Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 12 2014, 9:52 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARK SMALL GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE
CHRISTINA D. PACE
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY )
TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD )
RELATIONSHIP OF K.A. and S.A., )
MINOR CHILDREN, AND THEIR )
FATHER H.A., )
)
H.A., )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 28A01-1402-JT-70
)
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )
SERVICES, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE GREENE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Erik C. Allen, Judge
Cause Nos. 28C01-1309-JT-9, 28C01-1309-JT-10
AUGUST 12, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
Appellant-Respondent H.A. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
his parental rights to K.A. and S.A. (collectively, the “Children”). On January 4, 2013, the
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed the Children from their parents’ care after
receiving reports of neglect and observing that, among other things, (1) there were used
needles with dried blood on them in the home, (2) the toilet in the home was not working and
was full of feces and urine, and (3) there were piles of feces on the Children’s bedroom floor.
On January 7, 2013, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were children in need of
services (“CHINS”). The Children were adjudicated to be CHINS on February 11, 2013.
DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children
on September 5, 2013. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an
order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. On appeal, Father contends that
DCS did not provide sufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. We
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Father and E.L. (“Mother”) are the parents of the Children.1 K.A. was born on
October 19, 2002, and S.A. was born on February 5, 2004. The Children were removed from
Father’s care on January 4, 2013. Three days later, on January 7, 2013, DCS filed petitions
alleging that the Children were CHINS. In these petitions, DCS alleged that Father and
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Mother failed to provide the Children with a safe and appropriate living environment.
Specifically, DCS alleged that the family’s home did not have a working toilet; a non-
working toilet was observed filled with urine and feces; there were several mounds of dirty
clothes and feces on the floor of the Children’s bedroom; there were many visible syringes
with dried blood in the parents’ bedroom and in the kitchen; and a spoon with white residue
was visible in the parents’ bedroom. The Children have not been returned to Father’s care
since January 4, 2013.
On February 11, 2013, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. Also
on February 11, 2013, the juvenile court issued a dispositional order and parental
participation decree, in which it ordered Father to participate in certain services.
Specifically, Father was ordered to (1) participate in all recommended services relating to
substance abuse treatment; (2) attend supervised visitation with the Children; (3) complete a
domestic violence assessment and participate in recommended services addressing issues of
domestic violence; (4) participate in family therapy services in an effort to develop effective
communication and parenting skills; (5) participate in random drug screens; (6) remain in
contact with the DCS family case manager in order to allow the family case manager to
monitor Father’s compliance with services; (7) notify DCS of any changes in address,
employment, telephone number, and household composition; (8) notify DCS of any arrest or
criminal charges within five days of the arrest or of charges being filed; (9) permit the DCS
family case manager to make announced or unannounced visits to Father’s home; (10) keep
all appointments; (11) obtain and maintain suitable housing; (12) secure and maintain a legal
1
The termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children is not at issue in this appeal.
3
and stable source of income; (13) assist in the formulation and implementation of a plan
designed to protect the Children from abuse or neglect; (14) establish paternity of the
Children; (15) participate in and successfully complete counseling as referred by the family
case manager; (16) participate in and successfully complete a drug and alcohol assessment
and successfully complete all recommendations developed as a result of the assessment; (17)
complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations developed
as a result of the assessment; (18) complete a mental health evaluation; and (19) obey the
law. Father did not complete the services ordered by the juvenile court.
On September 5, 2013, DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Father’s
parental rights to the Children. On January 7 and 8, 2014, the juvenile court conducted an
evidentiary termination hearing at which Father appeared and was represented by counsel.
During the evidentiary termination hearing, DCS introduced evidence indicating that Father
had failed to participate in the services ordered by the juvenile court. DCS also introduced
evidence indicating that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best
interests. This included evidence that since being removed from Father’s care, the Children
have made positive progress with establishing bonds with others, beginning to trust others,
and becoming more social. This also included evidence that the Children were doing well in
school. In addition, DCS introduced evidence indicating that the Children required stability
and a sense of permanency, and that its plan for the permanent care and treatment of the
Children was adoption. Father acknowledged that he was incarcerated at the time of the
termination hearing and argued that as a result, he should be granted more time to comply
4
with the court-ordered services. Following the conclusion of the termination hearing, the
juvenile court issued an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. Father
now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional
right of a parent to establish a home and raise his children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, we acknowledge that the
parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships of our culture.” Id.
However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the
termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his responsibility as a
parent. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore,
parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s interests in
determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child
relationship. Id.
The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the
children. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the children’s emotional and
physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the children
are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is
permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
Father contends that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient
to support the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. In reviewing termination
proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the
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witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s
decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court
includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our
standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports
the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.
In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we set
aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only
if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no
facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if
the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or
the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
In order to involuntarily terminate a parent’s parental rights, DCS must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) one (1) of the following exists:
(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree;
(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable
efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required,
including a description of the court’s finding, the date of the finding,
and the manner in which the finding was made; or
(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the
supervision of a county office of family and children or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-
two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the
home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of
services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2012).
Father does not dispute that DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the second,
third, and fourth elements set forth in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b). Father, however,
claims that DCS failed to prove that the Children had been removed from his care for at least
six months under a dispositional decree.2 In making this claim, Father argues that the
juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting certain certified copies of documents created
in connection to the underlying CHINS actions.
Our standard of review for the admission of documents is well-settled.
The admission or exclusion of documentary evidence rests within the
discretion of the trial court. City of Indianapolis v. Heeter, 171 Ind. App. 119,
135, 355 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1976). A proper foundation for the admission of
such evidence must necessarily be laid, and if the trial court, within its
discretion, is satisfied as to the document’s validity, such evidence may be
admitted. Id. We will not disturb the rulings of the trial court unless an abuse
of discretion is shown. Id. An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court. Stone v. State, 536 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied.
Carter v. Knox Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 761 N.E.2d 431, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting DCS Exhibit 5 into
evidence. DCS Exhibit 5 contains various certified copies of documents which were created
7
in connection with the underlying CHINS actions, including the CHINS petitions, pre-
dispositional reports, the combined order finding the Children to be CHINS, the combined
order of participation, the combined dispositional order, various progress reports filed with
the juvenile court by service providers, and the combined order approving a change in DCS’s
permanency plan for the Children.
We note that Father does not challenge the admission of DCS Exhibit 5 on the same
grounds on appeal as he did during the evidentiary termination hearing. Father challenged
the admission of DCS Exhibit 5 on hearsay grounds during the evidentiary termination
hearing. On appeal, he challenges the admission of DCS Exhibit 5 by claiming that the
documents were not properly authenticated. Thus, Father’s challenge on appeal is waived.
See Musgrave v. Aluminum Co. of Am., Inc., 995 N.E.2d 621, 638-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(providing that it is well established that a party may not object on one ground at trial and
seek reversal on appeal using a different ground), trans. denied.
Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting DCS Exhibit 5 into evidence. In Carter, we specifically stated that
DCS was entitled to offer the CHINS petition, the pre-dispositional report, the parental
participation order, the modification report, or any other document or order containing
written findings, which was required to be created during the underlying CHINS proceedings
into evidence. See Carter, 761 N.E.2d at 438. DCS Exhibit 5 contains precisely the type of
documents mentioned in Carter. In addition, each of the documents contained in DCS
Exhibit 5 have been certified by the clerk of the juvenile court as being “true and complete”
2
Father correctly asserts that the juvenile court did not make a finding under subsection (ii) or (iii).
8
copies of the original documents filed in the underlying CHINS proceedings. Because DCS
Exhibit 5 contains certified copies of the type of documents specifically mentioned in Carter,
we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contents of
this exhibit into evidence during the evidentiary termination hearing.
In terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children, the juvenile court concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to establish the requirement set forth in Indiana Code section
31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A), i.e., that the Children had been removed from Father’s care for more
than six months under a dispositional decree. Again, the Children were removed from
Father’s care on January 4, 2013, and have not been returned to his care since that date. On
February 4, 2013, the juvenile court entered a dispositional order in which it noted that the
Children had previously been determined to be CHINS and ordered that the Children shall
remain in their current placements under the supervision of DCS. The evidentiary
termination hearing was conducted on January 7 and 8, 2014, approximately eleven months
after the juvenile court entered the dispositional order. DCS Exhibit 5 clearly demonstrates
that, at the time of the evidentiary termination hearing, the Children had been removed from
Father’s care for more than six months pursuant to a dispositional decree. As such, we
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove the requirement of Indiana Code section 31-
35-2-4(b)(2)(A). Father’s claim to the contrary amounts to an invitation to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
CONCLUSION
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Having concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s order
terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile
court.
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.A. and S.A., Minor Children, and Their Father H.A., H.A. v. Indiana Department of Child Services
Combined Opinion