Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 14 2013, 5:31 am
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
DONALD S. EDWARDS
Columbus, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DAROD A. WHEELER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 03A01-1212-CR-545
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Judge
Cause No. 03C01-1007-FB-1494
August 14, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Darod A. Wheeler appeals his sentence following the revocation of his probation.
Wheeler raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in
failing to award certain credit time in ordering Wheeler to serve a portion of his
previously suspended sentence. We remand with instructions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2011, Wheeler pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to two counts
of possession of a controlled substance as class C felonies. On February 28, 2011, the
trial court sentenced Wheeler to concurrent terms of five years on each count, all
suspended. The court further ordered Wheeler to probation for a period of four years,
effective immediately, and that Wheeler be placed with community corrections for a
period of one year, which may include work release or home detention. The court further
ordered that Wheeler be given “71 actual days credit . . . toward the sentence of
imprisonment for time spent in confinement as a result of these charges.” Appellant’s
Appendix at 38.
On April 25, 2012, the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging that
Wheeler violated the terms of his probation when he failed to complete substance abuse
treatment, failed to maintain full-time employment, failed to pay fees as ordered, drank
alcohol while on probation, was arrested for public intoxication, failed to complete
twenty-four hours of community service during the weeks he was not fully employed,
and failed to submit to three requested drug screens. Following a hearing on July 23,
2012, the court found that Wheeler violated the terms of his probation “by failing to
complete substance abuse treatment; failing to pay fees and costs; drank alcohol; was
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arrested and there was probable cause for his arrest for public intoxication and failing to
submit to three drug screens.” Id. at 63.
On November 13, 2012, the court held a hearing, near the end of the which the
court stated: “I’m going to order you serve three years on the balance of your sentence
and give you credit for . . . when were you picked up on this sir?” Transcript at 69.
Wheeler replied “Thursday,” and the court stated: “So that would be November 8th, so
that would . . . be five days of credit towards that.” Id. at 70. The court stated: “I didn’t
give you the . . . your full five years because you were successful for a while, so I’m not
going to give you all the time that you were initially were sentenced to, you know. But . .
. because I’m going to recognize that you were . . . you didn’t violate probation right
away.” Id. The following exchange then occurred:
Wheeler: Will I get time for the year house arrest and the time that I
served in jail before and then I got sentenced or any of that?
Court: Well, that’s what . . . I’m not giving you all that five years. If
I gave you all that five years, I’d be giving you credit for
every single day. But on this one, you served five days this
time. So, I’ve given you credit and the rest of the credit time
goes towards the suspended portion of your sentence, which
I’m not imposing on you. I’m not making you serve
everything. . . .
Id. at 71. In an order dated November 13, 2012, the court ordered that Wheeler serve
three years of his previously suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction
(the “DOC”) and gave Wheeler “credit for five (5) actual days (11/8/12 to 11/12/12).”
Appellant’s Appendix at 76. The order further provided: “The Court orders that the
balance of [Wheeler’s] credit time go towards the balance of his sentence not imposed.”
Id. Wheeler initiated this appeal.
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The State has not filed a brief but instead filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss and
Remand with this court stating in part that it “agrees that [Wheeler] is entitled to credit
time which he has earned, including the seventy-one days from his original sentence, the
five days served, and the time which he served on home detention.” Verified Motion to
Dismiss and Remand at 2. The State requests that we dismiss this appeal without
prejudice and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
DISCUSSION
The issue is whether the court erred in failing to award certain credit time in
ordering Wheeler to serve a portion of his previously suspended sentence. At the time
of Wheeler’s violation, Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) set forth a trial court’s sentencing
options if the trial court found a probation violation and provided:
If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before
termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the
probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following
sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without
modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more
than one (1) year beyond the original probationary
period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
(Currently found at Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)). The Indiana Supreme Court has held that
a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the
abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The
Court explained that “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation
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rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
proceed” and that “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were
scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation
to future defendants.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (citation
omitted). As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation
revocation hearing, “the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a
finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d
209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Wheeler contends that the balance of his credit time at the time the court reinstated
a portion of his suspended sentence “would be the 71 actual days credit given when the
original five (5) year sentence was imposed, . . . and the credit time earned . . . while on
Home Detention through Community Corrections placement.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.
He asserts that “[i]t is illogical that the credit time [he] earned while being placed on
Home Detention . . . with . . . Community Corrections . . . be applied toward a sentence
not imposed as a result of a revocation of probation.” Id. He further argues that his
“earned credit time post sentencing should logically be applied toward the sentence being
imposed as a result of a revocation of probation” and that he “is not only entitled to the
five (5) actual days credit (11/8/12 to 11/12/12) but also for the days credit earned while a
Community Corrections placement from the original sentencing date (2/18/11) through
the time he was discharged from Home Detention (9/16/11).” Id. at 9. In its motion to
dismiss, the State agrees that Wheeler is “entitled to credit time which he has earned,
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including the seventy-one days from his original sentence, the five days served, and the
time which he served on home detention.” Verified Motion to Dismiss and Remand at 2.
Wheeler essentially claims that credit for time served of seventy-one days and
good time credit for the days he was placed on home detention should be applied to
reduce the three-year commitment to the DOC ordered by the court.1 This court has held
that good time credit should be given for time spent in home detention as a condition of
probation. See Peterink v. State, 971 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), summarily
aff’d in relevant part, 982 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Ind. 2013). Further, a defendant is entitled
to credit for time served prior to sentencing if he or she is subjected to pretrial
confinement that is a result of the criminal charge for which sentence is being imposed.
See Hall v. State, 944 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The State
concedes that Wheeler should be given credit for time served, including the seventy-one
days from his original sentence, and good time credit for time spent on home detention.
The trial court, in ordering that a portion of Wheeler’s previously suspended
sentence be reinstated, should have determined the total number of years or days of the
previously suspended sentence which it intended to impose as an executed sentence and
then awarded Wheeler the credit time to which he is entitled, namely, credit for time
served and good time credit for the days he was placed on home detention. Specifically,
as acknowledged by the State, Wheeler’s credit for time served would consist of the
seventy-one days for confinement prior to the February 28, 2011 sentencing order and the
1
In Purcell v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court used the phrase “good time credit” to describe
“the additional credit a prisoner receives for good behavior and educational attainment” and the phrase
“credit for time served” to refer to “the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives for time actually
served.” 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999).
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five days for confinement prior to the reinstatement of a portion of his previously
suspended sentence as set forth in the November 13, 2012 order. In addition, Wheeler’s
good time credit would relate to the period of time Wheeler was placed on home
detention, which according to Wheeler was from February 18, 2011, through September
16, 2011.
We therefore deny the State’s motion to dismiss and remand to the trial court with
instructions to calculate the credit time to which Wheeler is entitled, including credit for
time served and good time credit for the days he was placed on home detention, and to
amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the credit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Wheeler is entitled to credit for time
served and good time credit for the days he was placed on home detention and remand for
a calculation of the credit time Wheeler should receive and an amendment of the abstract
of judgment to reflect the credit.
Remanded with instructions.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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Darod A. Wheeler v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion