Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Mar 31 2014, 6:27 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TERELLE YOUNG, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1308-CR-712
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable David M. Hooper, Commissioner
Cause No. 49F08-1301-CM-4769
March 31, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Terelle Young (Young), appeals his conviction for failure to
stop after an accident resulting in personal injury, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code §§
9-26-1-1; -8.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Young raises one issues on appeal which we restate as: Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to disprove Young’s necessity
defense.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 20, 2013, Melin Nesbitt (Nesbitt) was sitting in the front passenger
seat of her car while parked outside a grocery store in Indianapolis, Indiana. Young, then
eighteen-years-old, entered the driver’s side of a red Lexus, which was parked
approximately fifteen feet away. Putting his car in reverse, Young backed into Nesbitt’s
car as Nesbitt’s husband was returning from the grocery store. Young exited his car,
checked whether it was damaged, gave Nesbitt the finger, and drove away from the
scene. Nesbitt copied down the car’s license plate number. Later that same day, police
officers located Young and the red Lexus at Young’s mother’s residence.
Because the collision caused Nesbitt’s knee to strike the dashboard of her car and
become painful and swollen, she received treatment in the emergency room. At the time
of the accident, Young held a learner’s permit and was prohibited from driving the car
alone. Also, Young’s “license had been suspended” after a previous incident where he
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received a learner’s permit violation and speeding infraction for driving over the speed
limit. (Transcript p. 116).
On January 20, 2013, the State filed an Information charging Young with failure
to stop after an accident resulting in personal injury, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 9-
26-1-1; -8. On April 29, 2013 and July 26, 2013, the trial court conducted a bench trial.
During trial, Young asserted a necessity defense arguing that because Nesbitt’s husband
was shouting at him and walking towards him, he rapidly left out of fear that Nesbitt’s
husband would start a fight. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Young
guilty as charged and sentenced him to 365 days with four days executed and 361 days
suspended to probation.
Young now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Young does not contest that he drove into Nesbitt’s car and left the scene of the
accident. He argues, however, that he did so out of necessity because Nesbitt’s husband
approached and acted as if he wanted to start a fight and that the State introduced
insufficient evidence to prove otherwise. The common law defense of necessity has
evolved over the years and is often referred to as the “choice of evils” defense. Toops v.
State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Although the confines of the necessity
defense vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the central element involves the emergency
nature of the situation. Id. That is, under the force of extreme circumstances, conduct
that would otherwise constitute a crime is justifiable and not criminal because of the
greater harm which the illegal act seeks to prevent. Id.
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Traditionally, in order to prevail on a claim of necessity, the defendant must show
that (1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a significant evil; (2)
there must have been no adequate alternative to the commission of the act; (3) the harm
caused by the act must not be disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) the accused must
entertain a good faith belief that his act was necessary to prevent greater harm; (5) such
belief must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances; and (6) the accused
must not have substantially contributed to the creation of the emergency. Dozier v. State,
709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Our supreme court has noted that necessity is an affirmative defense and that an
affirmative defense “admits all the elements of the crime but proves circumstances which
excuse the defendant from culpability.” Melendez v. State, 511 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ind.
1987). Thus, in order to negate a claim of necessity, the State must disprove at least one
element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Dozier, 709 N.E.2d at 29. The State
may refute a claim of the defense of necessity by direct rebuttal, or by relying upon the
sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. The decision whether a claim of
necessity has been disproved is entrusted to the finder-of-fact. Id. Where a defendant is
convicted despite his claim of necessity, this court will reverse the conviction only if no
reasonable person could say that the defense was negated by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
Reviewing the evidence before us, we do not conclude that a necessity justified
Young’s departure from the scene of the accident without exchanging information with
Nesbitt. By driving the vehicle with a learner’s permit and without a licensed driver,
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backing into Nesbitt’s parked vehicle with enough force to injure her knee and giving her
the middle finger, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Young substantially
contributed to the existence of the emergency. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut Young’s necessity defense.
Affirmed.
ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur
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Terelle Young v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion