Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 30 2014, 9:50 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
HUGH N. TAYLOR GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Auburn, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
LYUBOV GORE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
NICOLAS DUESLER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 76A03-1311-CR-454
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE STEUBEN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable William C. Fee, Judge
Cause No. 76D01-1209-FB-953
July 30, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Chief Judge
Case Summary
Nicolas Duesler had sexual intercourse on several occasions with a fourteen-year-
old girl who was mentally significantly younger than that. Duesler was found guilty by a
jury of four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor. The trial court
sentenced him to twelve years, with two years suspended and one and one-half years of
probation for each count, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of forty years.
Duesler now appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not
finding mitigating circumstances and his sentence is inappropriate. We find that there is
no abuse of discretion and Duesler’s sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore affirm the
trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
M.S. had only been fourteen years old for one week when her babysitter and trusted
family friend, Duesler, began having sex with her. Tr. p. 180. M.S. turned fourteen on
July 16, 2012, and although she has the physical development of an average fourteen-year-
old girl, M.S. has a mild cognitive disability and a mentality significantly younger than
fourteen years old. Id. at 225, 340. She is below grade level academically, and while an
average IQ for a fourteen year old falls around 100, M.S.’s IQ is somewhere below 70. Id.
at 225-26. In July 2012 M.S. was living in her grandmother’s home in Steuben County,
Indiana, along with her parents, aunt, and cousins. Id. at 174, 308. M.S.’s aunt began
dating Duesler in June 2012; Duesler was twenty-seven years old at the time. Id. at 26,
276. Duesler stayed in M.S.’s aunt’s room at M.S.’s grandmother’s house and babysat
M.S. and her three cousins while the other adults were at work. Id. at 176.
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Approximately one week after M.S.’s birthday, Duesler took her and her thirteen-
year-old cousin O.C. to his apartment. Id. at 180, 238. Once they arrived, Duesler sent
O.C. to retrieve “something” and also gave him cigarettes and “spice.” Id. at 240, 242.
“Spice” was an illegal substance, which Duesler had taught O.C. to smoke out of a “little
pipe thing.” Id. at 242. Duesler then took M.S. to his bedroom, took their clothes off, put
her on his bed, got on top of her, and had sex with M.S. Id. at 180-81. Afterwards, they
got dressed and walked back to M.S.’s grandmother’s house with O.C. Id. Although the
timing is unclear, Duesler took M.S. to his apartment two more times in the month of July
and followed the same routine. Id. at 182-85. Each time, Duesler took M.S.’s clothes off,
placed her on his bed, and had sex with her. Id. And each time, Duesler took O.C. along
but sent him away once the three arrived at Duesler’s apartment. Id. Duesler had sex with
M.S. a fourth time in M.S.’s aunt’s room at her grandmother’s house while M.S.’s cousins
were downstairs. Id. at 186. Duesler told M.S. “not to tell anybody or he would go to jail”
because she was “underage.” Id. at 188. M.S. never told anyone what was occurring
because she “felt scared” and “thought [she’d] get in trouble.” Id. at 187. M.S. wrote about
her feelings for Duesler in her journal. Id. In September 2012 M.S.’s parents discovered
that M.S. had been sexually assaulted and took her to be tested for pregnancy and sexually
transmitted diseases. Id. at 221, 252-53.
The State charged Duesler with four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct
with a minor. Appellant’s App. p. 219-22. After a jury trial, Duesler was found guilty on
all four counts. Id. at 14. At the sentencing hearing, several people testified on behalf of
Duesler, including Duesler’s mother, brother, and grandmother, as well as the pastor at the
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Church of Garrett and a volunteer from the in-jail ministry Duesler participated in. Tr. p.
325-35. Testimony from his mother, brother, and grandmother communicated that Duesler
was very close to his family and always did what he could to help his family in a time of
need. Id. Testimony from the pastor and the in-jail ministry volunteer described Duesler’s
building of relationships with the members of the Church of Garrett and participation in
the ministry. Id. Duesler, however, denied committing the offense; he stated that M.S.
“had a crush on him” and that after M.S.’s aunt and he broke up, M.S. “was devastated and
fantasized about him.” Appellant’s App. p. 238 (PSI p. 10). Duesler refused to
acknowledge any wrongdoing and stated he felt “[c]heated.” Id. at 238, 240 (PSI p. 10,
12). The trial court found the following as aggravating circumstances: Duesler’s extensive
criminal history, which included fourteen felony convictions and nine misdemeanor
convictions, his previous probation violations and other opportunities courts have offered
him, and the fact that he committed the crimes in a position of care, control, and trust over
M.S. Tr. p. 339-40; Appellant’s App. p. 232-37 (PSI p. 4-9). As mitigating circumstances,
the trial court acknowledged that Duesler had a courtroom full of family and friends in his
support and that he had been actively participating in bible study and in-jail ministry,
stating:
Now . . . I have listened to your family and obviously you have family that
is willing to be there for you under any set of circumstances. That’s a
wonderful thing. That’s a good thing and I appreciate their willingness to
take the witness stand and stand up for you today and testify for you. . . .
[W]e also heard from the leader of the bible study, the in-jail ministry, and
your pastor from Garrett and that’s a very good thing. I’m glad that you have
that support structure. I’m glad that you’ve taken steps to try to direct your
life in a different situation. One of the things that I’m mindful for, mindful
of is that in order to do that, really, you have to be accountable and so the
truth of what has happened has to meet up with your faith plan, your
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intentions and so, the Court, is happy that you have that support and it’s
important for you to redirect your behavior and it’s, in fact, a critical factor
in my determination whether to put you on probation yet again because you
haven’t been successful in the past being on probation. . . . [T]he fact that
you seem to be moving in that direction at least while you’ve been
incarcerated is a positive thing that certainly we would like to see continue.
Tr. p. 341-42. The trial court ultimately found that the aggravators substantially
outweighed the mitigators, and that the aggravators supported consecutive sentencing. Id.
at 342. The court sentenced Duesler to twelve years, with two years suspended and one
and one-half years of probation, for each count. Appellant’s App. p. 62. The court ordered
the sentences to run consecutively, for an aggregate term of forty years. Id.
Duesler now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
Duesler raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court failed to
identify mitigators. Second, he contends that his sentence is inappropriate.
I. Abuse of Discretion
In general, sentencing lies within the discretion of the trial court. McKinney v. State,
873 N.E.2d 630, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179
(Ind. 2002)), transfer denied. As such, we review sentencing decisions only for an abuse
of discretion, including a trial court’s decision to increase or decrease the presumptive
sentence because of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id. One way that a trial court
may abuse its discretion is if the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 491 (Ind. 2007) clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The relative weight
or value assignable to mitigators and aggravators is not subject to review for abuse of
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discretion. Id. The finding of mitigating factors is within the discretion of the trial court.
McKinney, 873 N.E.2d at 645 (citing Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005)). A
trial court is not obligated to weigh or credit the mitigating factors in the manner a
defendant suggests they should be weighed or credited. Id. “The allegation that the trial
court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires [the defendant] to establish that the
mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. (quoting
Plummer v. State, 851 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
Duesler first argues that the trial court failed to identify the redirection of his life
while incarcerated as a mitigator. However, the trial court clearly elaborated on what it
found as mitigators and discussed at length its pleasure with the fact that Duesler was trying
to change his behavior, stating, “I’m glad that you’ve taken steps to try to direct your life
in a different situation” and “the fact that you seem to be moving in that direction at least
while you’ve been incarcerated is a positive thing that certainly we would like to see
continue.” Tr. p. 341-42. Further, the court explained that this particular mitigator was “in
fact, a critical factor in [the trial court’s] determination whether to put [Duesler] on
probation.” Id. at 341. Thus, it is apparent that the court identified the steps Duesler had
taken while incarcerated to redirect his life as a mitigator. Duesler’s second argument that
the trial court should have taken into account his family, church, and the in-jail ministry or
Duesler’s “support structure” as a mitigating circumstance fails as well. The court clearly
considered this, and stated in reference to his family and church, “I appreciate their
willingness to take the witness stand and stand up for you today and testify for you. . . .
I’m glad that you have that support structure.” Id. To the extent that Duesler is essentially
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asking this Court to reweigh this mitigating circumstance, see Appellant’s Br. p. 12; as
stated before, the relative weight or value assignable to mitigators and aggravators is not
subject to review for abuse of discretion. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.
Last, Duesler argues that the court should have considered as a mitigator that he was
unlikely to commit this offense again. However, looking at his criminal history and the
fact that he has violated practically every probation given, this argument is also
unsuccessful. Despite identifying mitigators, the trial court found that Duesler’s extensive
criminal history, probation violations, and position of control and trust over M.S.
substantially outweighed any mitigating circumstance. We find no omissions of mitigating
circumstances that are clearly supported by the record and were advanced for
consideration. Id. We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a
trial court’s sentencing decisions. Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). “We
implement this authority through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision we find the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” Id. (quotations omitted). “We have long said that sentencing is
principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive
considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008) (citing
Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind. 1996)). In determining whether a sentence
is appropriate the court looks at the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,
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the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case. Id.
at 1224. Duesler bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that his sentence is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Appellate courts
may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial judge in sentencing
the defendant, including the suspended portion of the sentence. Davidson v. State, 926
N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).
As to the nature of the offenses, there is no dispute that Duesler preyed on a
fourteen-year-old girl with the mentality of a child significantly younger than that, and had
sex with her four times. He then coerced her not to tell her family by stating he would go
to jail if anyone found out, because she was underage.
In evaluating Duesler’s character, this Court has stated that “[t]he significance of a
criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character is based on the gravity, nature, and
number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d
1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007)). Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant’s character.
But Duesler does not have a minor criminal history. He has fourteen felony convictions
and nine misdemeanor convictions. Appellant’s App. p. 232-37 (PSI p. 4-9). His criminal
history includes multiple battery and domestic battery convictions, including a juvenile
offense against his own mother. Id. at 232, 236-37, 240 (PSI p. 4, 8-9, 12). Further,
Duesler has violated practically every probation he has been placed on. Id. at 232-237 (PSI
p. 4-9).
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The trial court sentenced Duesler to twelve years, with two years suspended and one
and one-half years of probation, for each count, for an aggregate term of forty years.
Indiana Code section 35-50-2-5 states a person who commits a Class B felony shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term of between six and twenty years, with the advisory sentence
being ten years. Duesler’s four twelve-year sentences fall within these limits. And not
only did Duesler receive two years suspended on each count, but the suspended amount
means that Duesler will serve only the advisory sentence of ten years for each count. In
light of the gravity of his offenses, Duesler’s criminal character, and the advisory sentence
imposed for each count, we find that Duesler’s sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore
affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J. concur.
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