Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 13 2013, 7:18 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CHARLES L. MARTIN D. CHAD JOHNSON
Martin & Martin Warrick County DCS
Boonville, Indiana Boonville, Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE
DCS Central Administration
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION )
OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP )
OF L.P., D.P., & C.H., (Minor Children), )
)
and )
)
J.P. (Mother), )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 87A05-1212-JT-622
)
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )
CHILD SERVICES, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE WARRICK COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Keith A. Meier, Judge
Cause Nos. 87D01-1106-JT-160
87D01-1106-JT-161
87D01-1106-JT-162
August 13, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issue
J.P. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to L.P.,
D.P., and C.H. (the “Children”).1 Mother presents one consolidated and restated issue on
appeal: whether there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental
rights. Concluding there was sufficient evidence, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2010, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed the
Children from Mother’s home following an allegation of Mother’s drug use in the presence
of the Children, and a subsequent drug test in which Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. All three children have been living in
foster care since being removed from Mother’s home. At a hearing, Mother admitted to the
allegations in the Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition, and the Children were
determined to be CHINS. In May 2010, DCS was ordered to supervise visitation between
1
Mother has one other, older child who was not the subject of this termination or the underlying Child
in Need of Services case. Additionally, neither the father of L.P. and D.P., nor the father of C.H., participate in
this appeal; both fathers voluntarily relinquished their respective parental rights to the Children.
2
Mother and the Children, and Mother was ordered to participate in various treatment
programs and services, including random drug screens, completing mental health therapy,
cooperating with DCS, and participating in supervised visitation.
In July 2010, the trial court conducted a review hearing and found that Mother had
partially cooperated with DCS and ordered Mother to participate in random drug screens and
complete recommended treatment. In November 2010, at a permanency hearing, the trial
court found that Mother was making progress with mental health treatment but she continued
to test positive for drugs.2 In April 2011, at a review hearing, the court found that Mother
had completed a substance abuse treatment program, but that Mother was not submitting to
drug screens and the court declined to allow Mother unsupervised visitation until she had a
series of clean drug screens.
In June 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the
Children. In September 2011, at a review hearing, the court again ordered Mother to
participate in drug screens. The court also ordered the Court Appointed Special Advocate
(“CASA”) to make unannounced visits during Mother’s visitation time with the Children and
to report on her findings.
In December 2011, the trial court approved a plan to terminate parental rights and
found that Mother continued to test positive for drugs and that she was still under supervised
visitation with the Children. In July 2012, DCS filed an amended petition to terminate
parental rights. Following a fact finding hearing in September 2012, the court issued
2
Aside from the initial drug test when the Children were removed from Mother’s home, all of
Mother’s subsequent positive drug tests were positive only for marijuana.
3
findings of fact and conclusions of law in November 2012 and ordered that Mother’s parental
rights be terminated as to the Children. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be
supplied as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment terminating
parental rights, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In
re D.J., 755 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. We consider only the
evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
When reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which a termination of
parental rights is premised, we engage in a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine
whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the
judgment. Id. We will reverse only upon a showing of clear error. Id. A finding is clearly
erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it. In re A.J.,
877 N.E.2d 805, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. A judgment is clearly erroneous
only if the findings of fact do not support the trial court’s conclusions thereon, or the
conclusions thereon do not support the judgment. Id.
In evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination, the court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. R.G. v. Marion Cnty. Office,
Dep’t of Family & Children, 647 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.
Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical
4
development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly
harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired
before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
To determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a
child’s continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge
a parent’s fitness to care for her children at the time of the termination hearing and take into
consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also evaluate the parent’s habitual
patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.
Id.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In order for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated, DCS needed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable
efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required,
including a description of the court’s finding, the date of the finding,
and the manner in which the finding was made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the
supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen
(15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with
the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in
the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of
the parents will not be remedied.
5
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-
child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a
child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
Mother contests the trial court’s conclusions that: the conditions that resulted in the
Children’s removal will not be remedied; the continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the Children; and that termination is in the best interests of the Children.
Mother also, very briefly, argues that DCS does not have a satisfactory plan in place for the
Children. Mother’s overall argument focuses on the fact that, while she tested positive for
methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana at the time of the removal, she has since
only tested positive for marijuana. She also indicates that her marijuana use was the sole
factor that led to the termination of her parental rights. On the contrary, the trial court listed
facts beyond her drug use, and in our review of this case we determine that the record
supports the trial court’s findings and those findings support the trial court’s termination of
Mother’s parental rights.
The trial court here produced lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law. Some
of the relevant facts found by the trial court, and supported by the record, include the
following: there has been prior DCS involvement with Mother and the Children, including a
substantiated allegation that Mother punched her five-year-old daughter in the face in 2004,
an investigation regarding lack of supervision in 2004, and a substantiated lack of
supervision in 2005; in the current case, following the removal of the Children, Mother
6
submitted to DCS a drug screen report on which the date had been altered, Mother failed to
contact DCS following removal of the Children, and Mother failed to provide clothing and
medication for the Children after they were removed; an addictions assessment in May 2010
noted a good prognosis if Mother abstained from drug use; between April 2010 and February
2011 Mother failed to submit to regular drug screens; Mother testified to completing a
substance abuse program but the facility had no record of a patient by Mother’s name;
Mother admitted that she continued to use marijuana, and tested positive as recently as June
and July 2012, on dates coinciding with her weekly supervised visits with the Children; after
initial treatment, which was followed by marijuana use, Mother did not initiate individual
therapy for herself; Mother admitted that DCS had repeatedly communicated to her the
importance of her sobriety; the Children were in her care and custody when she was under
the influence of marijuana; Mother has not participated in school conferences; Mother has
been non-compliant with services, treats the Children as adults, and fails to set boundaries;
two of the children are in a foster home together, and the third child is in a separate
therapeutic foster home as a result of several medical conditions and destructive behavior;
Mother was not aware of all of the Children’s diagnoses until the day of the fact finding
hearing; Mother did not exercise all of her visitations with the Children and her visits were
not consistent; during a period where visitations were at Mother’s home, Mother failed to
provide meaningful interaction, discipline, or structure; Mother’s visits were moved to DCS
in October 2011 and that remained unchanged; Mother never progressed beyond supervised
visits in thirty months, and at the time of the hearing was visiting the Children for one hour
7
per week; several problems were noted with the visits and Mother’s interactions with the
Children, including a need for the Family Case Manager to intervene at least once during
each visit; if the Children were returned to Mother, her continued drug use could result in
future criminal liability and another removal of the Children; and both the Family Case
Manager and the CASA believe it is in the Children’s best interest for parental rights to be
terminated.
Mother does not contest any of the specific findings of the trial court, but instead
argues that the court’s judgment is not supported by the findings. We disagree. As for her
drug use, Mother cites to In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), but apparently
fails to realize that in J.L. we affirmed the determination that the child was a CHINS where
the mother used drugs while the child was asleep but nonetheless in her care and custody.
Similarly, the court here found that Mother was under the influence of marijuana while the
Children were in her care and custody, and that she had recently tested positive in a drug
screen coinciding with her visitation with the Children. In addition to Mother’s continued
drug use, the court found numerous facts relating to Mother’s visits with the Children and her
inability to appropriately interact with or parent them. In total, the court’s findings support
the conclusion that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal would not be remedied
and/or that continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to the Children.3
3
Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, the court needed only to find that one subsection of
Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) was met. The court found that both (i) and (ii) were met. Because
only one subsection is necessary, we do not distinguish between the two here, but hold that there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding on at least one of the subsections.
8
As for the best interests of the child factor, while the Children here have stated that
they wish to go back to Mother’s home, that is not unexpected and not the determining factor.
The court’s findings as noted above also support the trial court’s conclusion that termination
would be in the best interest of the Children. In particular, the court’s conclusion is
supported by fact that both the Family Case Manager and the CASA believed that
termination was in the Children’s best interests. See In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he recommendations of a child’s caseworker and [guardian ad litem]
that parental rights should be terminated support a finding that termination is in the child’s
best interests.”).
Finally, while Mother does not make much of an argument as for why DCS’s plan for
the Children is not satisfactory, she does mention that no adoptive parents have already been
approved by DCS. However, the plan for the Children here is adoption, and we have noted
previously that adoption is a generally satisfactory plan. Castro v. State Office of Family &
Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 373 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
Conclusion
Concluding there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s termination of
Mother’s parental rights as to the Children, we affirm.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
9
Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of L.P., D.P., & C.H. (Minor Children), and J.P. (Mother) v. The Indiana Dept. of Child Services
Combined Opinion