Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the Dec 05 2013, 9:05 am
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
BRIAN REITZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
KEIMONTE JACKSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1304-CR-339
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Stanley Kroh, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49G16-1211-FD-76359
December 5, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issue
Keimonte Jackson appeals his conviction of criminal trespass, raising the following issue:
whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the police officer who denied Jackson access to the
property was an agent of the property owner. Concluding the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to sustain Jackson’s conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On the evening of August 5, 2012, Officer Michael Hart of the Speedway Police
Department was on patrol in the area of Coppertree Apartments (“Coppertree”). Officer Hart
was dispatched to Coppertree, where he encountered Jackson. Learning that Jackson had no
contractual interest in the property, Officer Hart served Jackson with a written trespass notice in
accordance with the policy of the Speedway Police Department.
Gregory Randolph, who is the Community Manager at Coppertree, oversees the overall
operations of the community. Randolph testified that Coppertree has an agreement with the
Speedway Police Department which allows it to act as Coppertree’s agent; however, Randolph
admitted to never having read the actual written contract between the two entities. Randolph
also testified that the trespass notice served on Jackson by Officer Hart was a standard trespass
notice. It is common practice for a trespass notice issued on behalf of Coppertree to be
submitted to it for review, and if Coppertree accepts the trespass notice, it will be placed in a
binder at the apartment complex. The trespass notice issued against Jackson was submitted to
Coppertree by the Speedway Police Department, and Coppertree approved it.
On November 7, 2012, Officer Michael Clupper of the Speedway Police Department
responded to a domestic disturbance call at Coppertree and encountered Jackson. Officer
Clupper ran Jackson’s name against a trespass list kept by the Speedway Police Department and
discovered that Jackson had previously been issued a trespass notice at Coppertree.
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Jackson was charged with criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, and was found
guilty following a bench trial. Jackson was sentenced to 164 days suspended to probation and
was required to complete twenty-four hours of community service. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
When reviewing a defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence, the reviewing court will
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820
N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. Id. And we must affirm “if the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).
II. Criminal Trespass and Agency
A person commits criminal trespass if, without having a contractual interest in the
property, he “knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of another person after having
been denied entry by the other person or that person’s agent.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(1).
Jackson maintains that his conviction cannot stand because the evidence was insufficient to show
that Officer Hart, who served a trespass notice on Jackson, was an agent of Coppertree.
An agency relationship is created when one person gives another person authority to act
on his behalf. Glispie v. State, 955 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Agency is a relationship resulting from the manifestation of consent by one party
to another that the latter will act as an agent for the former. To establish an actual
agency relationship, three elements must be shown: (1) manifestation of consent
by the principal, (2) acceptance of authority by the agent, and (3) control exerted
by the principal over the agent. These elements may be proven by circumstantial
evidence, and there is no requirement that the agent’s authority to act be in
writing.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Here, there is sufficient evidence to prove the existence of an actual agency relationship.
Randolph, acting as a representative of Coppertree, testified that Coppertree had an agreement
with the Speedway Police Department through which the police would issue trespass notices on
its behalf. Indeed, it is common practice for Speedway police officers to issue these trespass
notices and for Coppertree to keep a record of any notices issued on its behalf. Second, there
was evidence showing that the Speedway Police Department and its officers have assented to act
as an agent of Coppertree, as police officers do, in fact, issue trespass notices and submit those
notices to Coppertree for approval based on established police department policy. And finally,
Coppertree exerts control over the Speedway Police Department in regard to this relationship,
evidenced by the fact that Coppertree asks that the Speedway Police Department submit copies
of the notices for Coppertree’s approval.
Conclusion
Concluding there was sufficient evidence to prove there was an agency relationship
between Coppertree and the Speedway police officer who issued the trespass notice against
Jackson, we affirm.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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