People v. Warren

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption JOSEPH W. WARREN, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-12-0721

Filed June 6, 2014
Modified upon
denial of rehearing August 29, 2014

Held Defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled
(Note: This syllabus substance with intent to deliver was upheld over his contention that the
constitutes no part of the State’s case was based on the incredible testimony of the woman who
opinion of the court but was with him at the time of his arrest, but the cause was affirmed in
has been prepared by the part and vacated in part and remanded with directions for the trial
Reporter of Decisions court to reimpose certain mandatory fines that were improperly
for the convenience of imposed by the circuit clerk rather than the trial court and to review the
the reader.)
information provided by the appellate court in Williams in connection
with the imposition of statutorily mandated fines in criminal cases.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County; No. 11-CF-443;
Review the Hon. Heidi N. Ladd, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.
 Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Martin J. Ryan, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J.
Robinson, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Pope concurred in the
judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a May 2012 trial, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession with
the intent to deliver a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West
2010)) (count I), and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS
5/24-1.1(a), (e) (West 2010)) (count II). In July 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to a
30-year term on count I and a concurrent 10-year term on count II. Defendant appeals, arguing
(1) the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on count I; (2) he is
entitled to a vacation of certain assessments imposed pursuant to his conviction; and (3) he is
entitled to additional sentencing credit for time served. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand with directions.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On March 21, 2011, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession with intent to
deliver a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The charges
arose from a traffic stop and later search of a hotel room rented by defendant.

¶4 A. The Traffic Stop
¶5 On March 18, 2011, Officer Jeremiah Christian of the Champaign police department, who
was assigned to the Community Action Team, observed defendant driving a green Oldsmobile
Bravada. Upon recognizing defendant as the driver, Officer Christian “conducted surveillance
to see where [defendant] was going.” Officer Christian followed defendant to the Red Roof Inn
on Anthony Drive. Officer Christian observed defendant exit his vehicle and enter a guest
room at the hotel. Officer Christian then left the area to meet with other members of the
Community Action Team.
¶6 The team formulated a plan to return to the area around the hotel to continue surveillance
on defendant’s activities. If defendant was observed leaving the hotel, an officer would follow

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 and wait for defendant to commit a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 to
20-402 (West 2010)). The officers would then stop the vehicle and further their investigation.
¶7 Officer Christian returned to the hotel to continue his surveillance. At some point during
his surveillance, Officer Christian observed defendant return to the Oldsmobile Bravada. He
was accompanied by a white female, later identified as Kimberly Rosas. Defendant drove the
vehicle away from the hotel and headed toward Neil Street. Officer Christian went to hotel
management to see whether defendant had rented a room at the hotel. Officer Christian learned
defendant had been renting a room at the hotel since March 8, 2011. The rental agreement
listed only defendant’s name. Officer Christian then went to the room and stood watch to
ensure nobody entered or left the room. Shortly thereafter, Officer Phillip McDonald observed
defendant commit a traffic violation while turning right onto Neil Street, and initiated a traffic
stop at the intersection of Neil Street and Interstate 74. Several other Champaign police
officers, including Katherine Thompson, Marshall Henry, and Robert Sumption, arrived on the
scene to provide backup.
¶8 Officer McDonald approached the vehicle and asked defendant to shut off the car. He
detected an odor of cannabis emanating from the vehicle. Officer Henry also detected the odor
of cannabis. Because the officers detected the odor of cannabis, Officer McDonald asked
defendant to step out of the vehicle so it could be searched. Defendant responded by attempting
to lock the driver’s door and reaching for the key still in the ignition. Officer McDonald then
reached inside the car and grabbed defendant’s arm. Officer Henry assisted Officer McDonald
in removing defendant from the vehicle. After the officers removed defendant from the
vehicle, a lengthy struggle ensued and defendant resisted the officers’ attempts to place him
under arrest.
¶9 During this struggle, Officer Sumption asked Rosas whether anything illegal was located
inside the car. At first she indicated there was not, but she later informed the officer a gun was
in her purse. This prompted Officer Sumption to draw his weapon and point it at Rosas. Officer
Sumption relayed this information to the other officers at the scene. Officer Sumption then
removed Rosas from the vehicle and placed her under arrest. She was escorted to the backseat
of Officer Thompson’s squad car. Officer Sumption removed the gun from Rosas’s purse and
determined the gun was loaded with a magazine containing six rounds of .25-caliber
ammunition. He also determined no rounds were in the weapon’s chamber. While sitting in the
backseat, Rosas told Officer Sumption defendant carried the purse containing the handgun to
the vehicle.

¶ 10 B. Rosas’s Postarrest Interview
¶ 11 As Officer Thompson escorted Rosas to her police car, she asked Rosas whether she had
anything “crotched,” meaning concealed within her undergarments or inside her vaginal or
anal cavity. Rosas stated she did not. While seated in the back of the police car, Rosas told
Officer Sumption that defendant carried the gun in her purse to the car. Rosas told Officer
Sumption approximately half an ounce of crack cocaine was located in the hotel room. Rosas
was then transported to the Red Roof Inn to confirm the location of the room in which she and
defendant had been staying.
¶ 12 Officer Thompson transported Rosas to the Champaign police department to speak with
Officer McDonald. After being informed of and waiving her Miranda rights (Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), Rosas stated she had a current addiction to crack cocaine.

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 Officer McDonald inquired about the gun recovered during the traffic stop. Rosas stated
defendant had the gun in his waistband until Officer McDonald initiated the traffic stop, when
defendant placed the handgun in Rosas’s purse.
¶ 13 Rosas then expressed her concern over going to jail. After Officer McDonald assured
Rosas she would not go to jail, Rosas stated, “I’ll do anything that you want me to do. I’ll be
helpful, you know, as long as I don’t go to jail.” Rosas then detailed the drug-dealing operation
defendant was running from the hotel room. Defendant would bring large quantities of crack
cocaine to the room and break it down for sale. He used a black scale to assist him in breaking
down the product. Defendant would then package the individual pieces for sale. Once
packaged for sale, defendant would place the individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine in a
plastic bag and “go deal.”
¶ 14 Rosas believed defendant was bringing at least four ounces of crack cocaine to the room
per day to package for sale. She further believed at least a half-ounce of crack cocaine would
be found in defendant’s black duffel bag inside the room and more would be found outside the
hotel room.
¶ 15 Rosas then asked to use the restroom. Officer Thompson, who stood by during the
interview, escorted Rosas to the restroom. While there, Rosas told Officer Thompson she had
crack cocaine concealed inside her vagina. Officer Thompson looked into the toilet and
observed a plastic bag containing what appeared to be individually packaged pieces of crack
cocaine. Officer Thompson informed Officer McDonald of what she discovered.
¶ 16 Rosas returned to the interview room, where Officer McDonald was to take a statement
regarding the crack cocaine discovered during Rosas’s bathroom break. When asked how the
crack cocaine came to be concealed within her vagina, Rosas initially told Officer McDonald
that defendant physically placed the cocaine inside her vagina just before the traffic stop.
Rosas assured Officer McDonald she was being truthful. Rosas stated this was her first time
out dealing with defendant. She also stated defendant wanted her to accompany him because
he had the gun, but she was not sure whether he wanted her there to take blame for the gun.
¶ 17 After about 15 minutes, Officer McDonald again asked Rosas to speak with him. Officer
McDonald sought clarification as to how the crack cocaine came to be concealed within
Rosas’s vagina. This time, Rosas stated defendant handed her the bag containing crack cocaine
and ordered her to conceal it in her vagina just before the traffic stop. Defendant told her she
would be sorry if she did not do so. Rosas then placed the crack cocaine inside her vagina.
Additionally, Rosas told police the last time she smoked crack was just before she and
defendant were arrested.

¶ 18 C. Search of the Hotel Room
¶ 19 After Rosas was interviewed, she was asked to swear to an affidavit in support of a search
warrant. The affidavit stated Rosas was with defendant when his Oldsmobile Bravada was
stopped. At the time of the stop, defendant removed a weapon, which belonged to him, from
his waistband and placed it into Rosas’s purse. Defendant was the registered occupant of room
258 at the Red Roof Inn on Anthony Drive in Champaign, Illinois, and currently possessed
approximately half an ounce of crack cocaine there in a black leather duffel bag. Defendant
had been using the room for one to two weeks to package cocaine he later distributed.
Defendant was selling approximately four ounces of cocaine per day.

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¶ 20 According to Officer Thompson, she transported Rosas to the Schnuck’s parking lot in
Savoy, Illinois. While there, Rosas swore to her affidavit in front of a judge. The judge issued
the warrant. Officer Thompson transported Rosas back to the Champaign County jail where
she was booked for the possession of the drugs concealed within her vagina.
¶ 21 Armed with a search warrant, the officers searched the hotel room. During the course of the
search, several items of evidentiary value were seized. Officers seized a silver Compaq laptop
computer, its charging chord, and a speaker system, which were all located on a nightstand
next to the bed; a certificate of title for a 1997 Oldsmobile Bravada issued to defendant, found
in a duffel bag later determined to belong to defendant; a rental receipt from the Red Roof Inn
naming defendant as the sole person who rented the room, which was found on the nightstand;
a blank check belonging to defendant, found in the same duffel bag as the certificate of title; an
Illinois identification (ID) card issued to defendant, which was found in a pair of men’s jeans
lying on the floor underneath the sink; and a prescription bottle containing pseudoephedrine
for defendant, which was found on the counter next to the sink.
¶ 22 The officers also seized a velvet Crown Royal bag containing five live rounds of
.25-caliber ammunition, which was found in a dresser drawer (at trial, Rosas testified the
drawer also contained defendant’s clothing, but defendant denied the items were his and
testified they belonged to Rosas); a black digital scale, which was located under the Crown
Royal bag; a box of plastic sandwich Baggies, which was found on top of the microwave;
numerous empty plastic Baggies with both bottom corners removed, which were found in the
garbage can near the bathroom; 17 individual “corner Baggies” containing crack cocaine, all of
which were found in a wadded-up paper towel in the garbage can; and two glass crack pipes
and one metal crack pipe.

¶ 23 D. Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Under Franks v. Delaware
¶ 24 On November 14, 2011, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), seeking to exclude from evidence the items seized from the
hotel room. In support of his motion, defendant attached three affidavits–his own, one drafted
by Cora Holland, and one purportedly drafted and signed by Rosas. The first part of Rosas’s
affidavit to support defendant’s motion to suppress contained argumentative statements about
the lawfulness of the search itself. Rosas’s affidavit goes on to state she felt coerced to answer
the police’s questions at the scene of the traffic stop. The affidavit states she was coerced into
implicating defendant for possession of the weapon and the drugs in the hotel room.
¶ 25 Rosas’s affidavit stated defendant was not in possession of the weapon at any time and it
did not belong to him. Defendant was not aware Rosas had the weapon in her purse. Defendant
was not in possession of any drugs and was unaware Rosas had drugs on her or in the hotel
room. While some of defendant’s possessions were in the hotel room, he would only come by
occasionally to shower and change clothes. Defendant rented the room at the hotel because
Rosas did not have a State ID card.
¶ 26 Rosas’s affidavit further stated Rosas had been addicted to crack cocaine for 11 years. She
supported her drug habit by “dating” men she did not know. One man she “dated” came to the
hotel room and inadvertently left the weapon found in Rosas’s purse in the room. Rosas kept
the weapon because she wanted to trade it for drugs. Defendant always tried to help Rosas
“leave the drug addiction and the drugs dating behind [her].”

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¶ 27 Rosas’s affidavit also stated everything Rosas told the police about defendant’s
drug-dealing operation was not true and she was solely responsible for the drugs and weapon
recovered on March 18, 2011. The last two sentences of Rosas’s affidavit state, “The record
reported that I was transported to [Schnuck’s in Savoy, Illinois], before a judge to swear to a
search warrant to search the hotel room. I was never transported to [S]chnuck’s in
Savoy[, Illinois], before a judge nor did I ever swear to a search warrant before a judge.”
¶ 28 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 29 E. Defendant’s Trial
¶ 30 During the May 2012 jury trial, several people testified to the evidentiary significance of
the items seized from defendant’s vehicle and the hotel room. Officer Christian testified that in
his experience as a police officer, he has encountered velvet Crown Royal bags approximately
50 times. He testified most times he has encountered these bags, they contain narcotics or a
weapon. The .25-caliber ammunition located inside the Crown Royal bag was significant to
Officer Christian because a .25-caliber handgun was recovered during the traffic stop. Officer
Christian also testified regarding the digital scale found in the hotel room. He testified he had
encountered such scales “hundreds, upon hundreds” of times throughout his experience as a
police officer. Officer Christian testified the price of narcotics is generally determined by its
weight. Narcotics dealers use digital scales to ensure they are giving their customers the correct
quantity of narcotics. Narcotics users may also possess scales to make sure they are not
“shorted” when they buy drugs.
¶ 31 Sergeant Dennis Baltzell of the Champaign police department testified to the significance
of the plastic Baggies, of which the corners were removed. The Baggies were indicative of
bags that have been used to package controlled substances, because the corners of the Baggies
were missing. Based on his training and experience, Sergeant Baltzell would expect this type
of Baggie to be found in locations where drugs were being packaged for sale. He would not
expect to find this type of Baggie in a location where controlled substances were merely being
consumed or used.
¶ 32 Sergeant Baltzell also recovered the crack cocaine from the hotel room’s trash can. He
testified that based on his training and experience, he concluded the crack cocaine was
packaged for sale–he found 17 individually wrapped packages, all containing similar amounts
of crack cocaine. Baltzell opined the 17 packages had a street value of $340. Further, if
Sergeant Baltzell were to find individually packaged amounts of a controlled substance, an
electronic scale, additional whole plastic bags, and bags that had been cut off at the corners all
at one location, he would conclude, based on his training and experience, the person in control
of the location was engaged in the manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance.
Narcotics dealers often protect themselves with a firearm. When drug dealers travel in a
vehicle, they often conceal the narcotics within the vehicle and carry a firearm for protection.
Narcotics dealers commonly ask someone else to hold their drugs while transporting them in a
vehicle. Sergeant Baltzell opined the quantity of crack cocaine recovered from the trash can
was not an amount consistent with personal use.
¶ 33 John Carnes, a forensic scientist for the Illinois State Police crime lab, testified he
examined both the handgun and its magazine for latent prints of which he could make a
comparison. Carnes was unable to find any latent prints on the handgun or magazine capable of
comparison. Carnes testified it was possible to touch something and not leave behind

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 fingerprints. Further, fingerprint residue is very fragile and not easy to preserve. Carnes was
not given any item to examine for latent prints beside the gun and its magazine.
¶ 34 Cory Formea, a forensic scientist for the Illinois State Police crime lab, testified he
collected a swab from each side of the gun’s handle for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis
and placed the swabs in the evidence vault, per department policy. Aaron Small, a forensic
scientist with the Illinois State Police crime lab, performed the actual DNA analysis. He
compared the swabs taken from the handgun with a standard sample from defendant. Small
testified he obtained single-source DNA profiles from each of the swabs taken from the
handgun. Those DNA profiles matched defendant’s DNA profile. In fact, the matching DNA
profile taken from the gun and defendant would be expected to occur in 1 in 130 quintillion
African-Americans, 1 in 5.8 sextillion Caucasians, and 1 in 45 sextillion southwest Hispanic
unrelated individuals. (Defendant is African-American.) It is possible to touch something and
not leave behind DNA. No sample from Rosas was compared with the swabs from the gun.
¶ 35 John Martin, a forensic scientist at the Illinois State Police crime lab, testified the 17
individual packages recovered from the hotel room all contained a substance testing positive
for cocaine. He determined the aggregate weight of the substance contained within the 17 bags
was 4.6 grams. As for the package recovered from the toilet at the Champaign police
department, it contained a substance testing positive for cocaine. Martin determined the
aggregate weight of the substance recovered from the police department’s toilet was 2.6 grams.
¶ 36 The State also presented the testimony of Rosas. She testified she was 27 years old and had
been smoking crack cocaine for about 17 years. Rosas had had problems with the law over the
past three years, including two misdemeanor convictions and three pending felony charges.
The pending felony charges involved both possession and delivery of a controlled substance.
Rosas had known defendant for about four years, and they had been in a dating relationship for
the past two years. Defendant and Rosas had been sharing the room at the hotel for about two
weeks at the time of their arrest, but defendant spent the night in the hotel room only some of
those nights. Defendant kept a couple changes of clothes, various personal items, and a laptop
computer in the room. Defendant also kept his crack cocaine in the room.
¶ 37 The night before Rosas and defendant were arrested, Rosas observed a man, nicknamed
“Rabbit,” enter the room and leave a large ball of cocaine for defendant. Rabbit and defendant
did not exchange any words. Rosas then observed defendant break down the cocaine using a
safety pin and package it for sale using the scale and plastic Baggies recovered from the room.
¶ 38 Once the crack cocaine was packaged for sale, defendant held onto the packages until
somebody called to set up a deal. Defendant’s customers would call defendant’s cellular
phone. Rosas answered the phone for defendant, took his customers’ orders, and arranged a
place to meet. Rosas would relay this information to defendant, and he would give her the
appropriate amount of crack cocaine. Rosas would deliver the crack cocaine for defendant,
either by bicycle or one of her friends’ vehicles, and return the money to defendant. Rosas
helped defendant deal drugs because she “was an addict, and you know, if I done something for
him, you know, I would get me some dope, myself.”
¶ 39 Rosas testified defendant obtained the handgun from a person in Rantoul. He traded a
couple of bags of crack cocaine for the weapon. Defendant then asked Rosas to hold onto the
gun for him because he was on probation and forbidden from possessing a weapon. Rosas was
scared to hold onto the gun because she had never been in that much trouble. Defendant put the
gun in her purse when they left the hotel on March 18, 2011. Rosas touched the gun only once

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 when asked by defendant to wipe off his fingerprints, but Rosas did not do so. Rosas also
testified as to how the crack cocaine came to be concealed within her vagina. She testified just
before Officer McDonald initiated the traffic stop, defendant handed her the cocaine and told
her to hide it inside her body, which she understood to mean inside her vagina. Rosas complied
with defendant’s request.
¶ 40 On cross-examination, Rosas admitted she was hoping to receive leniency from the State’s
Attorney in her pending cases by testifying against defendant here. Rosas also admitted she
smoked at least nine $20 pieces of crack cocaine per day. When showed a picture of the dresser
drawer containing the scale and Crown Royal bag, Rosas denied the items were hers. “Rabbit”
sold crack cocaine to Rosas on occasion, but not while she was living at the hotel. She stated
she and defendant both stayed in the hotel room and defendant paid for the room.
¶ 41 Defense counsel then confronted Rosas with the numerous inconsistent statements she had
given throughout the pendency of this case. Rosas admitted she first told Officer Sumption
nothing illegal was contained within the car before she told him a gun was in her purse. While
sitting in the back of the squad car, Rosas told the officers approximately one-half ounce of
crack cocaine was in a black duffel bag in the hotel room. Defense counsel also confronted
Rosas with the inconsistency in her story of the transaction by which defendant came into
possession of the handgun.
¶ 42 Defense counsel confronted Rosas with her conflicting statements regarding how the
handgun got into her purse–she first told police defendant carried her purse containing the
weapon to the vehicle but later told police defendant placed the handgun in her purse just
before Officer McDonald initiated the traffic stop. Defense counsel also confronted Rosas
about the crack cocaine found concealed in her vagina. When her postarrest interview began,
Rosas denied having anything illegal on her person, but during the course of the interview, a
bag containing individually wrapped pieces of cocaine was recovered from the toilet after
Rosas had used it. Rosas told police defendant physically placed the crack cocaine inside her
body, but she later told them defendant handed her the drugs and told her to conceal them
inside her vagina.
¶ 43 Rosas also admitted she told Officer McDonald she would cooperate as long as she did not
go to jail. Defense counsel then confronted Rosas with her affidavit in support of defendant’s
Franks motion to suppress. Rosas admitted she signed the document before the January 2012
hearing on defendant’s Franks motion. Rosas also admitted she testified she signed the
document in front of a notary. When asked whether she wrote the document, Rosas testified
she “helped writing that document.” Rosas then testified she was told to write the portions
incriminating herself and exonerating defendant, but she did not identify who told her to do so.
¶ 44 On redirect examination, the State asked Rosas about the affidavit in support of
defendant’s Franks motion. Rosas testified defendant told her to write the affidavit and to
include the information exonerating defendant. The State inquired about Rosas’s statement in
the affidavit in which she stated she was never taken to Savoy, Illinois, to swear to an affidavit
before a judge. Rosas testified she included this statement, even though she knew it could be
proved false, because she was scared of defendant. She knew if she did not take the blame,
defendant would punch and slap her. Defendant took Rosas to the notary and stood by as the
document was notarized.
¶ 45 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was renting the hotel room for Rosas as a favor
to her. Defendant kept clothing and some toiletries at the hotel room because he would stay the

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 night in the room on occasion. Defendant did not keep anything in the drawers. According to
defendant, “[e]verything in that room basically belongs to Ms. Rosas, because the room was
for her, because I had my own place.”
¶ 46 Defendant knew Rosas had a handgun, “[b]ecause she dated a man once who’s named
Jimmy, that’s what she told me, and he was the one that had had the weapon.” Defendant saw
the handgun in Rosas’s possession three days before the traffic stop and asked Rosas to dispose
of it. Rosas kept the gun because she knew she could trade it for drugs. Defendant touched the
gun, only once, because he thought it was a “nice weapon.”
¶ 47 Defendant denied attempting to start his vehicle after Officer McDonald asked him to exit
the car. Defendant denied he ever handled the handgun aside from when he first discovered it
was in Rosas’s possession. Rosas carried the handgun to his vehicle of her own free will.
Defendant denied packaging and selling drugs from the hotel. Defendant denied ever selling
drugs–he was previously a drug user, not a dealer. Rosas did not deliver drugs for defendant.
Defendant did not know drugs were in the hotel room. He knew, however, Rosas supported her
drug habit through prostitution, and he had been present when Rosas brought men to the room.
¶ 48 Defendant denied ever possessing the crack cocaine in Rosas’s vagina. He did not tell
Rosas to hide the crack cocaine inside her vagina. Rosas fabricated her statements
incriminating defendant because she wanted leniency from the State. Defendant denied telling
Rosas what information to include in her affidavit in support of his Franks motion. Defendant
never told Rosas how to testify in another proceeding and never threatened her harm.
¶ 49 On cross-examination, defendant maintained he was helping Rosas rent the hotel room out
of the goodness of his heart. He would take cash she gave him to go pay for the room. He
sometimes paid a portion of the bill out of his own pocket. Sometimes, defendant “dated”
Rosas and gave her money in exchange. Defendant knew Rosas was a drug user on March 18,
2011, but he “never got involved” with what she did. He often told her to go to rehab, but she
was stubborn and would not listen. “She kept her lifestyle,” defendant testified, “and my
mistake was just being around her like that.”
¶ 50 Defendant stated he had not smoked crack cocaine in four to five years. At the time of trial,
defendant still associated with Rosas. When asked whether his relationship with Rosas was the
same as it was on March 18, 2011, defendant stated it was. The last time defendant “dated”
Rosas was about three months prior to trial. Defendant thought he and Rosas would still be on
good terms after her testimony at trial. Rosas was only incriminating him to get leniency from
the State. Defendant was not upset with Rosas’s testimony at trial because he knew she would
testify as she did all along. Defendant knew he was the person the police were really after.
Defendant was never guilty of any offense of which he was accused. This incident, like all his
other previous run-ins with the law, was caused by the fact he is a nice person and others take
advantage of him.
¶ 51 On this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty on both counts.

¶ 52 F. Defendant’s Sentence
¶ 53 On July 2, 2012, the cause proceeded to defendant’s sentencing hearing. Prior to the
hearing, the parties were allowed to suggest corrections to the presentence investigation report
(PSI). Only the State took this opportunity, adding dates and case numbers to the portion of the
PSI detailing defendant’s criminal history. After the parties presented evidence in aggravation

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 and mitigation and argued the appropriate sentence for this case, defendant addressed the
court. Defendant stated he was innocent of the charges in this case. In fact, he was not guilty of
any offense in his criminal history. On this occasion and in his past, defendant was guilty only
by his association with criminals.
¶ 54 The trial court sentenced defendant to a 30-year term on count I and a concurrent 10-year
term on count II. After announcing this sentence, the court addressed the issues of sentencing
credit and monetary assessments with the parties. The court asked defense counsel whether
145 days was the correct calculation of credit for time served, and counsel responded in the
affirmative. Thereafter, the court awarded defendant 145 days’ credit for time served and
ordered defendant to pay a $100 crime laboratory analysis fee, a $2,000 mandatory
assessment, and a $340 street-value fine for the cocaine recovered from the hotel room. In
addition, the court authorized a $250 DNA analysis fee to be imposed, but only if defendant
had not previously been assessed the fee. Finally, the court ordered defendant to “pay all fines,
fees, and costs as authorized by statute,” but it did not specifically refer to any fine, fee, or cost
other than those already stated. The court asked whether the parties had anything else to add,
and both parties responded they did not.
¶ 55 After defendant’s sentencing hearing, the circuit clerk calculated the statutorily authorized
assessments against defendant, which are reflected in a printout from the clerk. The printout
from the clerk (see appendix), shows defendant was assessed the following fines and fees on
count I: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment; (2) a $10 automation assessment; (3) a $100
circuit-clerk assessment; (4) a $25 court-security assessment; (5) a $50 court-finance
assessment; (6) a $40 State’s Attorney assessment (a $30 assessment for felony conviction plus
the $10 remitted to the State’s Attorney as part of the juvenile expungement assessment); (7) a
$2 “State’s Attorney Au” assessment; (8) a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment; (9) a $5
spinal-cord-research assessment; (10) a $250 “State Offender DN” assessment; (11) a $100
trauma-fund assessment; (12) a $590 traffic/criminal surcharge; (13) a $30 juvenile
expungement assessment listed as three separate $10 assessments for the State Police Services
Fund, State’s Attorney’s Office Fund (the $10 assessment for the State’s Attorney is included
in the $40 charge listed for the State’s Attorney on the clerk’s printout), and Circuit Clerk
Operations and Administrative Fund; (14) a $5 drug-court assessment; (15) a $236 violent
crimes victims assistance (VCVA) assessment; (16) a $340 street-value fine; (17) a $1,275
mandatory assessment; and (18) a $10 State Police operations assessment.
¶ 56 On count II, the circuit clerk’s printout shows defendant was assessed the following fines
and fees: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment; (2) a $10 automation assessment; (3) a $100
circuit-clerk assessment; (4) a $25 court-security assessment; (5) a $50 court-finance
assessment; (6) a $40 State’s Attorney assessment (a $30 assessment for felony conviction plus
the $10 remitted to the State’s Attorney as part of the juvenile expungement assessment); (7) a
$2 “State’s Attorney Au” assessment; (8) a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment; (9) a $10
traffic/criminal surcharge; (10) a $30 juvenile expungement assessment listed as three separate
$10 assessments for the State Police Services Fund, State’s Attorney’s Office Fund (the $10
assessment for the State’s Attorney is included in the $40 charge listed for the State’s Attorney
on the clerk’s printout), and Circuit Clerk Operations and Administrative Fund; (11) a $5
drug-court assessment; (12) a $4 VCVA assessment (we note the printout also contains an
entry called “VICTIMS FUND–NO FI,” with no dollar amount listed); and (13) a $10 State

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 Police operations assessment. The printout also contains an entry for “CRIME LAB,” but no
dollar amount is listed.
¶ 57 This appeal followed.

¶ 58 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 59 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 60 Defendant argues the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction
for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Specifically, defendant
argues the State’s case was based entirely on the incredible testimony of Kimberly Rosas, and
as a result, defendant’s conviction and sentence for that offense must be vacated. The State
responds the evidence, notwithstanding Rosas’s testimony, is sufficient to sustain his
conviction. Defendant does not challenge his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon
by a felon.
¶ 61 When met with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considers whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114, 871 N.E.2d 728, 740 (2007). The critical question is whether the
record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
“This standard of review applies, ‘regardless of whether the evidence is direct or
circumstantial [citation], and regardless of whether the defendant receives a bench or jury trial
[citation].’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 743 N.E.2d 32, 40 (2000)).
¶ 62 It is not this court’s function to a retry defendant when met with challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541, 708 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1999).
Instead, our duty is “to carefully examine the evidence while giving due consideration to the
fact that the [trial] court and jury saw and heard the witnesses.” Id. As such, the jury’s findings
regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 115, 871
N.E.2d at 740. The jury’s findings regarding witness credibility are neither conclusive nor
binding, however, because reasonable people may act unreasonably on occasion. Id.
“Accordingly, a conviction will be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” Id.
¶ 63 To sustain a conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant had knowledge of
the presence of the controlled substance; (2) the controlled substance was in the immediate
possession or control of the defendant; and (3) the defendant intended to deliver the controlled
substance. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (1995).
¶ 64 Knowledge can rarely be proved by direct evidence and is typically “proved by defendant’s
actions, declarations, or conduct from which an inference of knowledge may be fairly drawn.”
People v. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d 348, 352, 636 N.E.2d 86, 90 (1994). Because knowledge is
difficult to prove, when actual or constructive possession is established, knowledge can
generally be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Id.; see also People v. Nettles, 23 Ill.
2d 306, 308, 178 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1961) (“where narcotics are found on premises under
defendant’s control, it may be inferred that the defendant had both knowledge and control of
the narcotics”). Actual possession requires actual physical dominion over the contraband,
while constructive possession is established where a defendant has exclusive control of the

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 premises in which the contraband is found. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 352-53, 636 N.E.2d
at 90. “The requirement of exclusive control does not mean that possession may not be joint.”
Id. at 353, 636 N.E.2d at 90.
¶ 65 Intent is also rarely proved by direct evidence. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657 N.E.2d at
1026. Courts look to a variety of factors to prove the intent element of the instant offense,
which include:
“whether the quantity of controlled substance in defendant’s possession is too large to
be viewed as being for personal consumption [citation], the high purity of the drug
confiscated [citation], the possession of weapons [citation], the possession of large
amounts of cash [citation], the possession of police scanners, beepers or cellular
telephones [citations], the possession of drug paraphernalia [citation] and the manner in
which the substance is packaged [citation].” Id., 657 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
In People v. Beverly, 278 Ill. App. 3d 794, 663 N.E.2d 1061 (1996), this court affirmed a
defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled
substance where the drugs were packaged for sale and the State proved one additional factor
tending to show an intent to deliver–the presence of a large amount of cash on defendant’s
person. Id. at 802, 663 N.E.2d at 1066-67; see also People v. Delgado, 256 Ill. App. 3d 119,
123, 628 N.E.2d 727, 730 (1993) (“The minimum this court has required for the affirmance of
a conviction for delivery involving small amounts of drugs is possession of the controlled
substance packaged for sale, plus at least one additional factor indicative of delivery ***.”).
¶ 66 In this case, the record evidence reasonably supports a finding of guilt. Defendant had
exclusive control over the hotel room in which the 4.6 grams of cocaine were found. In this
case, defendant was the only person named in the hotel rental agreement and paid for the room
in cash each day. Defendant kept important personal belongings in the room, such as a blank
check, a laptop computer, the certificate of title to his vehicle, and prescription medication.
Defendant also kept clothes and toiletries in the hotel room. Just because Rosas also had
unfettered access to the room and stayed there more often than defendant does not mean
defendant did not have exclusive control over the premises. See People v. Songer, 229 Ill. App.
3d 901, 905, 594 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1992). Exclusive possession may be joint. People v. Burke,
136 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599, 483 N.E.2d 674, 679 (1985). Because defendant had exclusive
control over the hotel room in which the crack cocaine was found, he constructively possessed
the crack cocaine recovered therefrom.
¶ 67 Since defendant had constructive possession of the crack cocaine found in the trash can of
the hotel room, the jury was entitled to find defendant had the requisite knowledge crack
cocaine was present in the room. See Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d at 308, 178 N.E.2d at 363. Here, other
facts tend to show defendant had knowledge of the presence of crack cocaine inside the hotel
room. Defendant was aware of the fact Rosas used cocaine. Further, defendant knew Rosas
“dated” men at the hotel to support her crack cocaine addiction. Defendant had the requisite
knowledge crack cocaine was located inside the hotel room.
¶ 68 Based on the record, we also conclude the jury was justified in finding defendant had the
requisite intent to deliver the crack cocaine. While executing the search warrant for the hotel
room, the police recovered a digital scale, live .25-caliber ammunition, whole plastic Baggies,
plastic Baggies of which the bottom corners had been removed, and 17 individually wrapped
pieces of crack cocaine. Because the crack cocaine found in the hotel room was packaged in a
manner consistent with how it is sold, the presence of one additional factor tending to show

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 intent can support a finding of intent to deliver a controlled substance. See Beverly, 278 Ill.
App. 3d at 802, 663 N.E.2d at 1066-67. Here, not only was the crack cocaine packaged for sale,
but ammunition and paraphernalia consistent with drug dealing was also found in the hotel
room. Further, the police recovered a gun during the search of defendant’s vehicle. The jury
was entitled to find defendant had the requisite intent to deliver the 4.6 grams of cocaine in the
hotel room.
¶ 69 Turning to the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine recovered from the toilet at the Champaign
police department, the record evidence supports a finding of guilt. Defendant had constructive
possession over the crack cocaine hidden inside Rosas’s body as he had exclusive control over
the vehicle in which Rosas was traveling. Defendant was the sole person listed on the vehicle’s
certificate of title. While the crack cocaine was located in Rosas’s body, giving her actual
possession thereof, the jury was entitled to find defendant constructively possessed the
cocaine. See People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75, 82, 740 N.E.2d 775, 779 (2000) (“The rule that
possession must be exclusive does not mean that the possession may not be joint ***.”).
¶ 70 Defendant’s constructive possession of the crack cocaine ultimately recovered from the
Champaign police department toilet gives rise to an inference defendant had knowledge of the
presence of the crack cocaine. See Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d at 308, 178 N.E.2d at 363. Further,
testimony of defendant’s attempt to lock the door and start the vehicle supports the inference
defendant had the requisite knowledge.
¶ 71 Finally, the record evidence shows the jury was entitled to find defendant had the requisite
intent to deliver a controlled substance. The crack cocaine ultimately recovered from the
Champaign police department toilet was packaged for sale in the same manner as that
recovered from the hotel room. Further, a loaded handgun was recovered from Rosas’s purse
during the traffic stop.
¶ 72 Defendant asserts the State’s evidence against him “was based entirely on the testimony of
admitted addict and co-defendant Kimberly Rosas.” Defendant argues Rosas’s testimony does
not carry the absolute conviction of its truth and, therefore, does not suffice as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of his guilt. In support of his argument, defendant cites Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532,
708 N.E.2d 365. In Smith, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on his murder
conviction. Id. at 534, 708 N.E.2d at 366. The supreme court determined the “weakness of the
State’s chief witness, along with the lack of other direct evidence linking defendant to the
crime, required a not guilty verdict as a matter of law.” Id. at 542, 708 N.E.2d at 370. The
supreme court noted “the circumstantial evidence tending to link defendant to the murder
merely narrowed the class of individuals who may have killed the victim, without pointing
specifically to defendant.” Id. at 545, 708 N.E.2d at 371.
¶ 73 The record shows Rosas’s statements throughout the pendency of this case contained
numerous inconsistencies as to how she came into possession of the gun and the drugs
ultimately recovered from her vagina. Her two affidavits appear to be in direct conflict with
one another. Rosas is admittedly addicted to crack cocaine and hoped for leniency from the
State in exchange for her statements incriminating defendant. Rosas’s statements are subject to
question, and they were subjected to scrutiny by the attorneys in this case. Further, Rosas
testified she was charged as defendant’s codefendant with possession of the crack cocaine
hidden in her vagina. On the State’s request, the jury was instructed to view Rosas’s testimony
with caution. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed. 2000) (prior
inconsistent statements); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (4th ed. 2000)

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 (accomplice testimony). The trier of fact was entitled to decide which version of events she
gave should be credited.
¶ 74 Moreover, we disagree the State’s case was based entirely on Rosas’s statements and
testimony. The State presented much circumstantial evidence against defendant
notwithstanding Rosas’s statements and testimony. Defendant rented a hotel room in which
extensive evidence of a drug-dealing operation was found. The State presented the testimony
of 11 people in addition to Rosas. Officer Christian and Sergeant Baltzell explained to the jury
the evidentiary significance of the items found in the hotel room–the items found were
indicative of the manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance. The jury was present
throughout the proceedings and found the State’s witnesses more credible than the defendant’s
own self-serving statements of innocence. The evidence presented by the State reasonably
supports a finding of guilt, and our function is not to reweigh this evidence. We affirm
defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

¶ 75 B. Fines and Fees
¶ 76 Defendant contends the trial court improperly duplicated the assessments imposed
pursuant to his conviction. Specifically, defendant argues he was assessed the statutorily
authorized fines and fees on each count within his single case, which is improper under People
v. Alghadi, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, 960 N.E.2d 612. Defendant argues this court should
vacate the duplicate fines. In addition, defendant argues the circuit clerk improperly assessed a
$250 DNA analysis fee after the court conditionally ordered the fee at his sentencing hearing.
¶ 77 The State concedes defendant was improperly assessed duplicate fines and fees and the
DNA analysis fee. We do not accept the State’s concession as to the duplicate fines and fees.
Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 60, 896 N.E.2d 327, 333 (2008). The State, further,
disagrees the trial court imposed certain fines, instead arguing because the circuit clerk
improperly imposed these assessments, remand is required so the fines may be imposed by the
judge. In addition, the State contends the court, on remand, must increase the street-value fine
imposed pursuant to defendant’s conviction on count I because the court erroneously imposed
the fine on only the cocaine found in the hotel room.

¶ 78 1. Fines and Fees on Each Count: Rethinking Alghadi
¶ 79 Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s imposition of one of each of the following
assessments on each count in his case: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment; (2) a $10
automation assessment; (3) a $100 circuit-clerk assessment; (4) a $25 court-security
assessment; (5) a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment; (6) a $50 court-finance assessment; (7) a
$40 State’s Attorney assessment; (8) a VCVA assessment ($236 on count I and $4 on count II);
and (9) a $10 State Police operations assessment. Defendant contends the court could not
properly impose these duplicate assessments on each count within his case, citing Alghadi,
2011 IL App (4th) 100012, 960 N.E.2d 612.

¶ 80 a. Trial Court Must Impose Fines as Component of Sentence
¶ 81 We must first consider whether the trial court or the circuit clerk imposed the assessments
in this case. Defendant argues the trial court improperly imposed the duplicate assessments of
which he takes issue. The State, however, points out the circuit clerk imposed the assessments.

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 See People v. Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 35, 5 N.E.3d 227 (“In appeals raising
statutory credit issues, this requires the parties’ briefs to contain a statement of facts identifying
which specific fines the trial court identified and expressly imposed as part of the sentence–and
which fines the circuit clerk simply assessed after sentencing and without bringing them to the
judge’s attention and having the judge sign off on them in a supplemental sentencing
judgment–and providing appropriate citations to the record. The parties may not agree to
overlook or otherwise ignore the circuit clerk’s imposition of fines not ordered by the trial
court.”). The record shows the court, at defendant’s July 2012 sentencing hearing, ordered
defendant to “pay all fines, fees, and costs as authorized by statute.” The record contains no
docket entry, order, or amended sentencing judgment reflecting the imposition of these
assessments during sentencing. The record does not otherwise indicate the court approved
these assessments, defendant or the attorneys were present for their imposition, or even that
defendant or defense counsel were notified thereof.
¶ 82 In this case, when the trial court ordered defendant to “pay all fines, fees, and costs as
authorized by statute,” it improperly delegated its power to impose a sentence to the circuit
clerk. See People v. Fontana, 251 Ill. App. 3d 694, 709, 622 N.E.2d 893, 904 (1993) (Second
District, “the imposition of a fine is a judicial act which can be performed only by a judge”);
People v. Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 52, 992 N.E.2d 3 (“The circuit clerk has no
authority to impose fines.”); Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶¶ 29-38, 5 N.E.3d 227 (in
finding the clerk improperly imposed the fines at issue, the court held the task of imposing
fines may not be delegated to the clerk); People v. Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993, ¶ 37, 5
N.E.3d 246 (vacating the circuit clerk’s imposition of mandatory fines because the circuit clerk
has no authority to levy fines against a criminal defendant); see also People v. Isaacson, 409
Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1085, 950 N.E.2d 1183, 1189-90 (2011) (trial court expressly imposed a
DNA assessment and a contribution to the Crime Detection Network and ordered defendant to
pay whatever mandatory assessments, including the VCVA fine, listed by the circuit clerk; the
record contained no evidence the court itself determined the mandatory fines that applied to the
defendant’s conviction and the appropriate amounts of those fines; this court held the
conditional discharge order erroneously abdicated that task to the clerk). Any fine imposed by
the clerk must be vacated and the cause remanded for the trial judge to impose the fines.
Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993, ¶ 37, 5 N.E.3d 246.

¶ 83 b. Assessments Imposed by Circuit Clerk
¶ 84 i. Distinction Between Fines and Fees
¶ 85 We next consider whether the assessments levied by the circuit clerk in this case are fines
or fees, because any fine assessed by the clerk must be vacated.
¶ 86 The supreme court has recognized, despite their label as fees, certain assessments imposed
pursuant to a conviction are fines. People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244, 250, 919 N.E.2d 906,
909-10 (2009); People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 599-600, 861 N.E.2d 967, 985-86 (2006). The
Graves court explained the distinction between fines and fees as follows:
“A fee is defined as a charge that seeks to recoup expenses incurred by the state, or to
compensate the state for some expenditure incurred in prosecuting the defendant.
[Citation.] A fine, however, is punitive in nature and is a pecuniary punishment
imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense. [Citation.]”

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 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 250, 919 N.E.2d at 909.

¶ 87 ii. Can Fines and/or Fees Be Imposed on Each Count?
¶ 88 As part of our analysis, we next consider whether the assessments levied in this case can
properly be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case.
¶ 89 This court has addressed the issue of whether certain fines, fees, and costs may be imposed
on each count in a defendant’s single case. In Alghadi, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, 960 N.E.2d
612, we explained, without the benefit of briefs or argument by the parties, as follows:
“Although a defendant may be charged with multiple counts within the same case
number, the defendant may only be assessed (1) one document-storage fee, (2) one
automation fee, (3) one circuit-clerk fee, (4) one court-security fee, (5) one
arrestee’s-medical assessment, (6) one court-finance fee, (7) one State’s Attorney
assessment, (8) one VCVA fine, and (9) one drug-court fee.” (Emphases in original.)
Alghadi, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, ¶ 22, 960 N.E.2d 612.
¶ 90 Following this court’s decision in Alghadi, the Second District addressed the issue of
whether fines may be imposed on each count within a defendant’s single case. In People v.
Pohl, 2012 IL App (2d) 100629, 969 N.E.2d 508, and People v. Martino, 2012 IL App (2d)
101244, 970 N.E.2d 1236, the Second District approached the issue by examining the language
of the statute or ordinance imposing each fee to ascertain whether that fee could be imposed
more than once. While the instant appeal was pending, this court decided People v. Larue,
2014 IL App (4th) 120595. In Larue, we declined to apply our own decision in Alghadi, and
instead followed the Second District’s approach to duplicate fines and fees. Id. ¶ 59. We will
examine the statutory language authorizing or mandating each fine or fee to determine whether
the imposition of multiple fines or fees in a defendant’s single case is proper.

¶ 91 iii. The Assessments in This Case
¶ 92 To determine whether an assessment is a fine or a fee and whether the assessment may be
imposed on each count within a defendant’s case, we look to the language of the statutes
providing for their imposition. Because the issues presented are ones of statutory construction,
our review is de novo. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 959 N.E.2d 621. Our primary
objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Id.
The best indication of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, which should be
given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6, 980 N.E.2d
1107. “When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as
written without resort to aids of statutory construction.” People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 232
Ill. 2d 179, 184, 902 N.E.2d 667, 671 (2009).

¶ 93 (a) The Document-Storage Assessments:
A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 94 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 document-storage fee (705 ILCS
105/27.3c(a) (West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, 2014 IL App (4th)
120595, ¶ 62, we held the clerk could only assess one document-storage fee against the
defendant, even though his case resulted in multiple convictions. We vacate one of the

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 document-storage fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 95 (b) The Automation Assessments:
A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 96 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 automation fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3a
(West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk could assess only
one automation fee per case. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 64. We vacate one of the
automation fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 97 (c) The Circuit-Clerk Assessments:
A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 98 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $100 circuit-clerk fee (705 ILCS
105/27.1a(w) (West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk
could assess only one circuit-clerk fee per felony complaint. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595,
¶ 66. Here, the two counts filed by the State constituted one felony complaint. We vacate one
of the circuit-clerk fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 99 (d) The Court-Security Assessments:
A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 100 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $25 court-security fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1103
(West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk could assess only
one court-security fee against the defendant. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 68. We
vacate one of the court-security fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 101 (e) The Court-Finance Assessments:
A Fee Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 102 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $50 court-finance fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c),
(g) (West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk can properly
impose a court-finance fee for each judgment of guilty or order of supervision. Larue, 2014 IL
App (4th) 120595, ¶ 70. In this case, because defendant was found guilty of two offenses, the
clerk properly assessed two court-finance fees against defendant.

¶ 103 (f) The State’s Attorney Assessments:
A Fee Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 104 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $40 State’s Attorney fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002
(West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk could impose the
State’s Attorney assessment on a per-conviction basis. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 72.
In this case, because defendant was convicted of two offenses, the circuit clerk properly
assessed two State’s Attorney fees against defendant.
¶ 105 Our review of the statute authorizing the State’s Attorney fee shows the State’s Attorney is
entitled to receive $30 for each felony conviction. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2010). The
additional $10 listed under the State’s Attorney assessment on the circuit clerk’s printout is the

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 $10 sum paid to the State’s Attorney out of the $30 juvenile-expungement assessment
discussed below. See 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West 2010).

¶ 106 (g) The State’s Attorney Automation Assessments:
A Fee Properly Imposed on Each Count
¶ 107 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $2 State’s Attorney automation fee on each
count in defendant’s case. Section 4-2002(a) of the 2012 version of the Counties Code
provides, in pertinent part:
“State’s attorneys shall be entitled to a $2 fee to be paid by the defendant on a
judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision for a violation of any provision of the
Illinois Vehicle Code or any felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense to discharge the
expenses of the State’s Attorney’s office for establishing and maintaining automated
record keeping systems.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012).
Public Act 97-673 amended section 4-2002 of the Counties Code to add the above-quoted
provision, which does not appear in the version of section 4-2002 in effect when defendant
committed the offenses in question. Pub. Act 97-673, § 5 (eff. June 1, 2012). If the assessment
is a fine, we must vacate its imposition as violating the prohibition on ex post facto
punishment. People v. Dalton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 158, 163, 941 N.E.2d 428, 434 (2010) (“The
prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to laws that are punitive. It does not apply to
fees, which are compensatory instead of punitive.”).
¶ 108 The plain language of section 4-2002(a) evidences the legislature’s intent the $2
assessment be compensatory in nature. The assessment is to be used to “discharge the expenses
of the State’s Attorney’s office for establishing and maintaining automated record keeping
systems.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012). Because the assessment is intended to reimburse
the State’s Attorneys for their expenses related to automated record-keeping systems, the
assessment is not punitive in nature. The assessment is a fee. Thus, the circuit clerk could
properly impose the assessment against defendant, even though the provision authorizing the
assessment became law after defendant committed the offenses charged in this case.
¶ 109 The plain language of section 4-2002(a) clearly evidences the legislature’s intent this fee
be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. A defendant must pay the $2 fee “on a
judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision for *** any felony, misdemeanor, or petty
offense.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012). Because a defendant may properly be charged
with and found guilty of multiple felony, misdemeanor, or petty offenses in a single case, the
$2 State’s Attorney automation fees could be imposed on each count in defendant’s case. This
conclusion is bolstered by the language in section 4-2002(a), providing “[n]o fees shall be
charged on more than 10 counts in any one indictment or information on trial and conviction;
nor on more than 10 counts against any one defendant on pleas of guilty.” Id. The circuit clerk
properly assessed two State’s Attorney automation fees against defendant.

¶ 110 (h) The Arrestee’s Medical Assessments:
A Noncreditable Fine That Can Be Imposed by the Court on Each Count
¶ 111 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment on each
count in defendant’s case. Section 17 of the County Jail Act (Jail Act) (730 ILCS 125/17 (West
2010)) provides, in pertinent part:

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 “The county shall be entitled to a $10 fee for each conviction or order of
supervision for a criminal violation, other than a petty offense or business offense. The
fee shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon
conviction or entry of an order of supervision. The fee shall not be considered a part of
the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine.
All such fees collected shall be deposited by the county in a fund to be established
and known as the County Jail Medical Costs Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used
solely for reimbursement to the county of costs for medical expenses and
administration of the Fund.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2010).
¶ 112 In Larue, this court held the arrestee’s medical fee, despite its label as a “fee,” was actually
a fine and could not be imposed by the circuit clerk. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 57. In
support of this conclusion, we noted a defendant can be required to pay the fine even though
defendant did not receive medical treatment or costs. Id.; see People v. Jackson, 2011 IL
110615, ¶¶ 24, 27, 955 N.E.2d 1164. Additionally, classifying the arrestee’s medical
assessment as a fee would render the language in the statute providing, “[t]he fee shall not be
considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine” (730 ILCS 125/17 (West
2010)), superfluous because fees are not subject to credit under section 110-14 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2010)). People v. Sulton, 395 Ill.
App. 3d 186, 190, 916 N.E.2d 642, 645-46 (2009). Because the arrestee’s medical assessment
is a fine, the clerk could not properly impose it.
¶ 113 The plain language of section 17 of the Jail Act clearly evidences the legislature’s intent
this fine be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. The fine is to be imposed “for each
conviction or order of supervision.” 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2010). A defendant may properly
be convicted of multiple offenses in a single case. Because a defendant may properly be
convicted on multiple counts in a given case, the trial court must reimpose the arrestee’s
medical fine on each count in defendant’s case.

¶ 114 (i) The Spinal-Cord-Research Assessment:
A Noncreditable Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 115 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 spinal-cord-research assessment against
defendant on count I only. Section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified
Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2010)) provides:
“(c) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fee of
$5 shall be assessed by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit
Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act
for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This
additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any
reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.” 730 ILCS
5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2010).
¶ 116 In Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 599, 861 N.E.2d at 985, our supreme court held the
spinal-cord-research fee, despite its statutory label as a fee, is a fine. We vacate the
spinal-cord-research fine imposed by the circuit clerk in this case. On remand, the trial court
shall reimpose the fine as mandated by the statute. Because the clerk imposed this fine on

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 count I only, we need not address whether the fine can be properly imposed on each count in a
defendant’s case.

¶ 117 (j) The Trauma-Fund Assessment:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 118 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $100 trauma-fund assessment on count I only.
Section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code provides:
“(b) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fine
of $100 shall be levied by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the
Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of
Courts Act for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund for distribution as provided under
Section 3.225 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.” (Emphases
added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2010).
¶ 119 In Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 593, 861 N.E.2d at 981-82, our supreme court held the trauma-fund
assessment authorized under section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code was clearly a fine because
the legislature labeled it as such. We vacate the trauma-fund fine imposed by the circuit clerk
after defendant’s sentencing. On remand, the trial court must reimpose the trauma-fund fine as
mandated by the statute. Because the clerk imposed this fine on count I only, we need not
address whether the fine can be properly imposed on each count in a defendant’s case.

¶ 120 (k) The Traffic/Criminal Surcharges:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 121 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $590 criminal surcharge on count I and a $10
criminal surcharge on count II. Section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code provides, in pertinent
part:
“(c) There shall be added to every fine imposed in sentencing for a criminal or
traffic offense, except an offense relating to parking or registration, or offense by a
pedestrian, an additional penalty of $10 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine
imposed.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010).
¶ 122 The plain language of section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code clearly shows the legislature
intended this assessment to be punitive in nature. The statute refers to the assessment as “an
additional penalty.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010). Further, the statute does not indicate the
assessment is to be used to reimburse the county or the State for the expenses related to the
prosecution of a defendant. Because the circuit clerk imposed the criminal surcharges after
defendant was sentenced by the trial court, we vacate these fines.
¶ 123 The plain language of section 5-9-1(c) shows the legislature intended this assessment be
imposed on each count in a criminal case. The statute provides the fine is to be “imposed in
sentencing for a criminal or traffic offense.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010). Because a
defendant may properly be sentenced for multiple offenses in a single case, a trial judge may
properly impose this fine on each count.
¶ 124 On remand, the trial court must reimpose a criminal surcharge on each count in defendant’s
case. This may require the fine to be recalculated, which will require the trial court to calculate
the total fines on each count and assess an additional $10 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of
fine imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010); see People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (4th)

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 120313, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 914 (“ ‘Lump Sum Surcharge’ ” imposed pursuant to section
5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code is to be calculated before the VCVA assessment; the surcharge is
added to the total fines and the VCVA assessment is calculated based on the new total); People
v. O’Laughlin, 2012 IL App (4th) 110018, ¶ 24, 979 N.E.2d 1023 (amount of surcharge fine is
based upon the gross amount of fines levied against defendant; VCVA assessment to be
imposed after surcharge is calculated).

¶ 125 (l) The Juvenile Expungement Fund Assessments:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 126 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $30 Juvenile Expungement Fund assessment
on each count in defendant’s case. The $30 juvenile-expungement assessment is listed on the
clerk’s printout as a $10 assessment for the Clerk Operations and Administrative Fund, a $10
assessment for the State’s Attorney Office Fund (the $10 assessment for the State’s Attorney is
included in the $40 charge listed for the State’s Attorney on the clerk’s printout), and a $10
assessment for the State Police Services Fund. Section 5-9-1.17 of the Unified Code provides,
in pertinent part:
“(a) There shall be added to every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal
offense an additional fine of $30 to be imposed upon a plea of guilty or finding of
guilty resulting in a judgment of conviction.
(b) Ten dollars of each such additional fine shall be remitted to the State Treasurer
for deposit into the State Police Services Fund ***, $10 shall be paid to the State’s
Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the criminal offense, and $10 shall be retained by the
Circuit Clerk for administrative costs associated with the expungement of juvenile
records and shall be deposited into the Circuit Court Clerk Operation and
Administrative Fund.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West 2010).
¶ 127 The plain language of section 5-9-1.17 clearly shows the legislature intended this
assessment to be a fine. The statute refers to the assessment as “an additional fine” that is to “be
added to every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal offense.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17(a)
(West 2010). Further, “the charge [is] used to expunge juvenile records and is in no way related
to the prosecution of the adult defendant against whom the charge is levied.” People v. Wynn,
2013 IL App (2d) 120575, ¶ 16, 3 N.E.3d 400; see Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56
(vacating the $30 juvenile-expungement fine because the clerk lacked authority to assess it).
Because the $30 juvenile-expungement assessment (including the three separate $10
assessments contained therein) is a fine, the circuit clerk cannot properly impose it. We vacate
the $30 juvenile-expungement fine–listed as three separate $10 charges for the Circuit Clerk
Operations and Administrative Fund, State’s Attorney’s Office Fund, and State Police
Services Fund–imposed on each count in defendant’s case. (We note our vacatur of the $10
assessment paid to the State’s Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the offense under section
5-9-1.17 does not affect the $30 to which the State’s Attorney was entitled on each count for
the two felony convictions in this case under section 4-2002(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS
5/4-2002(a) (West 2010)).)
¶ 128 The plain language of section 5-9-1.17 clearly shows the legislature intended this fine to be
imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. The statute provides the fine is to “be added to
every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal offense.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS

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 5/5-9-1.17(a) (West 2010). The fine is “to be imposed upon a plea of guilty or finding of guilty
resulting in a judgment of conviction.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17(a) (West 2010). Because a
defendant can properly be found guilty of and sentenced for multiple criminal offenses in a
case, the juvenile-expungement fine can be properly imposed on each count in a defendant’s
case. On remand, the trial court must reimpose the $30 juvenile-expungement fine on each
count in defendant’s case.

¶ 129 (m) The Drug-Court Assessments:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 130 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 drug-court assessment on each count in
defendant’s case. Section 5-1101(f) of the Counties Code provides, in pertinent part:
“(f) In each county in which a drug court has been created, the county may adopt a
mandatory fee of up to $5 to be assessed as provided in this subsection. Assessments
collected by the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to this subsection must be deposited
into an account specifically for the operation and administration of the drug court. ***
The fees are to be paid as follows:
***
(2) a fee of up to $5 paid by the defendant on a judgment of guilty or a grant of
supervision under Section 5-9-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections for a felony; for
a Class A, Class B, or Class C misdemeanor; for a petty offense; and for a business
offense.” 55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010).
¶ 131 In this case, the $5 drug-court assessment imposed by the circuit clerk was a fine, despite
its label as a “fee,” because the assessment is intended to be used “for the operation and
administration of the drug court.” 55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010). Because defendant never
participated in drug court, this assessment did not reimburse the state for the costs of
prosecuting defendant. People v. Unander, 404 Ill. App. 3d 884, 886, 936 N.E.2d 795, 797
(2010); Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 53, 992 N.E.2d 3 (“Although the drug court
assessment pursuant to section 5-1101(f) of the Counties Code [citation] is labeled a fee, it is
actually a fine where, as here, defendant did not participate in drug court.”). Because the clerk
imposed the $5 drug-court fines after sentencing, we vacate these fines.
¶ 132 The plain language of section 5-1101(f)(2) of the Counties Code shows the legislature
intended this fine to be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. The statute provides the
assessment is to be paid by a defendant “on a judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision.” 55
ILCS 5/5-1101(f)(2) (West 2010). Because a defendant may have a judgment of guilty
rendered on each count within a case, the plain language of the statute clearly evidences the
legislature’s intent a defendant may be assessed the drug-court fine on each count within his
case. On remand, the trial court must reimpose a $5 drug-court fine on each count in
defendant’s case.

¶ 133 (n) The VCVA Assessments:
A Noncreditable Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 134 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $236 VCVA assessment on count I and a $4
VCVA assessment on count II. Section 10(b) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act
provides, in pertinent part:

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 “[T]here shall be an additional penalty collected from each defendant upon conviction
of any felony *** of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. *** Such
additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any
reduction made in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.”
(Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010).
¶ 135 The plain language of section 10(b) shows the legislature intended this assessment to be
imposed as punishment in a criminal case. The statute labels the assessment “an additional
penalty” (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010)), which shows the legislature intended this
assessment to be punitive in nature. Further, courts have previously held, some for over 25
years, the circuit clerk is without authority to impose the VCVA assessment, referring to the
assessment as a fine. Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 55, 992 N.E.2d 3; People v.
Wisotzke, 204 Ill. App. 3d 44, 50, 561 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (1990) (Second District); People v.
Scott, 152 Ill. App. 3d 868, 873, 505 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1987) (Fifth District); People v. Tarbill,
142 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1061, 492 N.E.2d 942, 942 (1986) (Third District). We vacate the
VCVA fines in this case, as those assessments could not properly be imposed by the clerk.
¶ 136 The plain language of the statute clearly evidences the legislature’s intent the fine be
assessed on each count, as the statute provides the penalty is to be imposed upon conviction.
725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010). Because a defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses
within a single case, defendant could properly be ordered to pay a VCVA fine on each count.
¶ 137 On remand, the trial court must reimpose a VCVA fine on each count. This task may
require the court to recalculate the fine, which will require the court to calculate the total fines,
including the traffic/criminal surcharge, imposed pursuant to each count and impose an
additional penalty of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. 725 ILCS 240/10(b)
(West 2010); see Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 914 (“ ‘Lump Sum
Surcharge’ ” imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code is to be calculated
before the VCVA assessment; surcharge is added to the total fines and VCVA assessment is
calculated based on the new total); O’Laughlin, 2012 IL App (4th) 110018, ¶ 24, 979 N.E.2d
1023 (amount of surcharge fine is based upon the gross amount of fines levied against
defendant; VCVA assessment to be imposed after surcharge is calculated).

¶ 138 (o) The State Police Operations Assessments:
A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk
¶ 139 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 State Police operations assessment on
each count in defendant’s case. Subsection (1.5) of section 27.3a of the Clerks of Courts Act
(Clerks Act) (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5) (West 2010)) provides, in pertinent part:
“1.5. Starting on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General
Assembly, a clerk of the circuit court in any county that imposes a fee pursuant to
subsection 1 of this Section [(the automation fee)], shall charge and collect an
additional fee in an amount equal to the amount of the fee imposed pursuant to
subsection 1 of this Section. This additional fee shall be paid by the defendant in any
felony, traffic, misdemeanor, local ordinance, or conservation case upon a judgment of
guilty or grant of supervision.” (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5) (West
2010).

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 Subsection (5) of section 27.3a of the Clerks Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(5) (West 2010))
requires the clerk to remit this additional assessment to the State Treasurer for deposit into the
State Police Operations Assistance Fund.
¶ 140 In People v. Millsap, 2012 IL App (4th) 110668, ¶ 31, 979 N.E.2d 1030, this court held the
State Police operations assistance fee is a fine for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s
VCVA fine. See 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010). Because this assessment is a fine, the
circuit clerk could not properly impose this assessment against defendant. We vacate its
imposition.
¶ 141 The plain language of section 27.3a(1.5) clearly evidences the legislature’s intent this fine
be assessed only once in a defendant’s case. The fee is to be paid by the defendant “in any
felony, traffic, misdemeanor, local ordinance, or conservation case.” 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5)
(West 2010). Because the language of the statute refers to cases, and not individual
convictions, the State Police operations assistance fine may be assessed only once per case.
See Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 64. On remand, the trial court must reimpose this fine
on only one of the two counts.

¶ 142 2. The DNA Analysis Fee
¶ 143 Defendant argues the circuit clerk improperly assessed defendant a $250 DNA analysis fee
after the trial court conditionally ordered the fee at defendant’s sentencing hearing. Defendant
contends the imposition of this fee is void and must be vacated. The State concedes the $250
DNA analysis fee must be vacated. We accept the State’s concession.
¶ 144 While the DNA analysis assessment is a fee (see People v. Guadarrama, 2011 IL App (2d)
100072, ¶ 13, 955 N.E.2d 615 (holding the DNA analysis assessment is a “fee” because “the
fee is used to cover the costs incurred in collecting and testing a DNA sample that is taken from
a defendant convicted of a qualifying offense”))–meaning the circuit clerk could properly
impose it if a defendant was ordered to submit to DNA analysis–its imposition in this case was
not authorized and, thus, we vacate the $250 DNA analysis fee. In People v. Marshall, the
supreme court found the defendant was improperly ordered to submit to DNA analysis and pay
the attendant fee where he had previously submitted a DNA sample for analysis and paid the
fee. People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 303, 950 N.E.2d 668, 679 (2011). In Marshall, the
court held trial courts are authorized “to order the taking, analysis and indexing of a qualifying
offender’s DNA, and the payment of the analysis fee only where that defendant is not currently
registered in the DNA database.” Id. (Based on this language, we also conclude the fee cannot
be imposed on each count in a case.)
¶ 145 In this case, the trial court’s order regarding DNA analysis was consistent with the supreme
court’s holding in Marshall. At defendant’s July 2012 sentencing hearing, the court stated as
follows: “If [defendant] has not already done so–and I can’t imagine how he has not–then he
would have to submit a specimen for genetic testing in accordance with the statute, and only
then would he have to pay the genetic marker grouping analysis fee of $250.” In other words,
the court conditioned the imposition of the DNA analysis fee on whether defendant had
previously submitted a specimen for testing.
¶ 146 Defendant has attached as an appendix to his brief a printout from the Illinois State Police,
Division of Forensic Services, which shows defendant submitted a blood sample for DNA
analysis on February 17, 2005. The record confirms defendant previously submitted a DNA

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 sample for a previous case. The PSI states, “On [February 17, 2005], the defendant submitted a
DNA sample on a previous case.” Yet, the circuit clerk’s printout containing the fines and fees
assessed against defendant in this case shows he was assessed a $250 DNA analysis fee.
Because the record shows defendant submitted a DNA sample for analysis in 2005, the DNA
analysis fee imposed by the clerk in this case is void. Id. at 302, 950 N.E.2d at 679. We vacate
the $250 DNA analysis fee imposed by the clerk.

¶ 147 3. The Street-Value Fine
¶ 148 The State argues the trial court, on remand, must increase the $340 street-value fine
imposed to reflect the value of all the crack cocaine seized on March 18, 2011. Specifically, the
State argues defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession with intent to deliver 7.2
grams of crack cocaine, which included the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine located in Rosas’s
vagina. The State argues the court failed to include the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine located in
Rosas’s vagina in its calculation of the street-value fine. The State extrapolates the value of the
additional crack cocaine based on the per-gram value of the crack cocaine, deduced from the
evidence taken at trial on the value of the 4.6 grams found in the hotel room ($340 divided by
4.6 grams is $73.91 per-gram value), and seeks to increase the fine by $192 ($73.91 per gram
multiplied by 2.6 grams is $192).
¶ 149 In his reply brief, defendant characterizes the State’s argument as an unauthorized
cross-appeal. Specifically, defendant argues (1) the State’s contention is a free-standing claim
of error; (2) the State may not properly appeal the imposition of a fine because such appeals by
the State are not authorized by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006); and (3)
the order imposing the street-value fine is “at best” voidable, not void, and as such, the State
forfeited its claim of error.
¶ 150 Defendant contends because he did not challenge the value of the street-value fine imposed
by the judge, “[t]he State’s argument is thus not in response to an argument about a ‘judgment
[***] from which the appeal is taken’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)). In
this case, defendant’s notice of appeal indicates he is challenging his conviction and sentence.
Therefore, defendant placed his entire sentence, which includes the street-value fine (see
Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 32, 5 N.E.3d 227 (fines are part of sentence a judge must
impose)), before this court for review. Further, defendant seeks an additional two days’ credit
against his sentence, which would be accompanied by a $5 per day credit against creditable
fines, one of which is the street-value fine. We do not, as defendant suggests, characterize the
State’s pointing out of a sentencing error to be a “free-standing claim of error,” because
defendant put his entire sentence at issue.
¶ 151 Even if, for the sake of argument, we considered the State’s street-value fine argument to
be a “free-standing claim of error,” we would not change our conclusion the State could
properly point out this error. Rule 604(a) strictly limits the circumstances under which the
State may appeal a trial court’s judgment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006); see also
People v. Ramos, 339 Ill. App. 3d 891, 904, 791 N.E.2d 592, 603 (2003) (the rule “strictly
limits the State’s right to appeal”). The rule does not permit the State to challenge the propriety
of the sentence imposed on a defendant. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 509-10,
705 N.E.2d 81, 85 (1998). Where an appeal by the State is not authorized by Rule 604(a), the
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the issue. In re K.E.F., 235 Ill. 2d 530, 540-41,
922 N.E.2d 322, 328 (2009).

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¶ 152 The State may, however, seek to correct a void or partially void judgment on appeal. See
People v. Malchow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 665, 675-76, 714 N.E.2d 583, 591 (1999) (where the trial
court ordered a sentence less than that mandated by statute, the sentence was “illegal and void”
and “the appellate court ha[d] the authority to correct the sentence at any time, and Rule
604(a)(1) [did] not limit the State’s right to appeal”). “A void judgment is one entered by a
court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. A
void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally.” Roman, 184 Ill. 2d
at 510, 705 N.E.2d at 85. A trial court is obligated to order the criminal penalties mandated by
the legislature and has no authority to impose punishment other than what is provided for by
statute. Id. “The court exceeds its authority if it orders a lesser sentence than what the statute
mandates.” Id. The legislature has mandated the imposition of the street-value fine of an
amount not less than the full street value of the drugs seized. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West
2010); People v. Banks, 213 Ill. App. 3d 205, 213-14, 571 N.E.2d 935, 940 (1991) (because the
street-value fine is mandatory, the court remanded for imposition of the fine).
¶ 153 In this case, defendant was charged in count I with both the 4.6 grams of crack cocaine
located in the hotel room and the 2.6 grams later recovered from Rosas’s person. The State
presented evidence of the street value of only the 4.6 grams recovered from the hotel room.
Sergeant Baltzell testified the 17 individually wrapped packages had a street value of $340.
The trial court orally ordered defendant to pay a $340 street-value fine as part of his sentence.
The court ordered a sentence less than what is mandated by statute because the $340
street-value fine did not account for the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine later recovered from
Rosas’s person. Defendant’s sentence was void to the extent the street-value fine ordered by
the court was less than the street-value of all the crack cocaine recovered in this case.
Accordingly, on remand, the court must increase the street-value fine to reflect the value of all
the crack cocaine seized in this case. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West 2010).

¶ 154 4. Other Issues With Fines and Fees
¶ 155 Upon our examination of the record, we found other errors neither party raised regarding
the imposition of the fines and fees in this case. For instance, the trial court, at defendant’s
sentencing hearing, ordered defendant to pay a $2,000 mandatory assessment pursuant to
section 411.2(a)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(2) (West
2010)). The circuit clerk’s printout, however, shows the clerk only assessed a $1,275
mandatory assessment. The record provides no explanation for the disparity between what the
court expressly ordered and what the clerk later assessed. Presumably, the clerk assessed the
$2,000 mandatory assessment as ordered by the court and used the $725 credit to which
defendant is entitled to offset part of the assessment, leaving $1,275 of the mandatory
assessment outstanding.
¶ 156 The trial court also ordered defendant to pay a crime-lab analysis fee of $100 during his
sentencing hearing. Although the circuit clerk’s printout contains an entry for the crime-lab
analysis fee, no dollar amount is listed next to the entry. The record again provides no
explanation for the disparity between what the court expressly ordered and the clerk’s failure
to assess it.
¶ 157 On remand, the trial court, when reimposing the fines vacated herein, should ensure the
amended sentencing judgment containing the fines and fees assessed against defendant
contains the $2,000 mandatory assessment (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(2) (West 2010)) and the

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 $100 crime-lab analysis fee (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.4(b) (West 2010)) ordered by the court during
defendant’s sentencing hearing, as well as the amounts creditable against either.

¶ 158 C. Sentencing Credit
¶ 159 We initially note the parties agree the PSI lists the incorrect dates for defendant’s first
period of pretrial incarceration. The PSI indicates defendant was in custody for this offense
starting on March 21, 2011, and ending on July 1, 2011, when he posted bond. However, the
parties agree and the record confirms defendant was in custody for this offense starting March
18, 2011, when he was arrested. The PSI also indicates defendant was in custody for this
offense on July 2, 2012, which was the date he was sentenced. The parties agree defendant
should not be credited for July 2, 2012. See People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 503, 510, 942
N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (2011) (holding “the date a defendant is sentenced and committed to the
Department [of Corrections] is to be counted as a day of sentence and not as a day of
presentence credit”).
¶ 160 The parties do not agree as to the total amount of days for which defendant is entitled
credit. Defendant initially argued he was entitled to two additional days of credit toward his
sentence for his time in pretrial custody for March 18, 2011, through March 20, 2011 (less one
day for July 2, 2012), and $10 of additional monetary credit toward the creditable fines
imposed upon him.
¶ 161 The State responds by arguing defendant is not entitled to the two additional days of credit.
Specifically, the State argues where, as here, a defendant is out on bond for one offense and is
subsequently arrested and placed in custody for another offense, the defendant is returned to
custody on the initial offense when his or her bond is revoked or withdrawn (People v.
Arnhold, 115 Ill. 2d 379, 383, 504 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1987)), unless he is surrendered on the
initial offense to serve simultaneous custody for both offenses (People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d
452, 459, 667 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (1996)). Using the day defendant’s bond was revoked, May
24, 2012, the State contends the calculation of time served contained in the PSI was correct.
¶ 162 In his reply brief, defendant argues he is actually entitled to three additional days of credit
toward his sentence pursuant to section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-100(c) (West 2012)) and People v. Cook, 392 Ill. App. 3d 147, 150-51, 910 N.E.2d
208, 210 (2009), but he abandons his argument he is entitled to additional monetary credit
against his creditable fines. Specifically, defendant argues the State is arguing for the first time
on appeal the court erred in granting defendant credit for May 22, 2012, and May 23, 2012.
Defendant points out the State relied on facts not in the record–the Champaign County circuit
clerk’s website–to come to its calculation of credit. Using information from the Champaign
County circuit clerk’s website, defendant ascertained he was in custody on May 21, 2012,
through May 23, 2012, for an offense he committed while on bail in Champaign County case
No. 12-CF-773. Because the charges in case No. 12-CF-773 were ultimately dropped,
defendant will not be awarded credit for the three days he spent in jail as a result of the newer
charges. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c) (West 2010). Therefore, defendant urges he is entitled to
credit for May 21, 2012, May 22, 2012, and May 23, 2012, for a total of 148 days’ credit.
¶ 163 Defendant has the burden to present a record showing the error of which he complains.
Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). In this case, the trial
court ordered, with agreement of the parties, defendant is entitled to 145 days’ credit toward
his sentence. To get any credit for May 21, 2012, through May 23, 2012, defendant must show

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 he tendered his surrender on the offenses charged in the instant case. See Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d
at 459, 667 N.E.2d at 1308. The record contains no indication defendant tendered his surrender
for the offenses charged in this case, and as such, he is not entitled to credit for May 21, 2012,
through May 23, 2012. The record does show defendant’s bond was revoked on May 24, 2012.
Using the date defendant’s bond was revoked, the 145 days’ credit listed in the PSI is
correct–although the dates relied on to reach this calculation are incorrect.
¶ 164 In his petition for rehearing, defendant argues our decision in this case is inconsistent with
Cook, where we awarded defendant additional credit against his sentence pursuant to section
5-8-7(c) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(c) (West 2006)), which has since been
renumbered as section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code. See People v. Clark, 2014 IL App
(4th) 130331, ¶ 21. Section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code provides:
“CREDIT; TIME IN CUSTODY; FORMER CHARGE. An offender arrested on one
charge and prosecuted on another charge for conduct that occurred prior to his or her
arrest shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the
minimum term of imprisonment for time spent in custody under the former charge not
credited against another sentence.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c) (West 2010).
¶ 165 In Cook, the State charged the defendant, on November 16, 2007, with theft for conduct
occurring on November 2, 2007. Cook, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 148, 910 N.E.2d at 209. On
December 10, 2007, the State charged the defendant, in a separate case, with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. Id. The conduct underlying the possession charge was
committed while the defendant was out on bail for the original theft charge. Id. On January 18,
2008, the State charged the defendant with aggravated criminal sexual abuse for conduct
occurring on August 31, 2007. Id. (Later in the opinion, the majority states, “On January 30,
2008, while defendant was released on bond in both of his 2007 cases, defendant was arrested
and charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse (his 2008 case).” Id. at 149, 910 N.E.2d at
209.). In exchange for a guilty plea as to the theft and possession charges, the State agreed to
drop the remaining charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Id. at 148-49, 910 N.E.2d at
209.
¶ 166 After his arrest on January 30, 2008, for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the defendant
spent 26 days in custody before he, on February 25, 2008, surrendered his bond in the theft and
possession cases. Id. at 149, 910 N.E.2d at 209-10. We awarded the defendant the additional 26
days’ credit against his sentence where he “(1) was arrested for aggravated criminal sexual
abuse ***, (2) was prosecuted for theft over $300 *** which involved conduct that occurred
prior to his arrest in [the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse case], and (3) did not receive credit
for the time spent in custody in [the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse case] against another
sentence.” Id. at 150, 910 N.E.2d at 210.
¶ 167 While defendant’s petition for rehearing was pending, this court decided Clark, 2014 IL
App (4th) 130331. In Clark, we declined to follow the interpretation and analysis of section
5-4.5-100(c) set forth by the majority in Cook. Id. ¶ 25. Instead, we elected to follow the
analysis set forth by Justice Pope in her dissent and held defendant was not entitled to
additional credit where he sought credit against his sentence for the original charge for time he
spent in custody on a subsequent charge. Id. ¶ 26.
¶ 168 Justice Pope’s reading of subsection (c) in her dissent in Cook (Cook, 392 Ill. App. 3d at
151-52, 910 N.E.2d at 211-12 (Pope, J., dissenting)) is consistent with Robinson, wherein the
supreme court explained the purpose of section 5-4.5-100(c) was “to ‘prevent the State from

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 dropping an initial charge and recharging a defendant with another crime, with the intent of
denying credit for time spent in jail on the first charge.’ ” (Emphases added.) Robinson, 172 Ill.
2d at 460, 667 N.E.2d at 1309 (quoting People v. Townsend, 209 Ill. App. 3d 987, 990, 568
N.E.2d 946, 948 (1991)); see also People v. Kane, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 484 N.E.2d
296, 300 (1985) (“The purpose of subsection (c) is to insure credit for all confinement since
arrest in the circumstance where the original charge is dropped in favor of a new charge which
results in conviction and imprisonment.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks
omitted.)). The Robinson court determined section 5-4.5-100(c) did not apply “[b]ecause the
initial charge against defendant was not dropped in favor of a subsequent charge.” Robinson,
172 Ill. 2d at 461, 667 N.E.2d at 1309.
¶ 169 Here, defendant seeks credit against his sentence for the initial charges, in case No.
11-CF-443, for time he spent in custody as a result of a subsequent charge, in case No.
12-CF-773. Because the initial charges were not dropped in favor of the subsequent charge,
defendant is not entitled to credit for May 21, 2013, to May 23, 2013, under section
5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code. Id.; Clark, 2014 IL App (4th) 130331, ¶ 26. We affirm the
court’s order finding defendant is entitled to 145 days’ credit against his sentence and $725
credit toward any creditable fines imposed in this case.
¶ 170 A vast amount of judicial resources are expended in the appellate court to resolve issues
concerning the ever-expanding morass of fines and fees enacted by the legislature. See People
v. Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d 300, 309, 943 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (2010); O’Laughlin, 2012 IL App
(4th) 110018, ¶ 28, 979 N.E.2d 1023; Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 25, 991 N.E.2d
914; Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 35, 5 N.E.3d 227; Montag, 2014 IL App (4th)
120993, ¶ 38, 5 N.E.3d 246. In Folks, we called for a “comprehensive legislative revision in
the assessment of fines, fees, costs and the $5-per-day credit for time spent in custody prior to
sentencing.” Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 309, 943 N.E.2d at 1135. The legislature continues to
enact new fines, fees, and costs–in this case, leading to the imposition of 33 separate
assessments. This adds more complexity to many cases where the monetary assessments may
not even be collected. Perhaps the legislature will answer our call.
¶ 171 We stress the importance of the need for all parties involved–the trial court, the State’s
Attorney’s office, the criminal defense bar, and the circuit clerk’s office–to ensure fines are
properly imposed by the trial court with the attorneys and the defendant in attendance and on
notice. This process requires active participation from the parties. We understand it is a burden
to navigate the murky waters of fines and fees, but it is a burden required by law. We recognize
it is the long-standing practice of the circuit court clerks to impose the fees and costs associated
with criminal cases, but this does not excuse the similar treatment of fines, which are a
component of the sentence to be imposed by the sentencing judge. Fines are a component of
the sentence, and we require the help of the parties to fulfill our duties in resolving these issues
on review. This requires the statement of facts in each brief to identify the fines imposed and
whether the court or circuit clerk imposed them, with citations to the record. See Chester, 2014
IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 35, 5 N.E.3d 227.

¶ 172 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 173 We affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s judgment and remand for the trial court
to reimpose the mandatory fines vacated herein and impose all other fines mandated by statute.
We encourage the trial court to review the reference sheet this court provided in Williams,

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 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, 991 N.E.2d 914 (appendix), to assist in ensuring the statutorily
mandated fines in criminal cases are properly imposed. The State’s Attorney’s office can best
provide guidance as to which fines the county has required by ordinance or resolution. See
Pohl, 2012 IL App (2d) 100629, ¶¶ 11, 21, 969 N.E.2d 508. As part of our judgment, we award
the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS
5/4-2002(a) (West 2012).

¶ 174 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.

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