Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Aug 21 2014, 8:30 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN NAYLOR GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOHN NAYLOR, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 31A01-1301-PC-4
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HARRISON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Roger Davis, Judge
Cause No. 31D01-1204-PC-5
August 21, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Judge
Case Summary and Issue
John Naylor, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief, raising a single issue for our review: whether the post-conviction
court erred by denying Naylor’s petition, which was founded on a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Concluding the denial of Naylor’s petition was not erroneous,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts relevant to Naylor’s underlying convictions have been previously
recounted by this court in Naylor’s direct appeal:
On June 12, 2004, Linda Pittman was driving her van and her mother,
Myrtle Satterfield, was riding as a passenger. As Linda pulled into the
driveway of the residence in Mauckport she shared with her husband, Hobert
Pittman, Albert Pittman, Hobert’s son and Linda’s stepson, began shooting
at her van. Then Albert got into a Ford Explorer that belonged to Hobert and
began to back up towards Linda’s van. Albert stopped, and he and a
passenger got out and both started shooting at Linda’s van. Linda “played
dead” until Albert and his passenger got back into the Explorer and drove
away. Linda sustained several gunshot wounds to her face and body, and
Satterfield ultimately died of her gunshot wounds.
Linda then drove to a nearby tavern and stopped two men in a vehicle,
Darrell Mosier and Matthew Stanley, and asked them for help. Mosier
observed blood on Linda’s face and arm, and he saw that Satterfield was
“slumped over” in the backseat. Linda told Mosier and Stanley that her
stepson, Albert, had shot them and that he and “a friend of his” had fled the
scene in Hobert’s red Ford Explorer. Just then, Linda, Mosier, and Stanley
saw the Explorer driving towards them, and Linda yelled, “That’s them!”
Albert did not stop, but drove away. Stanley got out of Mosier’s vehicle to
assist Linda, and Mosier called 911 and began following Albert and the other
man, later identified as Naylor, in the Explorer. Mosier eventually caught up
to the Explorer after it had stopped under a bridge, and he saw Albert and
Naylor removing items from the Explorer and putting them into Naylor’s car,
which had been parked there.
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Albert and Naylor then drove away in Naylor’s car, and Mosier stayed
with them. At one point, Naylor pulled his car up next to Mosier’s vehicle at
a red stoplight, and Mosier got a good look at both men before they drove
away. Mosier then drove back to the scene where he had left Stanley with
Linda, and she was receiving medical attention. Mosier and Stanley gave
statements to the police, who subsequently discovered Hobert’s dead body at
his residence. Hobert had been killed prior to the attack on Linda and
Satterfield.
In the course of the ensuing investigation, police learned that Albert
and Naylor had been seen together the day before the shootings and that they
had gone to Florida together afterwards. Police in Daytona Beach, Florida,
ultimately arrested Albert and Naylor. As Florida police brought Naylor into
the police station, Detective Tammy Pera heard Naylor say that he “didn’t
want to talk” and that he was “facing the death penalty.” Later, while in jail
in Indiana, Naylor told Corrections Officer Brian Winninger, “I’m guilty of
killing those two people. I need to talk to someone over the situation. I’m
guilty and about to go crazy over what I’ve done. Can I please talk to you
about it?” But while Naylor considered entering a guilty plea, he ultimately
pleaded not guilty and faced a jury trial.
The State charged Naylor with felony murder (Satterfield), murder
(Hobert), attempted murder (Linda), conspiracy to commit burglary,
burglary, theft, auto theft, and assisting a criminal.1 A jury found him guilty
of felony murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit burglary, auto
theft, and assisting a criminal, and the trial court entered judgment
accordingly. At sentencing, the trial court found that the aggravators
outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Naylor to an aggregate term of
120½ years.
Naylor v. State, No. 31A01-0704-CR-157, slip op. at 1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In his direct
appeal, Naylor raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it found him competent to stand trial and sentencing; (2) whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence statements Naylor made to police
officers; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence
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Police found that several items had been stolen from the Pittmans’ home, including weapons used in the
shootings and Hobert’s Ford Explorer.
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certain photographs; (4) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
convictions; and (5) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.
This court affirmed in all respects. Id. Our supreme court denied Naylor’s petition to
transfer on March 13, 2008.
On April 9, 2012, Naylor filed his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A hearing was held on Naylor’s petition on
September 25, 2012. Witnesses at the hearing included Stanley Robison (Naylor’s trial
counsel), Donna Smallwood (Robison’s legal aid), Naylor, and three of Naylor’s family
members. The post-conviction court denied Naylor’s petition on December 14, 2012. This
appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief bears the burden of establishing grounds
for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). A petitioner
who is denied post-conviction relief appeals from a negative judgment, which may be
reversed only if “the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision
opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745
(Ind. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830 (2003). We defer to the post-conviction court’s
factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 746.
The Sixth Amendment’s “right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance
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of counsel, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient
such that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing
professional norms and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
performance. Id. at 687. When considering whether counsel’s performance was deficient,
the reviewing court begins with a “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was
reasonable. Id. at 689. A defendant is prejudiced if “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id.
The two prongs of the Strickland test—performance and prejudice—are
independent inquiries, and both prongs need not be addressed if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing as to one of them. Id. at 697. For instance, “[i]f it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course
should be followed” without consideration of whether counsel’s performance was
deficient. Id.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
On appeal, Naylor claims the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition,
and he complains of what we identify as three instances of alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel: (1) Robison’s failure to inform Naylor regarding his right to testify at trial and
his refusal to allow Naylor the opportunity to testify; (2) Robison’s failure to challenge the
admission of confessions made by Naylor; and (3) Robison’s failure to adequately
investigate or prepare for trial. We will address each of these allegations in turn.
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A. Naylor’s Right to Testify
Naylor’s primary argument throughout these post-conviction proceedings has been
that Robison performed deficiently by effectively denying Naylor his right to testify in his
own defense. In Naylor’s words, “Robison refused to allow [Naylor] the right to testify
and if he tried, Robison would ‘shout him down.’” Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2. The
post-conviction court, however, viewed the evidence quite differently, concluding that
Naylor’s decision not to testify was made by Naylor upon consultation with Robison. The
evidence supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion. Robison testified that he
“discussed with [Naylor] his right to testify no less than four times. . . . We discussed it
before trial and during trial. He agreed with it every time, not to testify.” Transcript at 49.
“The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses.” Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468-69 (Ind. 2006). The post-conviction
court determined that Naylor chose freely to forgo testifying after receiving the advice of
counsel. The court’s decision to credit Robison’s version of events over Naylor’s is a
straightforward credibility determination by the post-conviction court, and it is one that
Naylor has failed to demonstrate is clearly erroneous.
B. Challenge to Naylor’s Confessions
Next, Naylor contends Robison failed to challenge the admission of statements
made by Naylor confessing to the charges against him. The post-conviction court found,
and we agree, that Naylor’s allegations on this point are entirely groundless. The
confessions Naylor complains of were addressed in his direct appeal, and this court
specifically noted that Robison made a contemporaneous objection at trial prior to
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admission of that evidence. Naylor, slip op. at 6. Moreover, entries in the Chronological
Case Summary reflect unsuccessful attempts by Robison to have these statements
suppressed prior to trial. See Appendix of Appellant’s Brief at 20. Naylor’s assertion that
Robison did not challenge the admission of this evidence is demonstrably false, and thus
we find no error in the post-conviction court’s rejection of Naylor’s argument on this issue.
C. Trial Counsel’s Preparation and Trial Strategy
Last, Naylor asserts that Robison neglected to prepare for trial or present any
defense at trial. Specifically, Naylor states that an illness suffered by Robison hindered his
ability to adequately represent Naylor. Contrary to these assertions, the post-conviction
court found there was “a lack of any credible evidence to support any of these claims” and
that “Robison is a skilled trial attorney with [29 years] of criminal . . . experience.”
Appellant’s App. at 79. The evidence presented at Naylor’s hearing demonstrates that
Robison, among other things, filed a number of pre-trial motions to suppress or otherwise
exclude incriminating evidence, engaged in plea negotiations, participated in extensive
discovery, conducted depositions, and met with his client on numerous occasions. Robison
also testified that he turned away other prospective clients to make time for his
representation of Naylor.
With respect to trial strategy, we note that “[c]ounsel is afforded considerable
discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and we will accord that decision deference. A
strong presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” State v.
Holmes, 728 N.E.2d 164, 172 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1067
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(2001). The post-conviction court found Naylor’s claim that Robison did “not present[] or
prepar[e] any kind of defense,” Appellant’s Br. at 4, to be unsupported by the evidence. In
addition to the preparation mentioned above, Robison went to trial prepared to make
objections and thoroughly cross-examine the State’s witnesses. Naylor has failed to
demonstrate—either before the post-conviction court or on appeal—that any trial strategy
employed by Robison amounted to deficient performance.
Conclusion
Concluding the post-conviction court did not err by denying Naylor’s petition for
post-conviction relief, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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