Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Jul 31 2014, 8:51 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARK OLIVERO GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RONALD WILLIAMS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A03-1311-CR-451
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge
Cause No. 02D06-1304-MR-4
July 31, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
A jury found Ronald Williams guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced Williams to
an executed term of sixty-five years. On appeal, Williams claims that the evidence was not
sufficient to support his conviction. He also claims that the trial court abused its discretion at
sentencing in not finding certain mitigating factors and that his sentence is inappropriate
given the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to the jury’s verdict are as follows. On March 14, 2013,
Williams and some of his friends went to an Allen County social club, where they were
searched for weapons before they could enter. After the club closed, Williams drove some
friends home. In the car were Carolyn Bolden, Trisha VanCamp, Dexter King, Quintella
Payne, and Mark Young. Williams first dropped Payne and King at their home. Williams
asked who wanted to be dropped off next. Young replied that he wanted to be taken to Eden
Green. Williams stated that he did not want to drive there because it was 3:00 a.m. and there
were police in the area. Williams and Young got into an argument, which escalated as to
which one of them had more “street credit [sic].” Trial Tr. at 158. Williams stopped the car
in front of a house and entered it. Upon his return, Williams had his hand in his pocket and
drove off. Young stated that he was not scared and that he could shoot Williams in the back
of the head. VanCamp reminded Williams that he knew that Young did not have a gun.
Williams continued to argue with Young and took a handgun out of his pocket. Williams
stopped the car, and Bolden escaped and began to run. Williams and Young stepped out of
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the car and continued to argue. Williams pointed the gun at Young’s chin and chest area.
VanCamp exited the car and began to run. As she was running, she heard “five, six, seven”
shots. Id. at 168. Bolden heard “more than three or four” shots. Id. at 208.
Arturo Cruz lived near where Williams had stopped the car. Cruz noticed two men
near the car and saw one shoot the other. After the victim fell to the ground, the shooter
continued to shoot him. The shooter then drove away. Cruz called the police. When police
arrived they found Young lying in the road with multiple gunshot wounds, from which he
died. The autopsy showed that Young suffered from a wound behind his left ear, a wound to
his right ear, a wound to his lower abdomen, a wound to his left groin, and wounds to his
right and left legs.
The State charged Williams with murder. A jury found him guilty as charged. The
trial court sentenced Williams to an executed term of sixty-five years. He now appeals his
conviction and sentence.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – Sufficiency of Evidence
Williams contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
In determining the sufficiency of evidence,
[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Rather we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that
support the verdict and will affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence alone may support a
conviction.
Green v. State, 808 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).
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The gist of Williams’s argument is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the person who murdered Young. Here, VanCamp and Bolden testified
that Williams was involved in a heated argument with Young and that Williams brandished a
gun. VanCamp stated that she saw Williams point the gun at Young’s chin and chest before
she ran. As she was running, VanCamp heard “five, six, seven” shots. Trial Tr. at 168.
Bolden also heard “more than three or four” shots. Id. at 208. Cruz testified that he saw two
men near a car and saw one man shoot the other multiple times, enter the car, and drive away.
This evidence is more than sufficient to establish that Williams murdered Young. Therefore,
we affirm his conviction.
Section 2.1 ‒ Sentencing/Abuse of Discretion
Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sixty-five
year sentence. His main argument is that the trial court failed to credit mitigating factors that
he raised at sentencing. As long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to
review only for an abuse of discretion. Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or
find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both
significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 493
(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218. “When a defendant offers evidence of
mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating,
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and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating.”
Johnson v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (2007).
Williams argues that the trial court overlooked several mitigating factors. First, he
notes that many people submitted letters on his behalf regarding his good character and
contends that they should have been considered as a mitigating factor. At the hearing, the
trial court acknowledged having received numerous letters of support for Williams. The trial
court, however, did not find them to be a mitigating circumstance, which was within its
discretion in light of Williams’s brutal and senseless murder of Young.
Next, Williams contends that the trial court should have found that an extended
sentence would impose an undue hardship on his children as a mitigating factor. However, a
sentencing court is not required to find that a defendant’s incarceration would result in undue
hardship on his dependents. Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
This being a murder offense, the difference between the minimum sentence and the
maximum sentence “hardly can be argued to impose much, if any, additional hardship on the
child.” Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, we find no abuse of
discretion.
Lastly, Williams argues that he acted under a strong provocation, which was not
considered by the trial court to be a mitigating factor. However, we note that Williams did
not specifically raise this as a mitigator at sentencing, and therefore it is waived. Pennington
v. State, 821 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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Section 2.2 ‒ Sentencing/Appropriateness
Even if a trial court does not abuse its discretion in determining a sentence, we “may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,
[we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Whether a sentence is appropriate
“turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2009). Williams has the burden to establish that his
sentence is inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012).
Regarding the nature of the offense, “the advisory sentence is the starting point the
Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemyer,
868 N.E.2d at 494. The advisory sentence for murder is fifty-five years, with a range between
forty-five and sixty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. We conclude that the circumstances
surrounding the killing and its cruel nature justified the maximum sentence. We agree with
the trial court that Young’s murder was “senseless” and “absolutely stupid.” Sentencing Tr.
at 36. Williams murdered the unarmed Young over an argument about “street credit” [sic]
Trial Tr. at 158. We also find it disturbing that Williams shot Young multiple times after he
had fallen.
Regarding Williams’s character, we acknowledge that there were numerous letters
submitted regarding his good character. However, Williams has been convicted of two prior
felonies and three misdemeanors. He has committed crimes in multiple states and also had
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his probation revoked. His murder of an unarmed man over street credit [sic] does not reflect
well on his character. Williams has failed to carry his burden to establish that his sentence is
inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm his sentence.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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