Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of Mar 10 2014, 5:59 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JUAN WILLIAMS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1307-CR-373
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Deborah J. Shook, Commissioner
Cause No. 49F07-1301-CM-6762
March 10, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
The victim of a Battery,1 a class A misdemeanor, testified that appellant-defendant
Juan Williams punched him in the eye causing pain, swelling, and redness. A police
officer who was dispatched to the scene interviewed the victim and observed the injuries.
This evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams committed the offense, and his claim
that the conviction must be set aside under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity fails.
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
Abdelsalam Samara manages the Shell gas station on Illinois Street in
Indianapolis. On January 29, 2013, Williams entered the store to purchase a cigar. The
cigar was priced at .99 but the sales tax made the final cost $1.06. However, Williams
handed Samara $1 and asked for change. When Samara informed Williams of the total
price, the two began to argue.
Samara stepped out from behind the security area and told Williams to leave. In
response, Williams punched Samara in the eye, causing it to swell and turn red. The
injury also caused Samara pain that lasted for nearly a week. After Williams punched
him, Samara went back into the security cage, locked the door to the building, and called
the police.
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Officer Robert Carver was
dispatched to the Shell station to investigate. Samara told Officer Carver that Williams
hit him in the eye. Officer Carver noticed that Samara’s eye was red and swollen. In
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.
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Officer Carver’s experience in investigating battery cases, he concluded that Samara’s
injuries were consistent with being struck in the eye.
As a result, Williams was charged with battery on January 29, 2013. Following a
bench trial on July 25, 2013, Williams was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 365
days of incarceration with 359 days suspended to probation. He now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
As noted above, Williams argues that his battery conviction must be set aside
because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Williams
maintains that Samara’s testimony is incredibly dubious, in that “he gave contradictory
testimony about how the events unfolded, and there is no circumstantial evidence to
support his story.” Appellant’s Br. p. 2.
I. Standard of Review
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126
(Ind. 2005). We will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, together
with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. The conviction will
be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction.
Id. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind. 2001).
The offense of battery is defined in Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1 as follows:
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(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However,
the offense is:
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if:
(A) it results in bodily injury to any other person. . . .
Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-29 defines bodily injury as “any impairment of physical
condition, including physical pain.”
II. Williams’s Claims
In this case, the evidence presented at trial established that Williams became angry
with Samara and hit him in the eye. Tr. p. 10-11, 14-16. As discussed above, Samara’s
eye became swollen, turned red, and was painful for nearly a week. Id. at 10-11, 16.
This was sufficient evidence to establish that Williams committed battery on Samara that
resulted in bodily injury.
Notwithstanding the above, Williams seeks to invoke the incredible dubiosity rule
by arguing that Samara’s testimony was not worthy of credit because he gave
contradictory testimony about how the events unfolded, and there was “no circumstantial
evidence to support his story.” Appellant’s App. p. 2. Thus, Williams asserts that his
conviction must be vacated on this basis.
Under the incredible dubiosity rule, our Supreme Court has observed that
Within the narrow limits of the “incredible dubiosity” rule, a court may impinge
upon a jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness. If a sole witness
presents inherently improbable testimony and there is a complete lack of
circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s conviction may be reversed. This is
appropriate only where the court has confronted inherently improbable testimony
or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.
Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the
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testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable
person could believe it.
Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added). In addition,
inconsistencies between the testimonies of multiple witnesses do not make the evidence
“incredible” as a matter of law, and only go to the weight of the evidence. Morell v.
State, 933 N.E.2d 484, 492-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Notwithstanding Williams’s contentions, Samara unequivocally testified that
Williams hit him in the eye and caused the injuries. Tr. p. 10-11, 16. Additionally,
Officer Carver arrived at the scene to investigate and noticed that Samara’s eye was red
and swollen. Id. at 21. Officer Carver’s testimony is evidence that corroborates
Samara’s testimony that Williams injured him. Thus, Williams’s reliance on the
incredible dubiosity rule fails. In short, Williams’s arguments amount to a request that
we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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