official immunity entitles a public official to immunity both from liability and from
the risks of trial, issues of immunity must be resolved “as early as possible in the
legal proceedings.” See Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344-45 (Ga. 2001).
When deciding issues of state law, “we are bound to decide the case the way it
appears the state’s highest court would.” Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Whitaker Contr.
Corp., 242 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2001).
Under Georgia law, county law enforcement officers are entitled to official
immunity from suit and liability unless they “negligently perform a ministerial act
or act with actual malice or an intent to injure when performing a discretionary
act.” Roper v. Greenway, 751 S.E.2d 351, 352 (Ga. 2013); see also Ga. Const. art.
I, § II, par. IX(d).
Whether an official’s act is ministerial or discretionary is determined based
on the facts of each case. Grammens v. Dollar, 697 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. 2010).
Georgia courts define a “ministerial act” as “commonly one that is simple,
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absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and
requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.” Id. “A discretionary act,
however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in
turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them
in a way not specifically directed.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that, although Corporal Griggs was performing a
discretionary act when he attempted to arrest D.M.C., he had a “simple, absolute
and definite duty” -- imposed by an established FCPD policy -- to keep his finger
off the trigger unless he intended to shoot. As a result, Plaintiffs contend that
Corporal Griggs was engaged in a ministerial act when he negligently put his
finger on the trigger and, thus, is unentitled to official immunity.
Given the undisputed facts and as a matter of law, we reject Plaintiffs’
argument for two reasons. First, the FCPD policy at issue in this appeal did not
impose a ministerial duty on Corporal Griggs. Under Georgia law, for an
established policy to impose a ministerial duty on the part of an official, it “must
mandate simple, absolute, and definite action and require the execution of a
specific task without any exercise of discretion.” Grammens, 697 S.E.2d at 777-
78; see also Roper, 751 S.E.2d at 353 (“Procedures or instructions adequate to
cause an act to become merely ministerial must be so clear, definite and certain as
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merely to require the execution of a relatively simple, specific duty.”). “Where the
. . . policy requires the public official to exercise discretion in the implementation
of the . . . policy, the policy does not require the performance of a ministerial
duty.” Grammens, 697 S.E.2d at 778. In Grammens, the Supreme Court of
Georgia concluded that a school policy requiring the use of eye protection while
using “explosive materials” imposed no ministerial duty on a teacher, because the
policy did not define the term “explosive materials” and, thus, required the teacher
to use her discretion in determining whether the eye-protection policy applied to a
given situation.
Here, the FCPD says it had an established policy “prohibiting officers from
placing their fingers inside the trigger guard of their firearms unless they
reasonably believe their life is in danger or that they will suffer serious bodily
injury.” (emphasis added). In other words, the policy requires an officer to keep
his finger off the trigger “unless he intends on using deadly force.” (emphasis
added). By its very nature, the FCPD policy requires an officer to weigh various
circumstances and to use his personal judgment and experience to determine
whether the policy is applicable. So, the policy imposes no ministerial duty on
FCPD officers.
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Second and besides, even though Corporal Griggs admittedly violated an
established FCPD policy, the Supreme Court of Georgia has rejected expressly the
argument that an officer’s failure to comply with state law or department policy
while engaged in an otherwise discretionary act converts the officer’s conduct into
a ministerial act for purposes of official immunity. See Phillips v. Hanse, 637
S.E.2d 11, 12 (Ga. 2006) (affirming summary judgment based on official immunity
because officer had discretion to engage in high-speed chase, and the officer’s
violations of several provisions of the police manual during the chase did not turn
his discretionary act into a ministerial one); Cameron, 549 S.E.2d at 345-46
(officer entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity because his
failure to activate his lights and siren, in violation of state law, did not transform
his discretionary decision to engage in a high-speed chase into a ministerial act);
Logue v. Wright, 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (Ga. 1990) (officer responding to
emergency was entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity even
though he acted negligently by failing to activate his light and siren, in violation of
state law). In Logue, the Supreme Court of Georgia reasoned that, although the
officer had no discretion to violate the law (and, thus, acted negligently in doing
so), official immunity protects officers “who perform discretionary acts in a
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negligent manner.” 392 S.E.2d at 237. To say otherwise “would render the rule
meaningless.” Id.
In the light of the established precedent of the Supreme Court of Georgia,
we conclude that Corporal Griggs is entitled to official immunity. At the time of
the shooting, Corporal Griggs was engaged in the discretionary act of arresting
D.M.C. See Touchton v. Bramble, 643 S.E.2d 541, 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(“Under Georgia law, an officer’s decision to effectuate a warrantless arrest
generally is a discretionary act . . . .”). That Corporal Griggs, in violation of FCPD
policy, placed his finger inside the trigger guard of his gun when he had no
intention of shooting D.M.C. did not render his otherwise discretionary act
ministerial. Instead, the fact that Corporal Griggs violated FCPD policy is
pertinent only to a determination of whether he performed a discretionary act
negligently or with actual malice. See Phillips, 637 S.E.2d at 12; Roper, 751
S.E.2d at 354.
Because Corporal Griggs, as a matter of law, was engaged in a discretionary
act at the time of the shooting and because the district court has already determined
that nothing evidenced that Corporal Griggs acted with actual malice or intent to
injure D.M.C., Corporate Griggs is entitled to official immunity on Plaintiffs’ state
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law claims. We vacate the district court’s denial of summary judgment, reverse
and remand.
VACATED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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