Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
Oct 17 2013, 10:10 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
HAROLD FERRIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
HAROLD FERRIN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1210-PC-839
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Judge
The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49G06-0807-PC-174418
October 17, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Harold Ferrin, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. Ferrin raises two issues which we consolidate and restate as
whether the court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant facts as discussed in Ferrin’s direct appeal follow:
On July 10, 2008, R.F. (Mother) was bathing her six-year-old
daughter, M.Y., when she noticed redness on M.Y.’s genital area. The next
day, Mother decided to take M.Y. to Ferrin’s house. M.Y. refers to Ferrin
as “Papaw Dick” because her stepfather is Ferrin’s son. Tr. p. 114. While
in transit, Mother asked M.Y. if anyone had “touched her down there.” Id.
at 120. M.Y. covered her mouth and said that she could not tell because
“Papaw Dick said she would be in trouble.” Id. After Mother reassured
M.Y. that she was not in trouble and that she had not done anything wrong,
M.Y. responded, “Yes, I did. I went like this.” Id. M.Y. moved her hand in
a back and forth motion as she told her Mother what she had done to Ferrin.
Mother immediately took M.Y. to St. Vincent’s hospital to be examined.
M.Y. was examined by Dr. Jason Little. Dr. Little noted that M.Y.
had minimal redness on her genital area, but that the exam was otherwise
normal. Dr. Little explained that such redness is usually attributable to
poor hygiene and that the exam did not reveal whether M.Y. had been
sexually abused.
Ferrin v. State, No. 49A05-0907-CR-429, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. January 12, 2010).
On July 23, 2008, the State charged Ferrin with two counts of child molesting as
class A felonies and two counts of child molesting as class C felonies. Id. at 3. On May
18, 2009, Ferrin’s jury trial commenced. Id. M.Y. testified that she touched Ferrin’s
“private” in his bedroom when his clothes were off. Id. M.Y. stated that she had both
hands on Ferrin’s “private” and that she rubbed it with an “up and down” motion. Id.
M.Y. explained that it was Ferrin’s idea to put lotion on her hand, and that she had
2
touched him this way more than once, including one time in the barn where he “peed” on
the rug. Id.
M.Y. further testified that she and Ferrin were not wearing clothes when his
“private” and finger touched her “little girl.” Id. In addition, neither of them was
wearing clothes when Ferrin had M.Y. put her finger inside his anus. Id. After each of
these incidents, Ferrin admonished M.Y. not to tell anyone. Id. Ferrin denied having any
sexual activity with M.Y., but admitted that he had touched her vagina and buttocks when
he applied diaper rash cream because she was red all of the time. Id.
After three to four hours of deliberating, the jury sent out a note stating, “A few of
the jurors have reasonable doubt and feel they will not [ ]/cannot . . . change their opinion
based on the evidence we have on all counts.” Id. at 4. Defense counsel requested that
the trial court ask the jury whether they were at an impasse, while the State urged the trial
court to instruct the jury to continue deliberations. Id. Over defense counsel’s objection,
the trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberations, but noted that at some point, if
a decision was not reached, it would have to ask the jury whether it was at an impasse.
Id. Less than an hour after the trial court had instructed the jury to continue deliberations,
the jury found Ferrin not guilty on Count I, but guilty on Counts II, III, and IV. Id.
At the June 4, 2009 sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded that Ferrin’s lack
of criminal history, his history of gainful employment, and his service in the National
Guard were mitigating circumstances. Id. In aggravation, the court observed that Ferrin
had violated a position of trust. Id. The court sentenced Ferrin to consecutive terms of
3
thirty years and four years on Counts II and III respectively, but did not enter judgment
on Count IV because of double jeopardy concerns. Id.
On direct appeal, Ferrin argued that the trial court abused its discretion by not
asking the jury if it was at an impasse. Id. at 2. Ferrin also challenged his thirty-year
sentence and argued that the trial court erroneously applied Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2(i) in
violation of the prohibitions against ex post facto laws contained in the United States and
Indiana Constitutions. Id. We rejected Ferrin’s argument that reversal was required by
the trial court’s failure to ask the jury if it was at an impasse and utilizing Indiana Jury
Rule 28 to assist the jury. Id. at 5. With respect to his sentence, we held that the trial
court erroneously believed it was required to sentence Ferrin to an executed term of thirty
years. Id. at 9. Accordingly, we remanded to give the trial court the opportunity to
resentence Ferrin on Count II. Id. at 9-10.
On April 30, 2010, Ferrin, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In
May 2012, Ferrin filed a motion to amend his petition, and the court granted the motion.
In August 2012, Ferrin filed another motion to amend his petition, and the court again
granted the motion. On September 20, 2012, the court held an evidentiary hearing, and
Ferrin’s appellate counsel and trial counsel testified. Ferrin did not testify nor did he
introduce the trial record or other exhibits. On September 24, 2012, the court denied
Ferrin’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DISCUSSION
Before discussing Ferrin’s allegations of error, we note that although Ferrin is
proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are
4
required to follow procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004), trans. denied. We also note the general standard under which we review a post-
conviction court’s denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner in a post-
conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Ind.
Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the
petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Fisher, 810
N.E.2d at 679. On review, we will not reverse the judgment unless the evidence as a
whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the
post-conviction court. Id. Further, the post-conviction court in this case entered findings
of fact and conclusions thereon in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6).
Id. “A post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a
showing of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. In this review, we accept findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous, but we accord no deference to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction
court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.
To the extent that Ferrin fails to put forth a cogent argument, cite to authority, or
cite to the record, we conclude that such arguments are waived. See, e.g., Cooper v.
State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 834 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (holding that the defendant’s contention was
waived because it was “supported neither by cogent argument nor citation to authority”);
Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 398 n.3 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the defendant waived
argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument); Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d
5
193, 202-203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives any issue raised on appeal
where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to
authority and portions of the record.”), trans. denied. We also observe that Ferrin did
not offer into evidence or ask the court to take judicial notice of the trial transcript, the
charging information, or other documents related to the trial record and therefore the trial
record was not before the court for consideration.1 See Mitchell v. State, 946 N.E.2d
640, 644-645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that Ind. Evid. Rule 201(b)(5)2 allows a post-
conviction court to judicially notice the transcript of the evidence from the petitioner’s
underlying criminal proceedings, and noting that the petitioner did not offer his trial
record into evidence at the post-conviction hearing or ask the post-conviction court to
take judicial notice of the record, that the court did not judicially notice the record sua
sponte, and that the trial record therefore was never before the post-conviction court for
consideration), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Ferrin appears to argue that Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 does not contain an element of
intent and is overbroad as it punishes protected activities such as natural childbirth or
“using a suppository on an infant.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Without citation to the
record, Ferrin argues that “[i]t is undisputed fact that the charging information failed to
allege criminal intent as an element of child molesting by deviate sexual conduct.” Id. at
12. The State argues that Ferrin has waived these claims.
1
At one point during the hearing, the post-conviction court stated: “Well, the [trial] record is not
in.” Transcript at 37. The court’s order states: “No exhibits were admitted at the evidentiary hearing.
Notably, the record of proceedings was not admitted. Ferrin’s failure to admit the record of proceedings
makes it difficult for the Court to review his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Appellant’s
Appendix at 85.
2
Ind. Evid. Rule 201(b) provides that “[a] court may take judicial notice of law. Law includes . .
. records of a court of this state . . . .”).
6
Ferrin did not raise these claims on direct appeal and does not allege that his trial
counsel or appellate counsel were ineffective on these bases. Consequently, we conclude
that Ferrin waived these claims. See Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 768 (Ind. 2007)
(holding that only issues not known at the time of the original trial or issues not available
on direct appeal may be properly raised through post-conviction proceedings); Sanders v.
State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002) (holding that in “post-conviction proceedings,
complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they
show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at
the time of trial or direct appeal” and that it is wrong to review the petitioner’s
fundamental error claim in a post-conviction proceeding); Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d
719, 726 (Ind. 2001) (holding that post-conviction procedures do not provide a petitioner
with a “super-appeal” or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial
court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct appeal), reh’g
denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S. Ct. 1082 (2002); Hough v. State, 690 N.E.2d
267, 275 (Ind. 1997) (holding that the petitioner’s argument that a statute was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him was waived because it was available but
not argued on direct appeal), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S. Ct. 550
(1998).
We will address Ferrin’s arguments to the extent that he raises issues within the
context of ineffective assistance. Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his counsel’s performance
was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Ben-
7
Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), reh’g denied), reh’g denied, cert. denied,
534 U.S. 830, 122 S. Ct. 73 (2001). We apply the same standard of review to claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as we apply to claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied,
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1128, 121 S. Ct. 886 (2001). A counsel’s performance is deficient
if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional
norms. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). To meet the appropriate test
for prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. Perez v. State, 748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind. 2001). “[L]ogic dictates that ‘a
verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.’” Hilliard v. State, 609
N.E.2d 1167, 1169-1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104
S. Ct. at 2069)). Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. French, 778
N.E.2d at 824. Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a
prejudice inquiry alone. Id.
When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a “strong
presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Morgan v. State, 755
N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2001). “[C]ounsel’s performance is presumed effective, and a
8
defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.”
Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind. 2002). Evidence of isolated poor strategy,
inexperience, or bad tactics will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1171, 117 S. Ct. 1438 (1997). “Reasonable strategy is not subject to judicial second
guesses.” Burr v. State, 492 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. 1986). We “will not lightly speculate
as to what may or may not have been an advantageous trial strategy as counsel should be
given deference in choosing a trial strategy which, at the time and under the
circumstances, seems best.” Whitener v. State, 696 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ind. 1998).
A. Trial Counsel
Ferrin appears to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to
move to have the charges severed prior to trial; (2) failing to request a mistrial when the
jury made a request of the court to allow several members of the jury to be allowed to call
home to make arrangements for child care; and (3) failing to present a video of the
interview of M.Y. or the child hearsay hearing.
1. Severance
Ferrin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to have the
four charges severed prior to trial. The State argues that “[s]ince Ferrin was acquitted of
Count I, and the trial court vacated the jury’s verdict on Count IV, only Count II and
Count III remain of consequence.” Appellee’s Brief at 15. The State contends that
Counts II and III were not joined solely on the grounds that they were of similar character
9
but argues that they involved the same victim and the same time period and were based
on a series of connected acts.
Two or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, with
each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses: “(1) are of the same or similar
character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same
conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme
or plan.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-9 (2004). “Whenever two (2) or more offenses have been
joined for trial in the same indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of
the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the
offenses.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-11(a) (2004). See also Brown v. State, 650 N.E.2d 304,
305-306 (Ind. 1995). “In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the
prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court determines that
severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence of each offense . . .” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-11(a). In doing so, the trial court is
to consider: (1) the number of offenses charged; (2) the complexity of the evidence to be
offered; and (3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply
the law intelligently as to each offense. Id.; Brown, 650 N.E.2d at 305-306.
Ferrin does not direct our attention to the post-conviction transcript to indicate that
he asked his trial counsel questions regarding severing the counts. The record does not
include the charging information, and, based upon this court’s opinion on direct appeal,
the charges involved actions that allegedly occurred between June 16, 2007, and June 15,
10
2008, and involved M.Y. Ferrin, slip op. at 3. We cannot say that Ferrin has
demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective on this basis.
2. Mistrial
Ferrin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial
when the jury made a request of the court to allow several members of the jury to be
allowed to call home to make arrangements for child care. He states that the jury sent a
third note asking the court to allow several jurors to call home to arrange for child care
and that “[t]his third note does not appear in the trial transcripts but Mr. Ferrin knows it
occurred.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. The State argues that Ferrin has provided insufficient
evidence to support his claim and that trial counsel requested a mistrial at one point
during the deliberations.
Ferrin did not testify at the post-conviction hearing regarding a third note nor did
he introduce the trial transcript into evidence. Trial counsel testified that she did not
recall or vaguely recalled that there were several jurors who needed to call home to make
arrangements for child care and did not recall whether the court allowed the jurors to call
home to make arrangements. Trial counsel also testified that she asked for a mistrial after
the court at one point sent the jury back to deliberate. Under the circumstances, we
cannot say that the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a
conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. See Tapia v. State, 753
N.E.2d 581, 588 n.10 (Ind. 2001) (“It is practically impossible to gauge the performance
of trial counsel without the trial record, as we have no way of knowing what questions
counsel asked, what objections he leveled, or what arguments he presented.”).
11
3. Failure to Present Evidence
Ferrin contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
credibility of the victim with the video of the interview of M.Y. or a video of the child
hearsay hearing. The State argues that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance
by making a strategic decision to exclude the forensic interview of M.Y. and that Ferrin
has not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s strategic decision was reasonable.
Ferrin did not introduce the trial transcript, the video of the interviews with the
victim, or the transcripts of the interviews. During direct examination, trial counsel
testified that she thought there were inconsistencies in the victim’s statements that were
significant enough to question the victim’s credibility, that in hindsight she believed it
was a mistake to move to suppress the tapes, and that she did not “recall the specific
details” and later stated “I really don’t remember specifically what accusations were
made when.” Transcript at 22, 25. When asked why she made a motion to exclude the
taped interview of the child, trial counsel stated: “At the time I thought that – I didn’t
think it would be beneficial to keep showing the jury, the child making accusations
against you.” Id. at 30. Trial counsel also stated: “It was a decision that I weighed
heavily at the time and I made the decision I did for the strategic reasons I described and
all I can say is if I had to do it over again, I would show the tape.” Id. at 32. Trial
counsel also stated: “I had strategic reasons for everything that I did or did not do at the
trial. But again hindsight being 20/20, there are some decisions I wish I had gone the
other way on, such as showing the videotape.” Id. at 40-41.
12
On cross-examination, trial counsel conceded that she was aware of the
discrepancies when she made the choice to move to exclude the videotapes of the
interviews and that she did not know whether playing the tape would have made a
difference. Trial counsel also indicated that the balancing was having a “little child
repeat the allegations three or four separate times, right and balancing that with the
potential benefit of having her – pointing out that she didn’t say exactly the same way
three different times.” Id. at 44. Again, we cannot say that the evidence as a whole
unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-
conviction court.
B. Appellate Counsel
Ferrin argues that his appellate counsel failed to argue that the trial court erred by
not implementing Jury Rule 28. Ferrin also alleges that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue that the evidence was insufficient.
The State argues that appellate counsel raised the issue regarding Jury Rule 28 and
that Ferrin’s mere conclusory assertion that appellate counsel could have argued the issue
better does not allow him to circumvent the rule of res judicata. The State also argues
that Ferrin has failed to show that appellate counsel’s strategic decision not to dispute the
sufficiency of the evidence was unreasonable and that such an issue was clearly stronger
than the two issues raised by appellate counsel.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fall into three categories: (1)
denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues well.
Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193-195 (Ind. 1997) (citing Lissa Griffin, The Right to
13
Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1994)), reh’g
denied, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S. Ct. 550 (1998). Ferrin raises a claim under
the second and third categories.
His appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred by not asking the jury if it
was at an impasse and utilizing Indiana Jury Rule 28 to assist the jurors, and highlighted
the fact that the jury returned a verdict thirty minutes after the trial court instructed the
jurors to continue deliberations. Ferrin, slip op. at 5-6. We cannot say that Ferrin has
sufficiently developed an argument that his appellate counsel failed to present the issue
well or has demonstrated that reversal is required on this basis.
With respect to appellate counsel’s failure to raise a sufficiency of the evidence
claim, we observe that to prevail on a claim about appellate counsel’s failure to raise an
issue, the first prong of the Strickland test requires Ferrin to show from the information
available in the trial record or otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate
counsel failed to present a significant and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be
explained by any reasonable strategy. Carter v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind.
2010). We “consider the totality of an attorney’s performance to determine whether the
client received constitutionally adequate assistance.” Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194. In
Bieghler, the Court approved the two-part test used by the Seventh Circuit to evaluate
these claims: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of
the record; and (2) whether the unraised issues are “clearly stronger” than the raised
issues. Id. (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)).
14
The following exchange occurred at the post-conviction hearing between Ferrin
and his appellate counsel:
Q. . . . [W]hy then if there was no evidence, did you not argue the
sufficiency of the evidence on my appeal?
A. Because the standard of review on sufficiency is the evidence most
favorable to conviction. In this circumstance, you had the alleged
victim testifying, which supported there was sufficient evidence.
You would have lost that argument on appeal. The only way I could
raise an argument is under incredible dubiosity, which is a pretty
weak sufficiency of the evidence argument.
Transcript at 10. Moreover, again, Ferrin did not introduce the transcript from the trial.
Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the evidence as a whole unerringly and
unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Ferrin’s
petition for post-conviction relief.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
15