Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Jun 18 2014, 9:39 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
LISA M. JOHNSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Brownsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
LYUBOV GORE
Law Clerk
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DEMITRUS GRANT, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1311-CR-959
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge
The Honorable Anne Flannelly, Commissioner
Cause No. 49G04-1308-FC-50900
June 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Demitrus Grant appeals his conviction of Class C felony operating a motor vehicle
after his license was suspended for life.1 He alleges his conviction was improper because he
operated the motor vehicle during an “extreme emergency” as defined by In. Code §9-30-10-
18. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 3, 2013, around 8:00 p.m., Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
Officer Jason Norman was traveling southbound on Dr. Martin Luther King Street when he
noticed a red Chevy Monte Carlo that was going forty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five
miles per hour speed zone. He initiated a traffic stop when the Monte Carlo made an abrupt
lane change without a proper turn signal. Grant, the driver of the car, pulled over.
Officer Norman approached Grant and asked for identification. Grant claimed he
could not produce an ID, but he gave the name and identifying information of George Robey.
Tyla Mays, the passenger, produced proper identification. Officer Norman looked up
George Robey in the BMV database and the picture did not resemble Grant. Grant then
confessed his real identity. Officer Norman ran Grant’s information in the BMV database
and determined Grant was a habitual traffic violator with a lifetime suspension of his license.
Grant admitted he “knew he was not supposed to be driving.” (Tr. at 88.)
Officer Brian Harvey arrived, and Mays told him she was Grant’s girlfriend and they
were heading to a hotel at the time of the stop. While Mays was with Officer Harvey, he
1 Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17.
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noted she winced in pain once. The officers offered multiple times to summon an
ambulance, but Mays said she did not need an ambulance and she was capable of driving.
After Mays was released with the car, she asked for directions to her hotel and returned there
for the night.
Grant was arrested and charged with Class C felony operating a motor vehicle after
his license was suspended for life. Grant raised the defense of “extreme emergency” under
Ind. Code §9-30-10-18. A jury rejected the defense and found Grant guilty, and the court
imposed a sentence of five years.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Grant admitted he drove while his license was forfeited for life, but he asserted there
was an “extreme emergency”:
In a criminal action brought under section 16 or 17 of this chapter, it is a
defense that the operation of a motor vehicle was necessary to save life or limb
in an extreme emergency. The defendant must bear the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence to establish this defense.
Ind. Code § 9-30-10-18.
Whether there was an “extreme emergency” was a question of fact for the jury, and we
consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict. Cain v. State, 844 N.E.2d 1063, 1066
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In reviewing sufficiency of evidence, we will not reweigh evidence or
judge credibility of witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We
respect “the jury’s exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence.” Id.
Grant testified he and Mays were on the way to St. Vincent’s Hospital because they
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had been at his cousin’s hotel room when Mays began vomiting and complaining of sharp
back pains for forty-five minutes. This concerned Grant because Mays was pregnant with his
child and he feared something was going wrong with the pregnancy. Grant alleged he drove
because he did not think Mays was capable.
When Grant was pulled over, he was driving away from two nearby hospitals, to
which one would presumably go if an extreme emergency existed. Grant testified he was
driving to St. Vincent’s Hospital, which was thirty minutes away, rather than going to a
closer hospital, because he did not trust the two nearby hospitals. However, the location
where he was stopped was not on a direct route to St. Vincent’s from Mays’ hotel. Neither
Grant nor Mays indicated to an officer at the scene of the traffic stop that an ambulance was
needed or that there was an emergency. See Shrum v. State, 664 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding no extreme emergency when Shrum did not tell police his passenger
was having a diabetic attack). Rather, Mays explicitly declined an offer to summon an
ambulance, said she was capable of driving, and drove to her motel and then home to Ohio
the next day. There was ample evidence to permit the jury to find Grant was not driving
because of an extreme emergency.
CONCLUSION
As there is sufficient evidence no extreme emergency existed, we affirm.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, concur.
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