Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Jan 16 2014, 9:16 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KIMBERLY A. JACKSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHAUNCEY KRANTZ, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 84A04-1302-CR-87
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Judge
Cause No. 84D06-1202-FA-344
January 16, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Chauncey Isaac Krantz appeals his sixteen-year sentence for Class C felony child
molesting, Class C felony child exploitation, and Class D felony possession of child
pornography. We affirm.
ISSUES
Krantz presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him; and (2) whether his sentence is inappropriate.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Terre Haute Police Department received email messages from an Ohio man
later identified as Dirk Gellert. 1 The emails included several attachments containing
transcripts of instant messages between Gellert and Krantz, who Gellert knew only as
“sethisaacs86,” about adult men having sex with children. In the conversations, Krantz
discussed how he and other men had engaged in sexual intercourse with young D.L., who
Krantz portrayed as (and believes to be) his own biological daughter. The discussions
were graphic and described brutal and aggressive acts. Krantz even pretended to be both
D.L. and her mother, using his “sethisaacs86” account to have sexually explicit
conversations with Gellert. Krantz and Gellert planned to meet so Gellert could have
sexual intercourse with D.L. When interviewed by the police, Krantz admitted sending
the instant messages but claimed none of them were true.
In addition to the instant messages, Gellert provided the police with photos Krantz
had sent him. Several showed D.L. partially nude; for example, in one photo, she wore
1
Gellert is also identified in the record as “Dirk Gellar.”
2
only her underwear. Initially, when interviewed by the police, Krantz denied taking any
pictures of D.L. It was not until the police showed him the photos that he admitted
secretly taking them.
The police recovered several other photos that had been deleted from Krantz’s cell
phone. Some depicted children engaging in sexual activity, including one titled “twelve
year old fornicates with a six year old.” Pre-Trial Tr. p. 74. Others depicted the sexual
organs of people who police believed to be children, although the photos did not display
the subjects’ faces or other indication of their ages. Their captions, however, indicated
they were depictions of D.L. and other minors before, during, and after sexual
intercourse. Krantz admitted he had these photos on his cell phone. However, he
claimed the ones with D.L.’s name in the caption were really not images of her, but
instead photos that he had merely received, titled, and sent out.
During a forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center, D.L. disclosed that
Krantz had “raped” her starting when she was six years old. Appellant’s App. p. 190.
She also stated that Krantz would make her touch his penis with her mouth, hands, and
vaginal area. She said that “white stuff” would come out of his “pee pee” when he would
rub his “pee pee” on her “pee pee.” Id. She further stated that “he would put the white
stuff in her pee pee and it would run out of her and he would then take pictures of it
coming out of her.” Id.
The State charged Krantz with two counts of Class A felony child molesting, one
count of Class C felony child exploitation, and one count of Class D felony possession of
child pornography. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Krantz pleaded guilty to a lesser charge
3
of Class C felony child molesting as well as Class C felony child exploitation and Class
D felony possession of child pornography. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining
Class A felony child molesting charge. The plea agreement left sentencing to the
discretion of the trial court.
While in jail, Krantz was recorded during a phone call to his mother in which he
expressed anger that jail staff had taken away a bracelet D.L. had given him. He
complained that authorities were “[t]aking away remnants of [D.L.]” and warned that he
was going to grab a staff member and fight “[t]o the death.” Sent. Tr. pp. 30, 33.
During preparation of his presentence investigation report, Krantz told the
probation officer that accusations he had molested D.L. were false and that D.L. had
recanted her accounts of being molested by him. In addition, he blamed Gellert for his
convictions and minimized his own culpability for the crimes.
Prior to sentencing, Krantz never petitioned the trial court to withdraw his guilty
plea due to his innocence. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court found his minimal
criminal history to be the only mitigating circumstance as he had only one prior
conviction for resisting law enforcement. As for aggravating circumstances, the trial
court identified: (1) D.L.’s young age, noting she was between five and nine years old at
the time of the offenses; (2) Krantz’s position of trust with D.L.; (3) Krantz’s lack of
remorse; (4) the emotional and psychological effects of the crimes on D.L.; and (5) that
Krantz would not respond to short-term jail incarceration. Finding that the aggravators
significantly outweighed the single mitigator, the trial court imposed consecutive eight-
year terms for the Class C felony child molesting and Class C felony child exploitation
4
convictions and a concurrent three-year term for the Class D felony possession of child
pornography conviction, for an aggregate sentence of sixteen years. Krantz now appeals
his sentence.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Krantz contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Subject to
the review and revision power discussed below, sentencing decisions rest within the
sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875
N.E.2d 218 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court abuses its
discretion when it: (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) enters a sentencing
statement that includes reasons that are unsupported by the record; (3) enters a sentencing
statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration; or (4) enters a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper
as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. If a trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing,
“remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with
confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly
considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.
Krantz challenges several aggravators found by the trial court and claims it
overlooked or should have found several other mitigating factors. Specifically, he argues
5
the court improperly found his position of trust with D.L., his lack of remorse, that he
would not respond to short-term incarceration, and the effects of his crimes on D.L. as
aggravators. He also argues the court failed to find his guilty plea, his cooperation with
police, and his difficult childhood as mitigators.
Position of trust. Krantz argues the record does not support the trial court’s
finding of his position of trust with D.L. as an aggravator. The record is clear, however,
that Krantz believed he was D.L.’s biological father and held himself out to be her father.
See, e.g., Appellant’s App. p. 163 (presentence investigation report reflects Krantz told
probation officer that D.L. was his biological child and that he maintained contact with
D.L.’s mother only for D.L.’s benefit); Sent. Tr. pp. 38 (Krantz stated in the jail phone
call that “they better not try and take anything else away from me, of my child”), 82
(Krantz’s mother testifying that “he’s thought for years that [D.L.] was his biological
child”).
Krantz nonetheless claims two of the court’s statements show it rejected his
paternity claim. First, in finding Krantz’s position of trust to be an aggravator, it stated:
The position of trust you’re in. You claim to be this child’s father or acting
as this child’s father, when there’s actually no documentation of you having
any children. Other than you testifying on the stand. The position of trust,
huge position of trust. Being a father of daughters myself, I would never, I,
handcuff me now if I do something like that.
Sent. Tr. pp. 115-16. We take this statement as a mere observation that although Krantz
provided the only evidence that he was D.L.’s father, it was sufficient to support that he
had believed and acted as a father and subsequently violated his position of trust.
Second, when the court rejected his proffered mitigator that incarceration would cause
6
undue hardship to his dependents, it stated: “No child is your legal dependent.” Id. at
117. This statement simply explains that incarceration could not cause undue hardship on
any legal dependents since he had none. It says nothing about Krantz’s position of trust.
It is undeniable that a court may find that a defendant held a position of trust with the
victim without finding that the victim was the defendant’s legal dependent. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by finding Krantz’s violation of a position of trust as an
aggravator.
Lack of remorse. Krantz next argues the record does not support the trial court’s
finding of his lack of remorse as an aggravator. In finding this aggravator, it stated:
I read the pre-sentence report. I didn’t see any remorse in the pre-sentence
report. The only time I heard you was up on the stand say, “I’m sorry, I’m
sorry. I’d tell her if she was here, I’m sorry.” Well she’s ten now, how can
she understand, I don’t know if she would understand your remorse.
Id. at 116.
The presentence investigation report states the following:
During this Probation officer[’]s interview with Krantz, he denied all
charges that he molested [D.L.] and stated that charges were going to be
dropped since his daughter “Recanted” her accounts of being molested by
him. The Defendant blamed “Dirk[,”] his Ohio chat-line friend, for making
him use his daughter[’s] middle name . . . in chat messaging between the
two which triggered the investigation which ultimately came to this instant
offense. He explained that he would have never been charged with Child
Exploitation if he had not used [D.L.’s] middle name . . . when chatting
with “Dirk[.”]
According to Krantz, the only thing that he did wrong was having
pictures of naked children on his cell phone. He maintains that “Dirk”
would send the pictures to him even though he had no interest in looking at
them.
7
Appellant’s App. p. 166. Thus, having already pleaded guilty to Class C felony child
molesting of D.L., Krantz then told the probation officer that he denied all molesting
charges and that D.L. had recanted. Krantz stated at the sentencing hearing that he meant
he denied only the original Class A felony charges, but given his complete denial of any
molesting charges during the presentence investigation, the court was within its discretion
to disbelieve his claim at the sentencing hearing.
Krantz also claims the probation officer inaccurately recorded his response and
points to several other inaccuracies in the report to support this claim. However, the
probation officer testified at the sentencing hearing. The officer admitted some mistakes
(his notation of Krantz’s social security number, birthplace, and marital status) but
testified that everything else accurately recorded what Krantz told him. For example,
contrary to Krantz’s claims at the sentencing hearing, the probation officer testified that
Krantz told him he was a regular user of an adult online chat service and that he had been
with two hundred men. Given the presentence investigation report and the probation
officer’s testimony, the court could reasonably conclude that the officer had accurately
recorded Krantz’s denial of all the molesting charges, which reflected upon Krantz’s
credibility with the trial court.
Krantz further faults the trial court’s observation that D.L. would unlikely
understand his remorse. We agree that a court may find remorse even if the victim does
not understand that remorse; however, we take the court’s overall statement to be that the
lack of remorse shown by the presentence investigation report outweighed his single
equivocal statement of remorse at the sentencing hearing.
8
The presentence investigation report reflects that Krantz denied ever molesting
D.L., claimed D.L. had recanted, blamed Gellert for getting him caught and convicted,
and blamed Gellert for sending him photos he was not interested in (a claim contradicted
by his statement to police that he received explicit photos, titled them, and sent them back
out). The court was well within its discretion in finding his lack of remorse as an
aggravator.
Short-term incarceration. Krantz also argues the record does not support the trial
court’s finding that he would not respond to short-term incarceration as an aggravator.
The record shows Krantz admitted having sexually explicit conversations with Gellert for
a period spanning at least two years, and during that time, Gellert sent him photographs
of children engaging in sex acts. D.L.’s forensic interview indicated that his sexual abuse
of her was ongoing and that he took both photo and video images of her. This evidence
shows that Krantz’s offenses were the result of a prolonged pattern of conduct and not
merely a one-time lapse of judgment.
Moreover, in his jail phone call to his mother, Krantz threatened violence to jail
staff after a bracelet D.L. had given him was taken away. In that same conversation, he
expressed an inability to come to terms with the fact that he was to have no contact with
D.L. See Sent. Tr. pp. 34 (“You tell them not to take my child away from me like that. . .
. They can’t do that.”), 40 (“[T]hey’re trying to take me away from [D.L.] for the rest of
my life.”). In addition, his Indiana Risk Assessment System score shows he is at high
risk of reoffending. The record amply supports a reasonable belief that Krantz would not
9
respond to short-term incarceration, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding this aggravator.
Victim impact. Krantz further argues that the emotional and psychological effects
of the crimes on D.L. were not a valid aggravating circumstance. It is settled law that
victim impact is an improper aggravator where there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the impact on the victim was different than the impact generally experienced by
victims of the same crime. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ind. 2007). The
principal evidence regarding the emotional and psychological effects of the crimes on
D.L. came from her mental health counselor’s testimony at the sentencing hearing. The
counselor testified that D.L. had experienced problems at school and difficulties with
fear, nightmares, anger, trusting people, and making friends. She also stated that D.L.
would likely need long-term treatment. However, she also acknowledged that D.L.’s
issues were common to children who had been molested, and like them, she would
probably suffer the effects for a good part of her life. This evidence does not reveal
destructive effects not normally experienced by victims of such crimes. While we
recognize the terrible effects Krantz’s abuse has had on D.L., we are compelled to
conclude the court abused its discretion by finding victim impact as an aggravator.
Guilty plea. As to Krantz’s claims regarding mitigators, his main contention is
that the court should have found his guilty plea to be a mitigator. A defendant who
pleads guilty deserves some mitigating weight to be afforded to the plea. Anglemyer, 875
N.E.2d at 220. However, a trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion by failing
to recognize a defendant’s guilty plea as a significant mitigating circumstance. See id. at
10
220-21. A guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant mitigation where the
defendant has received a substantial benefit from the plea or where the evidence against
the defendant is such that the decision to plead guilty is more likely the result of
pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse. See id. at 221.
Krantz was charged with two counts of Class A felony child molesting (which
carried a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years on each count), one count of Class C
felony child exploitation, and one count of Class D felony possession of child
pornography. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State agreed to allow him to plead to a
lesser charge of Class C felony child molesting (along with the child exploitation and
possession of child pornography charges) and dismissed the second Class A felony child
molesting charge. The reduction of one Class A felony to a Class C felony and the
dismissal of the other Class A felony shows a substantial benefit received by Krantz.
Krantz nonetheless argues that the reduction and dismissal were merely in
conformance with the evidence against him. He claims D.L.’s use of the word “rape”
really indicated nothing more than fondling, thus supporting child molesting only as a
Class C felony (fondling or touching) and not a Class A felony (sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual conduct). See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (2007). While it is certainly true that
D.L. recounted several incidents of fondling, she also stated that Krantz had “raped” her
starting when she was six years old, that he would make her touch his penis with her
mouth and vaginal area, and that “he would put the white stuff in her pee pee and it
would run out of her and he would then take pictures of it coming out of her.”
11
Appellant’s App. p. 190. This evidence is sufficient for a trier of fact to consider in
support of two counts of Class A felony child molesting as charged by the State.
Had Krantz been convicted of these two Class A felonies alone, he could have
faced a potential sentence of up to one hundred years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (2005)
(maximum sentence for Class A felony is fifty years). Instead, the plea agreement
allowed him to significantly limit his sentencing exposure for child molesting to just
eight years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a) (2005) (maximum sentence for Class C felony
is eight years). Krantz thus received a substantial benefit from his guilty plea. The court
therefore did not abuse its discretion by failing to find that his guilty plea rose to the level
of a significant mitigator. 2
Cooperation with police. Krantz also argues the court should have found his
cooperation with police to be a mitigator. However, a trial court is not obligated to
accept the defendant’s contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance.
McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Ind. 2001). Here, Krantz was initially
dishonest with police and denied taking any photos of D.L. It was not until he learned
that the police were already in possession of the photos that he admitted taking them.
Further, he initially denied D.L.’s allegations and claimed he had not touched her
inappropriately in any way. Appellant’s App. p. 182. In light of these dishonest
2
Krantz claims the dismissed Class A felony charge “appears to” refer to a specific motel room incident
that could only have supported a Class C felony charge. Appellant’s Br. p. 16. However, he points to
nothing in the record from which we can conclusively determine that the dismissed charge referred to this
incident. In any event, the State’s reduction of the first Class A felony to a Class C felony was a
substantial benefit in itself to warrant the trial court’s rejection of his guilty plea as a significant mitigator.
12
statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by omitting any cooperation with
the police as a mitigator.
Difficult childhood. Krantz further argues the court should have found his
difficult childhood to be a mitigator. He points to his own testimony as well as his
mother’s indicating that he was sexually abused as a child.
The trial court explicitly rejected mental illness (which, Krantz’s testimony shows,
was related to his difficult childhood) as a mitigator. It did not, however, explicitly reject
his difficult childhood as a mitigator. Nonetheless, if a trial court does not find the
existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, it is not obligated to
explain why it has found that the factor does not exist. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
Here, portions of the sentencing statement show the court clearly considered the
testimony regarding his difficult childhood. See Sent. Tr. pp. 116 (“You said you have
nightmares from the things that happened to you as a child. Well, you’ve turned your
nightmares into her nightmares.”); 117 (noting absence of medical evidence verifying
violent childhood sexual abuse alleged by Krantz); 118 (“You[r] problems became her
problems and you put them on her.”). It is therefore apparent the court found that his
difficult childhood was not a significant mitigator. We conclude this decision was not an
abuse of its discretion. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (“It is apparent to us that
rather than overlooking Anglemyer’s mental illness, the trial court determined it was not
significant and thus would not be a factor influencing the trial court’s sentencing
decision. This was the trial court’s call. We find no error.”).
13
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Krantz’s minimal
criminal history to be the only mitigator. And although the court abused its discretion by
identifying victim impact as an aggravator, it properly found his position of trust, his lack
of remorse, and that he would not respond to short-term incarceration as aggravators.
Furthermore, the evidence supports the conclusion that these incidents occurred over a
significant period of time. Given that the aggravators also included D.L.’s young age,
which was not challenged by Krantz, we are confident that the trial court would have
imposed the same sentence had it not relied on victim impact as an aggravator.
II. INAPPROPRIATE SENTENCE
Krantz also contends his sentence is inappropriate. Although the trial court may
have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing Krantz’s sentence, Article 7, Sections
4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision
of sentences through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court “may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind.
2007) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). The defendant has the burden of
persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id.
We first look to the statutory sentencing ranges established for the classes of the
offenses. Krantz pleaded guilty to two Class C felonies and one Class D felony. The
statutory sentencing range for a Class C felony is between two and eight years, with the
advisory sentence being four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a). The statutory sentencing
14
range for a Class D felony is between six months and three years, with the advisory
sentence being one and a half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(a) (2005). Krantz was
sentenced to maximum terms, with the Class C felonies to be served consecutively to
each other and the Class D felony to be served concurrently with the other sentences, for
an aggregate sentence of sixteen years.
We next look to the nature of the offenses and Krantz’s character. As to the nature
of the offenses, Krantz sexually victimized young D.L., who he believed to be his own
biological daughter and held out to be his daughter to others, when she was between five
and nine years old. There is evidence in the record that he forced D.L. to touch his penis,
and he also rubbed his penis against her vagina. Further, Krantz took pictures of his
semen running out of D.L.’s vagina. In addition, he sent instant messages describing in
excruciating detail the aggressive and brutal sexual abuse he and other men perpetrated
upon D.L. He also secretly took and disseminated photos of D.L. in a partially nude
state. Lastly, the police were able to recover several deleted photos constituting child
pornography on Krantz’s cell phone, including one titled “twelve year old fornicates with
a six year old.” Pre-Trial Tr. p. 74. The nature of the offenses alone justifies his sixteen-
year sentence.
As to his character, the record reveals that Krantz’s victimization of D.L. was not
a mere lapse in judgment but instead a pattern of behavior exhibiting a willingness to
abuse and exploit his young biological daughter over several years for his own personal
gratification. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that, despite his guilty plea, the
record shows his unwillingness to accept responsibility for his conduct: he denied ever
15
molesting D.L., claimed she had recanted, and blamed his conduct on his online chat
friend Gellert, which reflected upon his credibility with the trial court. Krantz’s poor
character is further shown by the phone call recorded at the jail. There, he threatened to
fight jail staff “[t]o the death” in retribution for taking away a bracelet from D.L. Sent.
Tr. p. 33. The phone call reflects a continued fixation on D.L. and an inability to
understand that he is to have no contact with her.
Krantz nonetheless asks us to consider his undocumented physical ailments and
points to his testimony at the sentencing hearing recounting his physical health issues.
We acknowledge, as did the trial court, that Krantz lost a significant amount of weight
between his arrest and sentencing. Nonetheless, other than his own self-serving
testimony, he provided no evidence that he would not receive the medical care he needs
at the Department of Correction.
Krantz also claims that the sexual abuse he suffered as a child in some way
redeems his character. Even assuming the truth of this claim, however, it simply does not
excuse his conduct or his character.
Krantz has failed to persuade us that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Also, the trial court exercised its
discretion by sentencing Krantz to less than the maximum sentence that he could have
received.
CONCLUSION
We therefore affirm Krantz’s sentence.
KIRSCH, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
16
Chauncey Krantz v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion