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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. NO. 33,204
5 CHARLES JAMES,
6 Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
8 Charles W. Brown, District Judge
9 Gary K. King, Attorney General
10 Santa Fe, NM
11 for Appellee
12 Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellate Public Defender
13 Albuquerque, NM
14 for Appellant
15 MEMORANDUM OPINION
16 ZAMORA, Judge.
17 {1} Defendant has appealed from a conviction for DWI. We previously issued a
18 notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to uphold Defendant’s
1 conviction. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration,
2 we remain unpersuaded. We therefore affirm.
3 {2} Defendant has raised two issues. Because we previously described the pertinent
4 evidence and set forth our analysis in the notice of proposed summary disposition, we
5 will avoid unnecessary reiteration here. Instead, the following discussion will focus
6 on the content of the memorandum in opposition.
7 {3} First, Defendant renews his argument that the State failed to establish the
8 validity of the traffic stop which led to his arrest. [DS 8; MIO 8-10] However, Officer
9 Romero’s testimony that Defendant was approaching a DWI checkpoint driving in the
10 wrong direction down a one-way street, [RP 76] is sufficient to establish that the stop
11 was supported by an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had
12 occurred or was occurring. See NMSA 1978, § 66-7-316(B) (2003) (“Upon a roadway
13 designated and signposted for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the
14 direction designated.”); and see generally State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 15, 143
15 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130 ( “[T]o conduct an investigatory stop an officer must be able
16 to point to specific articulable facts that, when judged objectively, would lead a
17 reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.”(internal
18 quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 21,
2
1 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (noting that suspicion of violating a traffic law supplies
2 initial justification for stopping a vehicle). Although Defendant continues to argue that
3 it was incumbent upon the State to call the officer or officers who first hailed him
4 down, [MIO 8-9] we remain unpersuaded. Insofar as Officer Romero was actually
5 present at the scene, and was able to describe the facts and circumstances which
6 supplied an objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop, his testimony was
7 sufficient to establish that the stop was justified at its inception. Because the
8 subjective state of mind of the officer or officers who first hailed Defendant down is
9 not a material consideration in this case, see State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8,
10 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (“The [reasonable suspicion] test is an objective one. The
11 subjective belief of the officer does not in itself affect the validity of the stop[.]”
12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We conclude that additional
13 testimony from the other participating officer or officers would have been
14 unnecessary. We therefore reject Defendant’s first assertion of error.
15 {4} Second, Defendant continues to challenge the district court’s election not to
16 sanction the State for failing to produce a blank breath card. [DS 8; MIO 10-12] As
17 described at greater length in the notice of proposed summary disposition, Defendant
18 made no showing of either the materiality of the blank breath card or the prejudice
3
1 occasioned by the State’s failure to produce it. [RP 82] Under the circumstances, we
2 perceive no abuse of discretion. See generally State v. Jackson, 2004-NMCA-057, ¶
3 10, 135 N.M. 689, 92 P.3d 1263 (“A showing of noncompliance is insufficient to
4 entitle a defendant to dismissal or other sanctions—the prejudice resulting from the
5 violation must also be established.”). We therefore reject Defendant’s second assertion
6 of error.
7 {5} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed summary
8 disposition and above, we affirm.
9 {6} IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 _______________________________
11 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge
12 WE CONCUR:
13 __________________________________
14 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
15 __________________________________
16 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
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