Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the Nov 21 2013, 8:51 am
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KAREN CELESTINO-HORSEMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JODY KATHRYN STEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
GERMAINE JONES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1305-CR-396
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge
Cause No. 49G01-1202-FB-7594
November 21, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issue
Germaine Jones appeals his convictions of robbery and criminal confinement, both Class
B felonies, raising the following issue for our review: whether there was sufficient evidence to
sustain his convictions. Concluding the evidence was sufficient to prove Jones’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Suzette Surprenant was the sole employee working a Speedway gas station in
Indianapolis during the early hours of January 13, 2012. Around 4:00 a.m. that morning, two
young African-American men entered the gas station. The first man’s face was exposed, and he
was later identified as Kenneth Compton. Compton wore a black hooded jacket and a baseball
cap. The second man wore a mask. The masked man wore a black coat with a quilted diamond
pattern, and the hood of his jacket was pulled up over a red, black, and white baseball cap with a
sticker on the bill. The masked man also wore gray and black duck boots.
Compton pointed a gun at Surprenant and ordered her to open the cash register.
Surprenant opened the register, and Compton removed fifty-seven dollars in cash. Compton then
demanded that Surprenant open the safe, but she replied that she could not because it was time
locked. At that point, Compton turned to the masked man and said “Wayne, grab the squares,”
meaning cigarettes. Transcript at 19. The masked man grabbed a plastic bag and put all of the
Newport cigarettes in the bag. At the same time, Compton stole seventeen 124K Gold Rush
scratch-off lottery tickets. Then, Compton said “Let’s go, Wayne, let’s go,” tr. at 20, and the two
men left the store and ran south down the street on foot. Surprenant locked the doors and called
the police.
The Speedway’s district manager was able to identify the serial numbers of the stolen
lottery tickets and contacted the Hoosier Lottery around 6:00 a.m. The Hoosier Lottery’s
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security measures allow it to be alerted if someone attempts to redeem a stolen lottery ticket.
Around 10:30 a.m. the same morning, four of the stolen lottery tickets were presented for
redemption at a mini-mart on South Keystone Avenue. A Hoosier Lottery representative
immediately contacted the mini-mart clerk, who confirmed that two African-American men
wearing black jackets and baseball caps had attempted to redeem the tickets and that they had
left in a maroon Chevy Malibu. The police were immediately contacted, and an officer of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department conducted a traffic stop of a maroon Chevy Malibu
he observed driving north on I-65 just minutes after the dispatch.
Compton was driving the vehicle, which contained three other passengers, one of whom
was Germaine Jones. Jones was wearing a black hooded jacket with a quilted diamond pattern
and black and gray duck boots. Jones falsely identified himself as “Donald Montgomery” but
was later identified by his full name “Germaine Dewayne Jones.” Tr. at 104, 181. Twelve
unopened packs of Newport cigarettes were found in the vehicle, including two packs that were
found on Jones’s person. Four baseball caps were found in the vehicle, including one red and
black cap with a sticker on the bill.
While incarcerated at the Marion County Jail, Jones made several phone calls from the
jail. Jones identified himself as “Wayne” during those calls. Tr. 188.
Jones was charged with robbery and criminal confinement, Class B felonies, and a jury
found him guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced Jones to twenty years executed, with
eighteen years to be served at the Indiana Department of Correction and two years with
community corrections on work release.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
When reviewing a defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence, the reviewing court will
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we must respect “the
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jury’s exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124,
126 (Ind. 2005) (citation omitted). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. Id. And we must affirm “if the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Jones argues that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his
convictions for robbery and criminal confinement. Specifically, he maintains that the evidence
was not sufficient to identify him as Compton’s masked accomplice in the robbery. We
disagree.
“Elements of offenses and identity may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence
and logical inferences drawn therefrom.” Bustamante v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ind.
1990). “Circumstantial evidence will be deemed sufficient if inferences may reasonably be
drawn that enable the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 821, 826 (Ind. 2002).
Jones’s brief seeks to attack each piece of evidence individually and argues that none of
the evidence proves Jones’s identity. But where the State’s case is built on circumstantial
evidence, the evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt even if individual pieces of evidence
in isolation may not. Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 1998). When considered as a
whole, the circumstantial evidence in this case is such that a jury could find Jones guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
First, Compton referred to his masked accomplice as “Wayne” during the robbery;
“Wayne” is the same name by which Jones referred to himself while making phone calls from
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the Marion County Jail.1 Second, Jones was with Compton when four of the stolen lottery
tickets were redeemed. Third, when the police pulled over Compton’s vehicle, Jones was
wearing a black hooded coat with a quilted diamond pattern and gray and black duck boots—
clothing which matched that worn by Compton’s masked accomplice. Fourth, twelve unopened
packs of Newport cigarettes, the brand stolen during the robbery, were found in the vehicle,
including two packs that were found on Jones’s person. Lastly, the police found a red and black
baseball cap in Compton’s vehicle that matched the hat worn by Compton’s masked accomplice.
Taken together, this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
infer that Jones was Compton’s masked accomplice and guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. Accordingly, the evidence presented at Jones’s trial was sufficient to sustain his
convictions.
Conclusion
Concluding the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove Jones’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, we affirm.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
1
Jones’s brief, in both its statement of facts and analysis, omits the fact that Compton referred to his
masked accomplice as “Wayne” and that Jones identified himself as “Wayne” when making phone calls from the
Marion County Jail. We find this omission noteworthy because we believe this to be one of the most incriminating
facts presented against Jones.
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