IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-41155
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN DE LA FUENTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. B-00-CR-149-1
April 19, 2002
Before GARWOOD, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Juan De La Fuente (De La Fuente) appeals his jury conviction
for importation and possession with intent to distribute less than
50 kilograms of marihuana. He argues that the district court erred
in including a deliberate-ignorance instruction in its charge to
the jury.
In light of De La Fuente’s inconsistent statements, his
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
nerevousness during the search of the vehicle, the testimony from
customs inspectors and De La Fuente’s own testimony at trial, the
district court did not err in instructing the jury on deliberate
ignorance. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 950-
53 (5th Cir. 1990).
With respect to the complaints on appeal as to the form or
precise wording of the deliberate ignorance charge given, we note
that the only objection at trial was “I only object to Section 8,
second paragraph, Page 5, which is the deliberate ignorance charge.
It was requested by the Government and the evidence doesn’t show
it.” The deliberate ignorance charge given is exactly that
provided in the then current, as well as in the present, Fifth
Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.37 (1997 ed. and 2001 ed.), and
has frequently been quoted by this Court with apparent approval
where we have upheld the giving of a deliberate ignorance
instruction against the claim that the evidence did not support it.
See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 476 n.6 (5th Cir.
1999); United States v. Lara-Velasquez at 953. No case has been
cited to us holding this form or wording of the deliberate
ignorance instruction to be erroneous. We discern no plain error
(if, indeed, error of any kind) in the precise wording or form of
the deliberate ignorance instruction given and further conclude
that likely prejudice has not been shown in respect to the
presently asserted errors of wording or form in the deliberate
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ignorance charge as given. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
AFFIRMED
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