IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 00-31226
_____________________
KEITH BRAZLEY
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
Respondent - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 00-CV-864
_________________________________________________________________
April 16, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
A jury convicted Petitioner - Appellant Keith Brazley of
second degree murder in Louisiana state court. After Brazley
unsuccessfully appealed his conviction, a state court denied him
habeas corpus relief. A federal district court denied Brazley
federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Brazley obtained a
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
certificate of appealability from this court and now appeals the
district court’s denial of federal habeas corpus relief. For the
following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
denying relief.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On September 3, 1995, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Keith
Brazley (“Brazley”) entered the home of his ex-girlfriend,
Michelle Guy, and killed Anthony Brazley (“Anthony”), Michelle’s
boyfriend at that time.1 The principal events leading up to the
crime include the following. On the evening of September 2,
1995, Anthony and Michelle attended a birthday party with
Michelle’s uncle, Gregory Guy (“Gregory”), and his wife Anita.
After the party, which ended around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m. on
September 3, Anthony, Michelle, Gregory, and Anita returned to
the home that Michelle and the Guys shared.2 Gregory and Anita
returned in their car, while Anthony and Michelle returned in
Anthony’s van. Because Michelle was afraid that seeing Anthony’s
van in front of the Guys’ home would anger Brazley, she
instructed Anthony to park his van on the side of the house.
Michelle and Anthony then entered Michelle’s apartment to retire
for the evening.
1
The defendant, Keith Brazley, and the victim, Anthony
Brazley, are unrelated to each other.
2
Gregory and Anita resided on the ground floor of the
two-story home, and Michelle and her three children lived
upstairs in a separate apartment.
2
At approximately 3:00 a.m., Michelle answered a knock at her
front door. Brazley knocked her down and then entered the
apartment. Michelle fled the apartment. Brazley then allegedly
armed himself with a kitchen knife and attacked Anthony, stabbing
Anthony in the neck. Anthony’s stab wound resulted in excessive
bleeding that eventually caused his death.
The sound of the confrontation woke Gregory, Anita, and
Michelle’s three children. Gregory ran to Michelle’s apartment
and found the apartment empty except for the three children.
Gregory then went out into the front yard to investigate a trail
of blood that originated in Michelle’s apartment. Gregory
observed Brazley pull up to the front of the house in Brazley’s
car. Brazley then allegedly commented to Gregory, “I’ve been
waiting to do this.” Brazley drove away from the front of the
house in his vehicle. Gregory continued following the trail of
blood which led him around the corner of the house, where he
discovered Brazley attempting to load Anthony’s body into the
trunk of Brazley’s car. After a warning from Gregory, Brazley
fled the scene, leaving the body on the street. The police
arrived at Michelle’s apartment soon thereafter. Based on
witness interviews and information received during their
investigation of the crime scene, the police arrested Brazley.
On October 26, 1995, Brazley was charged with the first degree
murder of Anthony.
3
Brazley pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. During
discovery, defense counsel asked the State to reveal all of
Brazley’s statements that it intended to introduce at trial. The
State responded that all res gestae statements would be used.3
During the prosecutor’s opening statement at trial, he referred
to the statement allegedly made by Brazley to Gregory suggesting
that Brazley had been “waiting to do this.” Defense counsel
moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, for exclusion of the
statement during the trial on the ground that the statement had
not been revealed to defense counsel during discovery. The State
argued that the statement was a res gestae statement and was thus
properly revealed to defense counsel during discovery, but the
trial court rejected that argument. The trial court then
excluded the statement from evidence and offered to instruct the
jury that the statement was not evidence.
At the close of evidence, the trial court asked defense
counsel if he wanted any additional jury instructions, and
defense counsel did not offer additional instructions. As a
result, the trial court never instructed the jury that Brazley’s
inculpatory statement to Gregory was not evidence to be
considered in reaching a verdict. The jury found Brazley guilty
3
“Res gestae” refers to evidence of words or actions
which form an integral part of the charged offense. Pratt v.
Cain, 142 F.3d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
4
of second degree murder on May 12, 1996. The trial court
sentenced Brazley to life imprisonment without parole.
Because of the prosecutor’s improper mention of Brazley’s
alleged inculpatory statement during the prosecutor’s opening
statement, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed
Brazley’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v.
Brazley, 96-KA-1657 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/5/97), 703 So. 2d 87.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed the appellate
court’s ruling and reinstated Brazley’s conviction. State v.
Brazley, 97-K-2987 (La. 9/25/98), 721 So. 2d 841. Brazley sought
state habeas corpus relief, but the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied such relief without explanation on October 1, 1999. State
v. Brazley, 99-KH-1332 (La. 10/1/99), 747 So. 2d 1140.
On March 27, 2000, Brazley filed a petition for federal
habeas corpus relief in district court asserting, inter alia,
violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of
law and his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.
Brazley’s due process claim is essentially based on the
prosecutor’s mention of Brazley’s inculpatory statement during
the prosecutor’s opening statement. As a result of the trial
court’s decision to sanction the prosecutor’s discovery abuse by
precluding the admission of Brazley’s inculpatory statement at
trial, the statement was never introduced at trial. Brazley
asserts that the prosecutor’s improper opening statement, coupled
with the discovery abuse and unremedied by a curative
5
instruction, amounts to particularly damaging prosecutorial
misconduct in violation of his due process rights.
Brazley’s Sixth Amendment claim is essentially based on the
same facts, i.e., the State’s failure to provide during discovery
Brazley’s alleged inculpatory statement coupled with the
prosecutor’s mention of that statement during his opening
statement. Brazley asserts that these actions violated his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense. Brazley argues that his
counsel’s theory of defense, i.e., that the killing may have
amounted to manslaughter but lacked the specific intent required
for a murder conviction, would have been different had his
counsel known that Brazley allegedly made the inculpatory
statement and that the statement would be brought to the jury’s
attention.
The district court denied federal habeas relief and denied
Brazley’s request for a certificate of appealability (a “COA”).
Brazley timely filed a motion for a COA and a notice of appeal in
this court. This court granted Brazley’s request for a COA on
the issue whether Brazley’s constitutional rights were violated
because the prosecutor referred to the undisclosed inculpatory
statement during his opening statement and because the trial
court failed to remedy the error by granting a mistrial or by
issuing a curative jury instruction.
6
II. Analysis
Since Brazley filed his federal habeas application in the
district court after April 24, 1996, his claims are governed by
the standards established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254
(Supp. 2001). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997);
Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1997). Under
the AEDPA, a petitioner must exhaust his state court remedies
before applying for federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b);
see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 (1982). Generally, the
exhaustion requirement is satisfied only when the specific
constitutional grounds urged in a federal habeas petition were
presented to the state’s highest court in a procedurally proper
manner. Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1999).
The State argued to the federal district court that Brazley
failed to exhaust his due process and Sixth Amendment claims
prior to applying for federal relief. Liberally construing
Brazley’s pro se state habeas petition, the district court
disagreed and concluded that Brazley properly exhausted his state
court remedies. Although the State does not assert its
exhaustion argument on appeal, the argument was not waived. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived
the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the
requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives
7
the requirement.”). Thus, this court may raise the exhaustion
issue sua sponte. Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2001). We agree with the district court that Brazley
properly exhausted his state court remedies with respect to his
due process and Sixth Amendment claims.
In this circuit, state and federal habeas petitions filed by
pro se petitioners “are construed liberally and are not held to
the same stringent and rigorous standards as are pleadings filed
by lawyers.” Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir.
1999). Thus, Brazley’s pro se application for state habeas
relief is entitled to “a broad interpretation.” Id. Brazley’s
state habeas petition alleges the denial of “a proper, and fair
deliberation by the jury” and the violation of his “right to a
fair trial.” Liberally construed, these statements assert a
violation of Brazley’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
of law. Furthermore, Brazley’s state habeas petition asserts
that the prosecutor’s mention of Brazley’s alleged inculpatory
statement undermined Brazley’s manslaughter defense. The
petition states:
The inadmissible statement became the state’s
one and only ally to show intent, but an ally
so overpowering, that nothing else [was]
needed. Every single piece of evidence [was]
received by the jury colored by this
statement being put before them. Absent this
inadmissible statement, the state’s case
wallowed in a sea of speculation.
8
Liberally construed, these statements assert a violation of
Brazley’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Lastly,
Brazley’s state habeas petition concludes with the statement that
his claims assert “violations of well established constitutional
rights.” After granting Brazley’s state habeas petition the
broad interpretation to which it is entitled, we conclude that
the petition properly presented his Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendment claims to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Thus, Brazley
exhausted his state court remedies with respect to these
constitutional claims.
Under the AEDPA, a federal district court may not grant an
application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).4 The
phrase “clearly established Federal law” “refers to the holdings,
4
Because Brazley’s due process and Sixth Amendment claims
involve mixed questions of law and fact, § 2254(d)(1) applies
instead of § 2254(d)(2). See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475-
76 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that mixed questions of law and fact
are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1) rather than under § 2254(d)(2));
see also United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 403-04 (6th
Cir. 2001) (stating that prosecutorial misconduct presents a
mixed question of law and fact); Jones v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 946,
958 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d
1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Spillone,
879 F.2d 514, 520 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
9
as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). The parties do not argue, and
the record from Brazley’s state habeas proceedings does not
suggest, that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial of habeas
relief was not an adjudication on the merits of Brazley’s
constitutional claims. Thus, the AEDPA affords Brazley relief
only if he establishes that the state habeas court’s adjudication
was either “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of”
federal law. DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2002).
A state court decision is “contrary to” federal law where
“the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or where “the state
court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on
a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S.
at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable
application of” federal law if “the state court’s application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.”
Id. at 409. Thus, “we have no authority to grant habeas corpus
relief simply because we conclude, in our independent judgment,
that a state supreme court’s application of [federal law] is
erroneous or incorrect.” Neal v. Puckett, No. 99-60511, 2002 WL
407382, at *4 (5th Cir. March 15, 2002) (en banc).
i. Brazley’s Due Process Claim
10
Brazley asserts that the prosecutor’s improper opening
statement, along with the trial court’s subsequent failure to
issue a curative jury instruction, violated his due process
rights.5 Thus, Brazley argues that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
denial of habeas relief on his due process claim was “contrary
to” or an “unreasonable application of” federal law. In
analyzing whether the prosecutor’s statement violated Brazley’s
due process rights, “[t]he relevant question is whether the
[statement] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). In order to rise to the level of a due
process violation, the prosecutor’s statement must render the
trial “fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 183.
Brazley argues that the prosecutor’s reference to Brazley’s
alleged statement to Gregory that Brazley had been “waiting” to
kill Anthony was damaging because the statement suggests that the
killing was premeditated murder rather than manslaughter.6
5
The prosecutor’s mention of Brazley’s inculpatory
statement was improper because the statement was not supported by
evidence presented during trial. See supra Part I.
6
The only theory of manslaughter relied on by Brazley at
trial was the “heat of passion” theory. Under this theory, a
homicide which would otherwise be murder can be downgraded to
manslaughter if the homicide was “committed in sudden passion or
heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to
deprive an average person of his self-control and cool
reflection.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (West 2002).
11
Brazley thus asserts that the prosecutor’s error destroyed his
manslaughter defense and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.
The State counters that, because the trial court excluded
Brazley’s alleged statement to Gregory from evidence, the
prosecutor’s error actually helped Brazley’s defense. The State
asserts that Brazley’s manslaughter defense was unsuccessful
because of the evidence introduced at trial, rather than the
prosecutor’s improper opening statement.
The State introduced substantial evidence at trial
supporting a conviction for murder rather than manslaughter.
First, the State established that, unlike in many manslaughter
cases, Brazley was not provoked by discovering Anthony and
Michelle in bed together. Rather, Brazley knocked down Michelle
before entering her apartment to search for Anthony. Second, the
State’s evidence showed that Brazley had the presence of mind to
obtain a weapon from the kitchen before looking for Anthony in
the bedroom. Brazley did not testify and did not present any
defense witnesses. His entire defense consisted of the opening
statement of defense counsel, which appears to argue for a
manslaughter conviction (as distinguished from a first degree
murder conviction), cross-examination of the State’s witnesses
and the closing statement of his counsel (which was not
transcribed). To the extent that the jury focused on the
reference during the prosecutor’s opening statement to Brazley’s
alleged statement, his manslaughter defense was clearly
12
undermined. But the evidence presented at trial shows little, if
any, real support for a manslaughter defense. On this record, we
cannot say that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s determination that
Brazley’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair by the
prosecutor’s improper opening statement, along with the trial
court’s subsequent failure to issue a curative jury instruction,
was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” federal
law.
ii. Brazley’s Sixth Amendment Claim
In addition to his due process claim, Brazley asserts that
the State’s discovery violation coupled with the prosecutor’s
improper opening statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to
present a complete defense. Brazley thus argues that the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial of state habeas relief on his
Sixth Amendment claim was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
application of” federal law.
“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303, 329 n.16 (1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
At first glance, this sweeping language appears to reach
Brazley’s Sixth Amendment claim. However, Brazley does not point
13
to any authority, and we have been unable to discover any,
holding that a prosecutor’s improper reference to an undisclosed
inculpatory statement violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense. Virtually all of the Supreme Court’s
cases discussing the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense
consider violations of either the Confrontation Clause due to the
presentation of State evidence without the opportunity for
defense cross-examination7 or violations of the Compulsory
Process Clause because the defendant was prevented from putting
on witnesses or from introducing evidence.8 In light of the
dearth of Supreme Court cases addressing a similar Sixth
7
See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557-61
(1988) (analyzing whether the introduction of testimony
concerning an out-of-court identification violated the
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause when the
identifying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain
the basis for the identification on cross-examination); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-20 (1974) (analyzing whether the
refusal to allow the defendant to cross-examine a key prosecution
witness violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause).
8
See, e.g., Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308-12 (analyzing
whether an evidentiary rule requiring the exclusion of polygraph
evidence, which was offered by a defendant to rebut an attack on
his credibility, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to present a defense); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-53
(1991) (analyzing whether the exclusion of evidence of the
defendant’s own past sexual conduct with the victim, as a
sanction for the defendant’s failure to comply with the
notice-and-hearing requirements of the state’s rape-shield
statute, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense); Taylor v. Illinios, 484 U.S. 400, 407-18
(1988) (analyzing whether the imposition of a discovery sanction
that entirely excluded the testimony of a material defense
witness violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present
a defense).
14
Amendment claim, we cannot say that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
denial of Brazley’s state habeas claim was “contrary to” or “an
unreasonable application of” federal law.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s denial of habeas relief on Brazley’s due process
and Sixth Amendment claims was not “contrary to” or an
“unreasonable application of” federal law. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying federal habeas
relief.
15