Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
Dec 31 2013, 9:06 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DONALD E. C. LEICHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DAVID R. MCCLURE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 34A02-1306-CR-491
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Douglas A. Tate, Judge
Cause No. 34D03-1212-CM-1293
December 31, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
David R. McClure appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor criminal
mischief. McClure argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Because we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain
McClure’s conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In December 2012, Douglas Persons was working at the Kokomo SuperWash.
Suddenly, Douglas heard a loud bang on the door. When he looked out the window, he
saw McClure standing outside. Douglas recognized McClure because he was in a
romantic relationship with McClure’s wife, Brandi.
Douglas knew that McClure was upset about his relationship with Brandi.
Because he did not want to get into a fight with McClure at the SuperWash, Douglas
stayed inside and threatened to call the police. McClure began yelling and calling
Douglas names. Then Douglas heard a loud noise. Tr. p. 7. At that time, Douglas’s car
was parked “right outside the door.” Id. at 13.
Douglas waited inside until he saw McClure drive away from the SuperWash.
Douglas was the only employee working, and there were no other people or cars in the
parking lot. When Douglas approached his car, he noticed that the front left fender was
dented. Id. at 8; State’s Ex. 1. He called the police.
The State charged McClure with Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. After a
bench trial, McClure was found guilty of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. He
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was sentenced to 180 days in the county jail with two days executed and the remainder
suspended to unsupervised probation.
McClure now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
McClure argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind.
2012). We look solely to the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. A conviction will be affirmed if the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence could have allowed a
reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In order to convict McClure of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, the State
was required to prove that he “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damage[d] or
deface[d] the property of another person without the other person’s consent.” Ind. Code
§ 35-43-1-2(a)(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in conduct in
plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard
involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-
41-2-2(c). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the
conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b).
Finally, “a person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct,
it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). The trial court, acting as the
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trier of fact, may resort to reasonable inferences based on examination of the surrounding
circumstances to determine the existence of the requisite intent. White v. State, 772
N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ind. 2002). Furthermore, “the requisite intent may be presumed from
the voluntary commission of the act.” Mishler v. State, 660 N.E.2d 343, 348 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996).
The evidence most favorable to the judgment is sufficient to sustain McClure’s
conviction. At trial, Douglas testified that McClure was angry because Douglas was in a
romantic relationship with McClure’s wife. McClure drove to the SuperWash, banged on
the door, and called Douglas names. When Douglas refused to come outside and
threatened to call the police, he heard a loud noise. At the time, McClure was standing
outside near Douglas’s car, and no one else was in the parking lot. After he saw McClure
drive away, Douglas went outside and saw that his car’s front left fender was dented. At
trial, Douglas testified that he believed McClure had damaged his car. Tr. p. 12. And a
police officer who saw the damaged car testified that there was a shoe mark in the center
of the dent. Id. at 22. Although McClure denied touching the car and claimed the dent
was there when he arrived at the SuperWash, the trial court could reasonably conclude
that McClure, angry that Douglas was in a romantic relationship with his wife, had
intentionally damaged Douglas’s car without his consent.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, McClure argues that Douglas could
not say with certainty that the damage to his car did not occur before the incident at the
SuperWash. See id. at 12; Appellant’s Br. p. 2-4. But the trial court considered this
testimony and nonetheless determined that the State presented sufficient evidence to
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prove that McClure committed Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. We agree.
McClure’s claim to the contrary amounts to an invitation for this Court to reweigh the
evidence, which we may not do.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.
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