NO. COA14-122
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 2 September 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Vance County
No. 12CRS052725-26
DONTE MACON,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from Judgment entered on or about 10
July 2013 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Superior Court, Vance
County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 August 2014.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Jonathan Shaw, for the State.
Wait Law, P.L.L.C., by John L. Wait, for defendant-
appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
Donte Macon (“defendant”) appeals from the judgment entered
after a Vance County jury found him guilty of carrying a
concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a felon.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting in-
court identifications by two police officers whose testimony was
tainted by impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification
procedures. We hold that the trial court did not err by
admitting the in-court identifications.
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I. Background
On 8 October 2012, defendant was indicted for carrying a
concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a felon.
Defendant pled not guilty. Before trial, defendant moved to
suppress both the in-court and out-of-court identifications of
him by Officer D.L. Ragland and Sergeant J. Ragland. He argued
that the officers violated the Eyewitness Identification Reform
Act (EIRA) and his constitutional rights by viewing only a
single photograph to identify defendant as the perpetrator.
By order entered 11 July 2013, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. Based on the uncontested
findings of fact, around noon on a sunny 31 August 2012, Officer
Darryl Ragland and Sergeant Jamie Ragland of the Henderson
Police Department were on patrol when they saw a green Honda
parked behind a convenience store. When they returned to the
convenience store thirty minutes later, the same green Honda was
still parked in the same location. Based on their experience
with drug transactions in this area, they suspected that the
occupants were engaging in the sale of heroin, so they
approached the vehicle to make an investigatory stop. They saw
one person sitting on the driver’s side of the Honda when a
person with dreadlocks got into the passenger’s side. As the
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officers approached, the Honda pulled off, drove a short
distance, then stopped. The passenger got out of the Honda and
looked directly at Officer Ragland. Officer Ragland had an
unobstructed view of the passenger’s face from about 10 feet
away. He noticed that the passenger was a light-skinned black
male with long dreadlocks and green eyes. The passenger took off
running, so Officer Ragland followed him. Officer Ragland asked
the passenger to stop, but he refused. During the pursuit, the
passenger discarded an object before jumping over a fence.
Sergeant Ragland noticed that the passenger was running
away but did not initially get a good look at him. Sergeant
Ragland got back into his police car to try to cut off the
fleeing passenger. As the passenger jumped over a fence,
Sergeant Ragland saw him from about 5 to 7 yards away. He had an
unobstructed view of the fleeing man, who then climbed another
fence and escaped. The officers could not catch him.
Two more officers arrived on scene, including Officer
Burrell. Officer Ragland told Officer Burrell what he had seen
and described the passenger. Officer Burrell said that the
person he described “sounds like Donte Macon.” Officer Ragland
and Sgt. Ragland then returned to the Henderson Police
Department and entered the name “Donte Macon” into their RMS
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database. When the system returned a photograph of defendant,
Sgt. Ragland said, “That’s him.” Both Officer Ragland and
Sergeant Ragland recognized the person in the photograph as the
passenger who fled from the green Honda. The officers then
pulled up another photograph of defendant and confirmed that he
was the man they saw earlier. At the hearing, both officers
“identified the defendant in open Court as the person they saw
on August 31, 2012 with 100% certainty.”
Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that the
EIRA did not apply here and that the procedure used to identify
defendant was not unduly suggestive. The trial court further
concluded that the in-court identifications made by both
officers were “of independent origin” from the procedure used to
identify defendant. Therefore, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress.
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show the facts as
found by the trial court. Additionally, Officer Ragland
testified that he looked on the ground where defendant had
discarded the object during the chase and found a small caliber
handgun. Officer Ragland picked it up with a leaf and brought it
back to the police department’s evidence locker. Both officers
testified, over objection, that defendant was the person they
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saw fleeing on 31 August 2012. The police tested the recovered
firearm for fingerprints, but were unable to find any prints
sufficient for testing. The State also introduced evidence of
defendant’s prior felony conviction.
After the State rested its case-in-chief, defendant
testified on his own behalf. He denied that he was at the
convenience store on 31 August 2012 and denied possessing a
firearm of any kind. He testified that on the day in question
he was with his “baby’s mother” at her house in Henderson.
Defendant stated that he was aware that, as a felon, he was not
allowed to possess firearms, so he stayed away from them.
The jury found defendant guilty of both charges. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 14-26 months imprisonment.
Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Motion to Suppress
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the in-court identifications made by the
officers because the procedure they used to identify him
violated the EIRA and his constitutional due process rights. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
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“This Court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a motion
to suppress in a criminal proceeding is strictly limited to a
determination of whether the court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and in
turn, whether those findings support the court’s conclusions of
law.” State v. Boozer, 210 N.C. App. 371, 378, 707 S.E.2d 756,
763 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. rev.
denied, ___ N.C. ___, 720 S.E.2d 667 (2012). “However, when, as
here, the trial court’s findings of fact are not challenged on
appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence
and are binding on appeal.” State v. Robinson, ___ N.C. App.
___, ___, 727 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2012) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). We review questions of statutory interpretation
de novo. Johnson v. Robertson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 742
S.E.2d 603, 605 (2013).
B. North Carolina Eyewitness Identification Reform Act
Defendant argues that the police failed to abide by the
lineup procedures required by the EIRA, codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-284.52 (2011). The State counters, and the trial
court concluded, that the EIRA does not apply here. At the
hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the State argued that
the EIRA did not apply because the use of a single photograph to
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identify a suspect is not a “photo lineup,” and that,
furthermore, it does not apply to identifications made by police
officers in the course of their investigation. We agree that
the identification based on two photographs here was not a
“lineup” and, therefore, was not subject to the procedures
outlined in the EIRA.
The trial court made the following findings of fact, none
of which are challenged by defendant:
6. That on August 31, 2012 Detective
Darryl L. Ragland and Sgt. Jamie Ragland
were on routine patrol as police officers
with the City of Henderson Police Department
assigned to the narcotics unit.
7. That Darryl Ragland has been employed
with the Henderson Police Department for 3
years and seven months and was so employed
on August 31, 2012.
8. That Jamie Ragland was employed with
the City of Henderson Police Department for
21 years and was so employed August 31,
2012.
9. That as the officers were driving an
unmarked police vehicle in the City of
Henderson on August 31, 2012, they noticed a
green Honda motor vehicle with a person on
the driver’s side parked behind Alex Market
Store at the corner of Maple Street and
Nicholas Street in Henderson.
10. That as the officers continued on
patrol they drove by the Alex Market and
noticed that the green Honda remained parked
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behind the market for a period of thirty
minutes.
11. That this was suggestive of drug
activity (sale of heroin) to the officers.
12. That the officers drove up behind the
green Honda to initiate an investigative
stop.
13. That it was approximately 12 noon with
bright sunlight when the officers drove up
behind the Honda.
14. That the officers viewed a person enter
the passenger side of the Honda.
15. That there was a person sitting on the
driver[’s] side[] of the green Honda.
16. That Officer D. L. Ragland and Sgt.
Ragland noted that the person getting into
the Honda had dread locks.
17. That the Honda pulled off as the
officers approached, went a short way and
then stopped.
18. That the passenger got out of the
Honda.
19. That Officer Darryl Ragland got out of
the unmarked police vehicle.
20. That the passenger then looked directly
at Officer Ragland.
21. That at this point, Officer Darryl
Ragland had an unobstructed view of the
passenger and most specifically the
passenger’s face.
22. That Officer Darryl Ragland was 10 feet
from the passenger when he saw his face.
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23. That from this face to face between
Officer D. L. Ragland and the passenger,
Officer[] Ragland noticed that the passenger
was an African-American male, light skinned,
long dreads and green eyes.
24. That Officer Darryl Ragland did not
know the passenger before this time.
25. That the passenger began running.
26. That Officer Darryl Ragland asked the
fleeing man to stop.
27. That Officer Darryl Ragland pursued the
fleeing man who did not stop.
28. That during the pursuit, Officer D. L.
Ragland saw the fleeing man discard an
object before he jumped over a fence.
29. That Officer D. L. Ragland stopped his
pursuit and discovered a small caliber
handgun which had been discarded by the
fleeing passenger.
30. That until the passenger ran, Sgt.
James J. “Jamie” Ragland saw no interaction
between Officer Darryl Ragland and the
exiting passenger as he focused on the
person on the driver’s side of the green
Honda.
31. That at the point in time when Sgt.
Ragland noticed that Officer Darryl Ragland
began to chase the fleeing passenger, Sgt.
Ragland noted only that the passenger was an
African-American male with light skin and
dreads.
32. That Sgt. Ragland tried to follow the
chase by car in hopes of being able to cut
off the fleeing passenger.
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33. That as Sgt. Ragland drove he could see
the chase behind houses that faced Nicholas
Street.
34. That Sgt. Ragland saw that the fleeing
passenger was coming upon a fence and drove
his car behind a house in an effort to
apprehend the passenger.
35. That as the passenger came over a fence
. . . he turned around.
36. That Sgt. Ragland had a clear
unobstructed view of the fleeing passenger
who looked straight at him.
37. That Sgt. Ragland was about 5 to 7
yards from the fleeing passenger.
38. That Sgt. Ragland noted that the
fleeing passenger was an African-American
male with light skin and dreads.
39. That the fleeing passenger was able to
climb another fence and escaped.
40. That other Henderson Police Officers
Sgt. Collier and Officer Burrell arrived on
the scene.
41. That Officer D. L. Ragland reported to
Sgt. Collier and Officer Burrell what had
occurred together with a description of the
person who fled.
42. That Officer Burrell said that he
sounds like Donte Macon.
43. That both Sgt. Ragland and Detective
Ragland went directly to the Henderson
Police Department and entered the name of
Donte Macon into the automated RMS system.
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44. That when a photograph of Donte Macon
was pulled up on the screen, Sgt. Ragland
said “That’s him.”
45. That both Detective Ragland and Sgt.
Ragland immediately recognized that the
person in the photo was the same person who
fled from Alex’s Market.
46. That this identification occurred
within 10 to 15 minutes of the encounter
with the fleeing passenger at Alex’s Market.
47. That another photo of Donte Macon was
provided by the RMS system.
48. That this photo of Donte Macon was also
identified by both Officers as the person
who fled from Alex’s Market.
49. That D. L. Ragland identified the
defendant, Donte Macon, as the person who
fled the area behind Alex’s Market, as the
person who he chased and as the person who
discarded a handgun on August 31, 2012.
50. That Jamie Ragland identified the
defendant, Donte Macon, as the person he saw
coming over a fence and who escaped on
August 31, 2012.
51. That both Officer Ragland and Sgt.
Ragland identified the defendant in open
Court as the person they saw on August 31,
2012 with 100% certainty.
In general, out-of-court eyewitness identifications can be
classified as “lineups,” “photographic identifications,” or
“showups.” See generally, Wayne R. LaFave, et. al., Criminal
Procedure §§ 7.4(d), (e), (f) (3d ed. 2007). Other commentators
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distinguish between three types of out-of-court identifications:
live lineups, photo lineups, and showups. See Robert L. Farb,
Arrest, Search , and Investigation in North Carolina 558 (4th
ed. 2011). The EIRA defines a lineup as either a live lineup or
a photo lineup. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284.52(a). Both types of
lineups under the EIRA are defined by the use of a number of
subjects—one suspect and several “fillers.” The statute defines
“photo lineup” as “[a] procedure in which an array of
photographs is displayed to an eyewitness for the purpose of
determining if the eyewitness is able to identify the
perpetrator of a crime.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284.52(a)(7). It
requires lineups to be conducted by an independent administrator
and specifies the procedure for picking the fillers, among a
number of other quite specific procedures for administering the
lineup. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284.52(b).
Interpreted broadly, these provisions could be read to
prohibit all showups, an effect we have held the Legislature did
not intend. State v. Rawls, 207 N.C. App. 415, 423, 700 S.E.2d
112, 118 (2010). Similarly, these provisions could be read to
prohibit any use of photographs to make an identification other
than in a photo array.
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We hold that the EIRA does not apply to such single-
photograph identifications because they are not lineups. The use
of a single photograph (or two photographs of the same person,
as here) to make an identification has been criticized as
“highly suggestive.” LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 7.4(e). The
same is true of showups. See State v. Turner, 305 N.C. 356, 364,
289 S.E.2d 368, 373 (1982)
(describing showups as “suggestive and unnecessary”).
Nevertheless, we held in Rawls that there was no indication that
the Legislature intended the EIRA to ban showups, and the
Legislature has not since amended the statute to indicate
otherwise. Rawls, 207 N.C. App. at 423, 700 S.E.2d at 118.
The procedure used here might be called a photographic
showup; it has similar benefits and suffers from similar
weaknesses as a live showup, in which the witness is confronted
with a single suspect, often in handcuffs or otherwise detained.
Compare Turner, 305 N.C. at 364, 289 S.E.2d at 373 (describing
showups as “the practice of showing suspects singly to witnesses
for purposes of identification”) with LaFave, Criminal Procedure
§ 7.4(e) n. 85-86 (collecting cases that describe various uses
of a single photograph to make an identification, many of which
criticize the practice as “suggestive”). In both cases, only a
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small number of suspects were presented to the witness (three in
Rawls, one here) a short time after the crime was committed.
As we noted in Rawls, our Supreme Court has recognized the
benefits of the showup as an investigative technique. Rawls, 207
N.C. App. at 422, 700 S.E.2d at 117. We observed in Rawls that
“the showup is a much less restrictive means of determining, at
the earliest stages of the investigation process, whether a
suspect is indeed the perpetrator of a crime, allowing an
innocent person to be released with little delay and with
minimal involvement with the criminal justice system.” Id.
(citations, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
Like a live showup, the photographic showup here was done
promptly after the officers saw the passenger flee, while their
memory of the incident was still fresh. Even more than a live
showup, the technique used by police here allowed them to
determine at an early stage of their investigation whether the
lead they received from a fellow officer was worth pursuing. We
do not believe that the Legislature intended to prevent police
officers from consulting with a photograph in their database to
follow up on leads they are given by other officers. Therefore,
we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the EIRA
does not apply here.
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C. Impermissibly Suggestive Identification Procedure
Even if the EIRA does not apply, the normal due process
rules still do. Defendant argues in the alternative that the
procedure employed here was impermissibly suggestive. We hold
that even assuming the procedure was impermissibly suggestive,
the officers’ in-court identification was admissible because it
was based on an independent source.
The trial court found that Officer Ragland was “10 feet
from the passenger when he saw his face.” The passenger “looked
directly at Officer Ragland.” Sgt. Ragland “had a clear
unobstructed view of the fleeing passenger who looked straight
at him[,]” from “about 5 to 7 yards” away. Given that both
officers had a clear and unobstructed view of the suspect, the
trial court concluded that “the in-court identification of the
accused by Officer Darryl Ragland and by Sgt. Jamie Ragland is
of independent origin.” Defendant does not challenge this
conclusion.
Even assuming the out-of-court identification procedure was
impermissibly suggestive, the officers’ in-court identifications
would still be admissible if those in-court identifications had
an origin independent of the impermissible procedure. State v.
Knight, 282 N.C. 220, 226, 192 S.E.2d 283, 287 (1972); State v.
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Jordan, 49 N.C. App. 561, 566, 272 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1980); State
v. Pulley, 180 N.C. App. 54, 64-65, 636 S.E.2d 231, 239 (2006),
disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 574, 651 S.E.2d 375 (2007). Since
the trial court concluded that the in-court identifications had
an “independent origin,” and “were not tainted by any pretrial
identification procedure,” and defendant does not challenge that
conclusion, we must hold that the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion to suppress the in-court
identifications. See Jordan, 49 N.C. App. at 566, 272 S.E.2d at
409.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did
not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress and admitting
the in-court identifications.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge MCGEE and Judge BRYANT concur.