Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case. Feb 17 2014, 7:24 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JAY RODIA GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
LARRY D. ALLEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BARNARD LOCKETT, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1307-CR-653
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Clayton Graham, Judge
Cause No. 49G17-1205-FD-32260
February 17, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Barnard Lockett appeals the revocation of his community corrections placement.
We affirm.
Issue
Lockett raises one issue, which we restate as whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the revocation of his community corrections placement.
Facts
In 2012, Lockett was convicted of Class D felony domestic battery and sentenced
to 545 days, with seventy-four days executed and 471 days suspended, and to 365 days of
probation. In April 2013, Lockett admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
agreed to serve 365 days in a community corrections program with work release. On
June 14, 2013, the State filed a notice of community corrections violation against
Lockett. The notice alleged that, on May 15, 2013 and May 16, 2013, Lockett was
released from Duvall Residential Center (“Duvall”), but he failed to report to work. After
a hearing, the trial court found that Lockett violated the terms of his community
corrections placement and ordered him to serve thirty days in the Marion County Jail.
Lockett now appeals.
Analysis
Lockett contends there is insufficient evidence to support the revocation of
community corrections placement. Leona Woodson, a caseworker at Duvall, testified
about the purported violations. Woodson also testified about Duvall’s log-in and log-out
process, and computerized and handwritten log sheets were admitted over Lockett’s
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hearsay objection. Lockett contends that this evidence was insufficient because Woodson
had no personal knowledge of Lockett’s whereabouts on those days and was not the
keeper of the records at Duvall.
“A reviewing court treats a petition to revoke a placement in a community
corrections program the same as a petition to revoke probation.” Bass v. State, 974
N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “The State must prove the violation by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “[T]here is no right to probation: the trial court has
discretion whether to grant it, under what conditions, and whether to revoke it if
conditions are violated.” Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007).
“[P]robationers do not receive the same constitutional rights that defendants
receive at trial.” Id.
The due process right applicable in probation
revocation hearings allows for procedures that are more
flexible than in a criminal prosecution. Such flexibility
allows courts to enforce lawful orders, address an offender’s
personal circumstances, and protect public safety, sometimes
within limited time periods. Within this framework, and to
promote the aforementioned goals of a probation revocation
hearing, courts may admit evidence during probation
revocation hearings that would not be permitted in a full-
blown criminal trial.
Id. (citations omitted). In Reyes, our supreme court adopted the “substantial
trustworthiness test” as “the more effective means for determining the hearsay evidence
that should be admitted at a probation revocation hearing.” Id. at 441. In applying the
substantial trustworthiness test, “the trial court determines whether the evidence reaches a
certain level of reliability, or if it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness.” Id.
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Woodson offered extensive testimony about the log-in and log-out process and
how the log sheets were generated. She explained that the person who logs that
information has a duty to accurately record that information and that the computerized
system cannot be changed or tampered with after the information has been added. She
also testified that identification is required to leave the building. Even if the log sheets
would have been inadmissible hearsay in an ordinary criminal proceeding, 1 the record
shows that they had a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness and were properly
considered by the trial court.
The log sheets show that, on May 15, 2013, Lockett was released for work at 4:59
a.m. and returned at 12:32 p.m. and, on May 16, 2013, Lockett was released for work at
4:51 a.m. and returned at 8:16 p.m. This evidence taken with Woodson’s testimony that
she was notified by Lockett’s employer that he did not work on those days was sufficient
to establish that Lockett violated the terms of his community corrections placement.
Conclusion
The evidence was sufficient evidence to support the revocation of Lockett’s
community corrections placement. We affirm.
Affirmed.
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
1
On appeal, Lockett does not develop cogent argument supported by citation to authority establishing the
log sheets were inadmissible hearsay and waives any argument to that effect. See Keller v. State, 987
N.E.2d 1099, 1121 n.11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
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