UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4393
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARWIN TYRONE PETTIS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00396-CMC-2)
Submitted: August 27, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Parks N. Small, Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, T. DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carwin Tyrone Pettis, Jr., appeals from the
twenty-four-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his
supervised release. He contends that this sentence is plainly
unreasonable. We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2006). We consider first whether
the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a
more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than undertaken for the reasonableness
review for Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). If we find the sentence
procedurally or substantively unreasonable, we must then decide
whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
Here, the district court correctly calculated and
considered the advisory policy statement range of eighteen to
twenty-four months’ imprisonment, considered relevant factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012), and heard argument from
counsel and allocution from Pettis. The court also sufficiently
explained its reasons for imposing a sentence within the policy
statement range. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
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Pettis contends that, in determining his sentence, the
district court improperly relied on the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of his violative conduct, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment. Because
Pettis did not object in the district court to its consideration
of these factors, our review is for plain error.
United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2010).
The district court’s consideration of these factors
was in conjunction with its consideration of the factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). “Although § 3583(e)
enumerates the factors a district court should consider when
formulating a revocation sentence, it does not expressly
prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted
from the statute.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641
(4th Cir. 2013). Because the district court properly considered
the need for punishment in conjunction with the enumerated
factors, we find no plain error by the district court. See id.
at 642 (concluding that reference to non-enumerated factor does
not render revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when
considered in conjunction with enumerated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors).
Accordingly, we conclude that the twenty-four-month
revocation sentence — which is not greater than the statutory
maximum and is within the advisory policy statement range — is
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not plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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