Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 13 2014, 5:58 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MAURICE HAMLER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1312-CR-609
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven Rubick, Magistrate
Cause No. 49G17-1308-FD-52340
August 13, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Maurice Hamler appeals his convictions of resisting law enforcement, a Class A
misdemeanor, Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 (2013) and disorderly conduct, a Class B
misdemeanor, Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3 (2006).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Hamler presents one issue for our review: whether there was sufficient evidence to
support his convictions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the early morning hours of August 9, 2013, police were dispatched to an
apartment complex regarding a domestic disturbance. When they arrived at the apartment
complex, they found Hamler and a man later identified as Hamler’s brother, Marlon,
speaking loudly to each other in the courtyard area. The officers noted that Hamler’s
clothing matched that described by the dispatcher. Hamler attempted to leave the area
when the police approached, and a struggle ensued.
Based upon this incident, Hamler was charged with strangulation, a Class D felony,
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9 (2006); domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-
42-2-1.3 (2012); battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2012); resisting
law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1; disorderly conduct, a
Class B misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3; and public intoxication, a Class B
misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3 (2012). A bench trial was held, and, at the close of
the State’s case, the trial judge granted Hamler’s motion for involuntary dismissal as to the
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charges of strangulation, domestic battery, battery, and public intoxication. Hamler was
found guilty of resisting law enforcement and disorderly conduct. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Hamler contends that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support his
convictions of resisting law enforcement and disorderly conduct. When reviewing claims
of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court neither reweighs the evidence nor assesses the
credibility of the witnesses. Brasher v. State, 746 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ind. 2001). Rather, we
look to the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. Id. We will affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
A. Resisting Law Enforcement
In order to obtain a conviction of resisting law enforcement in this case, the State
must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Hamler (2) knowingly or intentionally
(3) forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered (4) with a law enforcement officer (5) while
the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties. See Ind. Code §
35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). Hamler asserts that the State’s evidence does not demonstrate that he
forcibly resisted the officers.
Our Supreme Court has determined that a person forcibly resists, obstructs, or
interferes under this statute when he or she uses “strong, powerful, violent means” to
impede a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of duties. Spangler v. State, 607
N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993). Not all non-passive actions fulfill the force requirement of
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the statute, id. at 724; yet, the amount of force need not rise to the level of “mayhem.”
Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009). Rather, even a modest level of
resistance might support an offense under this statute. Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724,
727 (Ind. 2013).
The evidence most favorable to the conviction in the present case discloses that
when the officers arrived on the scene, they noticed that Hamler’s clothing matched the
description given to them by the dispatcher. As the officers approached Hamler and his
brother, Hamler, in an aggressive manner and with balled fists, attempted to push in
between the two officers. One of the officers extended his arm to stop Hamler and told
Hamler that they needed him to wait there. Hamler responded that he knew his rights, that
his aunt was a lawyer, and that he was going home and there was nothing they could do to
stop him. At that point, one of the officers told Hamler he needed to put him in handcuffs
for his safety as well as the officers’. When the officers attempted to place handcuffs on
Hamler, he “yanked his arms forward” out of the officers’ hands. Tr. p. 11. The officers
again attempted to place handcuffs on Hamler at which point they had to take him down to
the ground. Hamler put his hands underneath his body and laid down on top of them. The
officers eventually were able to remove Hamler’s hands and secure him in handcuffs.
Hamler’s actions here amount to forcible resistance so as to satisfy the requirements
of the statute. See Lopez v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming resisting
law enforcement conviction where defendant refused to stand up, pulled away from
officers, and laid on his hands in order to avoid being handcuffed), trans. denied.
B. Disorderly Conduct
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In order to obtain a conviction of disorderly conduct in this case, the State must have
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Hamler (2) recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally (3) made unreasonable noise (4) and continued to do so after being asked to
stop. See Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2). To support a conviction of disorderly conduct, the
State must prove that the defendant “produced decibels of sound that were too loud for the
circumstances.” Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied. Here, Hamler claims that the noise he was making was not unreasonable and that
he was not asked to stop.
The evidence at Hamler’s bench trial shows that when officers arrived at
approximately 2:30 a.m., they found Hamler and his brother speaking loudly to each other
in the courtyard of the apartment complex. When Hamler saw the officers, he referred to
them as “motherf***ers.” Tr. p. 7. The officers testified they detected a strong odor of
alcoholic beverage emanating from Hamler and that he had glassy, bloodshot eyes and
slurred speech. During the entire incident, Hamler was loud and boisterous and continually
yelled about knowing his rights, having an aunt that is an attorney, and getting the officers
fired. One of the officers testified to telling Hamler and his brother to “stop yelling” and
to “just calm down” during the incident. Id. at 43. Both officers testified that Hamler was
very loud and that residents were looking out windows and opening doors to see what was
happening.
Thus, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that Hamler was yelling loudly at
approximately 2:30 a.m. in the middle of an apartment complex courtyard not only
disrupting the officers’ investigation but also disturbing the residents of the complex. The
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officers saw residents open their doors to observe the scene or watch from their windows.
In addition, the evidence shows that Hamler continued to yell and scream after being told
to stop and to calm down. This evidence is sufficient.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain
Hamler’s convictions of resisting law enforcement and disorderly conduct.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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